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ABSTRACT 
THE REPUBLICAN CHARACTER OFISLAMISMIN TURKEY FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF 'THE POLITICAL' 
Menderes ÇINAR 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Associate Professor Ümit CIZRE-SAKALLIOGLU 
December 1998 
This dissertation is an exploratory research that critically reviews the 
existing approaches to Islamism so as to evaluate their suitability and 
effectiveness and to suggest an altemative framework to approach Islamism. 
Islamism is primarily a political movement about the fundamentals of the 
society rather than a religious movement. Studying Islamismin terms of its 
religiosity, in terms of its modernity and in terms of its different 
civilizational outlook is not explanatory as far as its political aspects are 
concemed. Therefore, Islamism could be better comprehended if studied on 
political grounds and in relation to the context within which it emerges. This 
dissertation considers Islamism not in terms of its substance, which is 
Islamisation, but in terms of its alternative structuration of politics and in 
terms of its vision of state society relationship. The definition of concept of 
"the political" is central part of the alternative framework. A structuration of 
political sphere is determined by the underlying mode of societal 
integration. Although mixtures are possible, there are basically two modes 
of integration: liberal and republican. When viewed from this perspective it 
becomes apparent that the National Outlook Movement' s Islamİst 
opposition to Kemalist Westernization is accompanied by a gramınatical 
similarity, i.e. the structuration of the legitimate sphere of politics. Despite 
their substantive differences, both Kemalism and Islamism resemble each 
lV 
other grammatically and, as far as their structuration(s) of politics 
concerned, belong to the same family of republicanism. 
Keywords: Islamism, Kemalism, Republicanism, The National Outlook. 
V 
ÖZET 
'SİYASAL OLAN' AÇISINDAN TÜRKİYE'DEKi İSLAMCILICIN 
CUMHURiYETÇi KARAKTERi 
Menderes ÇINAR 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ümit CIZRE-SAKALLIOGLU 
Aralık 1998 
Bu çalışma İslamcılığa yeni bir yaklaşım çerçevesi önermek amacıyla halen 
mevcut olan yaklaşımların uygunluğunu ve yeterliliğini eleştirel bir biçimde 
gözden geçirmektedir. Islamcılık bir dini hareket değil, toplumun temelleri 
hakkında siyasal bir harekettir. Islamcılığı diniliği, modemiteyle ilişkisi veya 
onun farklı olan medeniyetçi bakış açısı bağlamında incelemek, Islamcılığın 
siyasi yönlerini yeteri kadar ortaya çıkaran bir yöntem değildir. Bu nedenle, 
Islamcılık içinde ortaya çıktığı bağlamla ilişkili olarak ve siyasal bir zemin 
üzerinde daha sağlıklı değerlenirilebilir. Bu tez Islamcılığı onun içeriği ile 
değil, ki bu Islamlaştırmadır, onun alternatif devlet-toplum ilişkisi vizyonu 
ve siyaseti yapılandırması temelinde değerlendirmektedir. Nelerin "siyasal" 
olarak tanımlan(ma)dığı sorusu önerilen alternatif çerçevenin merkezi bir 
unsurudur. Siyasal alanın yapılandırılmasında varsayılan sosyal 
entegrasyon modeli belirleyicidir. Karışımlar mümkün olsa da, liberal ve 
cumhuriyetci olmak üzere iki temel sosyal entegrasyon modeli vardır.Bu 
açıdan bakıldığında, Milli Görüş Hareketi'nin Kemalist Batılılaşmayakarşı 
olan Islamcı muhalefeti aslında gramer olarak, yani meşru siyasal alanın 
yapılandırılması bakımından, bir benzerliği de göstermektedir. İçeriksel 
farklılıklarına rağmen, Kemalism ve Islamcılık siyasal gramer olarak 
birbirlerine benzemekte ve siyasal anlayışı olarak her ikisi de 
cumhuriyetçilik ailesinden gelmektedirler. 
VI 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Islamcılık, Kemalism, Cumhuriyetçilik, Milli Görüş 
Hareketi. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For almost thirty years the National Outlook Movement (Milli Gorus 
Hareketi) has been an actor on the Turkish political stage. Itappeared with 
the National Order Party in January 1970, which was closed down by the 
Constitutional Court in 1971. The National Salvation Partyas the successor, 
was founded in October 1972. After the coup of 1980, the National Salvation 
party was closed down along with all other political parties and the W elfare 
Party (WP) was founded in July 1983. Since its inception in 1970 until the 
mid-1990s the National Outlook Movement, or more accurately its parties, 
have been considered as "fringe" parties. In the mid-1990s, the Welfare Party 
has become a major actor on the Turkish political stage by steadily 
increasing its votes. In the 1994 local elections, the W elfare Party's 
candidates were elected as mayors of many of the cities, including Ankara 
and Istanbul, the symbols of Turkish modernization. In the general elections 
of December 1995, the party increased its votes by almost 2 percent and 
received 21.38 of the total votes cast, which allowed it to have the plurality 
of the seats in the parliament. Thanks to this plurality of seats, 158 deputies, 
the party formeda majority coalition with the True Path Party in June 1996 
and the "charismatic" leader of the movement, Necmettin Erbakan, became 
prime minister. Although Erbakan as the key figure of the National Outlook 
Mavement had formed coalition governments with the Republican Peoples 
Party and with the Justice Party and the Nationalİst Action Party in the 
1970s, this last coalition was different in that it made an Islamİst leader a 
primeminister for the first time in the history of the secular Republic. 
Can the rise of the WP be interpreted as the failure of the Kemalist 
Westernization? W as the increase in the number of votes for the W elfare 
Party an indicator of the reassertion of "Islamic periphery" vis a vis the 
secular center? Is it possible to consider the rise of the mavement in terms of 
a center-periphery cleavage or modern-traditional dichotomy by employing 
a modernization paradigm? How can we comprehend the National Outlook 
better? Is focusing on its Islamic aspects adequate for a better understanding 
of the movement? 
This study is an exploratory research that critically reviews the existing 
approaches to Islamism to evaluate their suitability and effectiveness and to 
suggest an alternative framework/perspective to approach, understand and 
analyze Islamism in terms of the parameters the above questions provide. 
The alternative framework of analysis is by no means an invention but an 
introduction of the primacy of political sp here/ structuration as the proper 
focus of attention. Structuration(s) of political sphere in turn are determined 
to a large extent by the mode(s) of integration of society. Relatedly, 
similarities and differences between different political alternatives are 
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determined by the underlying mode of integration of society. Although 
mixtures are possible, there are mainly two basic modes of integration: 
republican and liberal. Islamism, this study postulates, is better understood 
if it is "contextualised," i.e. analyzed in relation to the political 
context/ configuration within which it emerges and with respect to i ts 
impact on dominant power relations. An analysis of the cantext with respect 
to the political structuration is necessary for this reason. This study, 
therefore, is not a study of Kemalism. But Kemalist structuration of Turkish 
politics ~s studied because only then we could have a better understanding 
of the political aspects of Islamist National Outlook Movement. 
An alternative framework will be suggested because the existing 
accountings for Islamism are found to be unsatisfactory. In chapter one, an 
attempt has been made first to elaborate what Islamism means and then to 
review critically some of the accounts for Islamism in the literature. The 
discussion throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout this study, is 
informed by a consideration of Islamism as a political rather than a religious 
movement, which should be assessed in terms of its politics rather than 
religiosity, that is, in terms of i ts positioning vis a vis the dominant power 
relations and vis a visthe society. Various explanations of Islamism are 
criticized on the basis of the deterministic links they build between Islamism 
and criticisms of modernity, the perceived failures of modernization and an 
essentialist canception of "Muslim society." 
3 lıKlkent Ur,ıversıty Library 
Analyses of Islamism on the basis of a 11COnservative Muslim reaction11 are 
criticized in this dissertation, because of their essentialist portrayal of Islamic 
culture as a preindustrial defensive culture that could not be an agent of 
change and that could only react to modernizing regimes so as to conserve 
the Islamic status quo. As such, this account is misleading, for it misses the 
modernizing aspects of Islamism by building a direct relation between Islam 
and Islamism. Similarly, in this perspective Islamism is explained in terms of 
Islam. It provides us only with two options: either submergence of Islam as a 
preindustrial-defensive culture for the sake of modernization or resurgence 
of Islam(ism) as a ll gr ass roots" movement. It misleadingly assumes that 
there is a culturally homogenous Muslim society whose politics and culture 
are determined by an essentialist definition of Islam. 
Explaining the rise ofIslamismin terms of failures of modernization, on the 
other hand, assumes that Islam, which is essentially a political rival to 
modernizing regimes and therefore, has been forced to submerge, has 
resurged as a result of the failures of modernization in delivering its 
promised goods. As such, modernization is associated with the effective 
administration of society and failures of it are deduced by the llresurgence" 
of Islamism. What is adequate for ll solving" the problem of Islamism is more 
modernization. Yet, whether or not socio-economic modernization 
determines the political outcomes is an important question that has to be 
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tackled. Similarly, whether the legitimacy of modernizing states is based 
only on their "performance" in material development is a crucial question. 
For some, modernization fails because the modernizing state is culturally 
alienated from the society and cannot legitimize its own modernization 
drive. By implication, Islamism could be regarded as the reassertion of 
Muslim society vis a vis the alienated s ta te. What is assumed in this 
perspective is that modern societies are culturally homogenous entities. This 
is an assumption that will be carefully examined in this study along with 
other major concerns. 
Other explanations of Islamism on the basis of postmodern deconstruction 
of modernity or on the basis of globalization(s) are no less deterministicin 
the links they establish between the rise of Islamism and 
postmodernismi globalization. Globalization as postmodem consumerism 
could actually be considered as an extension of the explanation of the rise of 
Islamism as a conservative reaction - a fundamentalist-religious movement-
of Muslim society to modernization. What is different this time is the object 
of reaction which is conceived as postmodernization rather than 
modernization. Similarly, globalization as neo-liberalism, as will be shown 
in the first chapter, shares the same logicwith the delivery failures 
perspective of the modemization paradigm. Postmodernism also allows for 
the possibilities of non-Western ways of modernization. It thereby triggers 
off a trend that renders Westernizing authoritarian regimes illegitimate. 
5 
However, the question that remains is, whether the legitimacy of the 
Westernizing regimes can be linked solely to Eurocentric definitions of 
modernity. 
This study takes Islamism as both an alternative modernizingmovement 
anda politicalmovement about the fundamentals of society. In the former 
aspect, Islamism represents a challenge to the West and Westernizing 
regimes. In this respect, Islamism is both a modern and modernizing 
movement. But, modernity of Islamism tells us little about the political 
aspects of the movement, because not all modern(izing) regimes or 
movements are democratic-plural. In most studies of Islamism while its 
relationship vis a vis the Westernizing regimes or Islam is explained, its 
relationship to society and the political structures within which it emerges is 
by-passed. In other words, Islamism is not generally studied as a movement 
about the fundamentals of the society. In terms of its concept of "the 
political," its vision of the state-society relations, and its definition of the 
political community, little is known. Little is known also about Islamism in 
relation to i ts context, or vis a vis the modernizing regime. In most studies, 
differences between Islamism and the modernizing regimes are explored 
especially as far as their civilizational outlook is concerned. Yet the fact that 
Islamism is anti-Westernizing does not tell us much about the political 
aspects of it, because we cannot associate a Westernizing regime 
automatically with democracy and pluralism. What is proposedin this study 
is "contextualisation" of Islamism in the sense of studying Islamismin 
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relation to and together with i ts context in political terms so as to avoid 
repudiating Islamism on the basis of its Islamicness or to avoid glorifying a 
modernizing regime on the basis of its Westernism. 
Chapter two acidresses the underlying assumptions that are apparent in 
most analyses of Islamism and, then, suggests an alternative framework. The 
first underlying framework is an essentialist definition of Islam as a political 
religion that merges state and religion and hinders modernization. The 
second underlying framework of most accounts of Islamism is a definition of 
modernity as a process of consistent progress and secularization in the sense 
of a decline in the social significance of religion. In this chapter, it is asserted 
that modernity is not about secularization but about the primacy of politics 
and modern functions of religion are indeed political but not religious 
functions. In this respect, it is suggested that secularization as a progressive 
decline in the social significance of religion has actually been a myth. It is 
also suggested that essentialist definitions of Islam foreclose the possibilities 
of a peaceful cohabitation between Islamism and the modernizing regime. 
Essentialist definitions of Islam portray the relations between modernization 
and Islam in terms of only submergence and resurgence and assesses the 
failures or successes of modemization in terms of "visibility" and 
"invisibility" of Islam. 
This study attempts to develop an alternative perspective for studying 
Islamism on its political ground and political aspects. Relatedly, it isa 
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theoretical attempt to construct an alternative framework for studying 
Islamism. This alternative approach asserts the primacy of politics and urges 
one to study a political movement in terms of its politics or more accurately 
in terms of its definition of "the political," of the political community and 
state-society relationship. In this way, the similarity of the political logic 
between a Westernizing regime and an Islamizing alternative could be 
discovered. The expected theoretical contribution of this study is therefore to 
suggest an alternative framework for studying Islamism that is different 
from the existing accounts, reviewed in chapter one, and that will enable us 
to discover both the political aspects of Islamism itself and its 
similarities/ differences from the modernizing regimes it challenges. It is by 
adopting this contextual approach that it becomes a legitimate question to 
ask the extent to which Islamism allows for the realization of freedoms in the 
public sphere. 
The crux of the alternative framework is the concept of "the political." What 
is meant by studying Islamism in terms of i ts politicalness is a study of the 
concept of "the political" as understood by Islamism. The same tool is also 
useful for analyzing the modernizing regime as well. The concept of "the 
political" shows the legitimate sp here of politics and its significance cannot 
be explained without answering the question of what holds societies 
together. This study assumes that modern societies are culturally 
differentiated plural societies. Therefore they are not held together by 
common values, common good or a moral consensus, but by the very 
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activity of politics. Politics, it will be argued, is the sphere where 
commonalties between different identities and ideologies are discovered. 
The idea that societies are integrated on the basis of a pre-given moral 
consensus, it will be argued, restricts the legitimate sphere of politics. 
In chapter two, this study will analyze the two different modes of 
integration which by and large determine the concepts of the political: 
liberal and republican. As will be shown, liberalism tends to empty political 
life of substantive argument by conceiving politics as founded upon self-
interest and for fear that pursuing a moral purpose would lead to 
trespassing of individual's autonomy. The task of state in liberalism is to 
protect rights and liberties of individual's who are ultimately the best judges 
of their interests. Republican politics, on the other hand, is oriented towards 
the good life of the community, which is conceived as the highest good. The 
task of the state is to uphold the idea of common good and realize it. 
Defined as the republican trap, while the orientation towards common good 
is praised, moralizatian of it in republicanism, it will be suggested, is prone 
to authoritarian political practices in the name of realizing the common good 
of society. 
The third chapter is a reading of Kemalism as a variety of republicanism that 
has fallen into the above republican trap. It must be emphasized at the very 
beginning thatKemalismin this study is not equated with a Westernization 
programme. What is meant by Kemalism, in this study, isa particular 
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structuration of politics regardless of its contents or substance. Kemalist 
structuration of politics is republicanist because of its concern with the 
establishment of a good society. Although politics is conceived asa process 
of discovering what is good for the whole society, the very possibilities of 
"discovery" of the comman good, i.e., the activity of politics, are restricted. 
This is because what is good for the whole society is already defined and 
therefore it was not a matter of political deliberation. Kemalism is originally 
an emancipatory project that turned the subjects of the Sultan into citizens of 
a modern republic. It was with the foundation of the Kemalist republic that 
the modern Turkish society was constituted. In this respect, neither the 
society nor the rights and liberties preceded the foundation of the Republic. 
The sources of moralizatian of Kemalism could be traced back to the 
founding moment. By taking Kemalism as the public morality of modem 
Turkish republic, which concerns the domains of right and wrong, the 
nature of good life, and the question of obligations, this study will try to 
explain how the sp here of politics and thereby possibilities of a dynamic 
cansensus between different political views on the issue of, for example, 
secularism, is restricted. 
The sources of considering Islamism as a reactionary mavement abusing 
religion for political purposes lies in Kemalist morality, which proposed a 
new interpretation of Islam in line with the Westermzation project. 
Kemalism has played a role in the politicization of Islam by plunging into a 
series of secularization policies that created a cultural cleavage between state 
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and society. Current Islamism, in Turkey, emerges out of this cleavage and 
takes up the issues created by Kemalist secularization. But whether Islamist 
National Outlook Movement is the exact representative of the society within 
this cleavage is a crucial question that will be elaborated in this dissertation. 
More importantly, the explanatory power of the cultural cleavage between 
state and society will be examined carefully. It is argued that the problem 
with Kemalism is not that it could not provide a public morality that would 
integrate masses to its modernization drive, but it is the very attempt to 
construct one that created political bottlenecks. The political implication of 
the cultural alienation thesis is the cultural unification of state and society 
which is quite contrary to the culturally differentiated nature of the society. 
In chapter four, the goal is to study the National Outlook Movement in the 
light of the above summary desetiption of the Kemalist regime and in 
relation to it. In doing so, as opposed to the conventional wisdom 
emphasizing the differences, the convergences between Islamism and 
Kemalismin terms of structuration(s) of politics, i.e. in terms of state-society 
relations will be examined. The overall aim is to reveal the resemblances 
between two substantively different alternatives, Islamism and Kemalism, in 
their structuration of politics or in terms of their political logic. Islamism 
converges with Kemalism on what might be called "culturalism," i.e. on 
seeing the appropriate culture as a precondition of modernization, though 
the deemed appropriate cultures are different. The concept of "the political" 
in Islamism, like in Kemalism, does not include the debates aboutthe nature 
ll 
of good life. Anather resemblance revolves around the discussion on the 
task of the state, which is to promote a substantive life style and thereby to 
carry out a social engineering project. Society, in both Kemalism and 
Islamism, is seen as an object of government and as homogenous. 
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CHAPTERONE 
APPROACHING ISLAMISM 
1. WHAT IS ISLAMISM? 
1.1. What Islamism is not 
Islamism is not religious fundamentalism. Contrary to the implications of 
the term fundamentalism, Islamism is not about the fundamentals of faith 
but of society. Although the leaders and ideologues of Islamist movements 
present their ideas in the way of a restaration of a pure, unsullied, and 
authentic form of religion, they actually seek to "revitalize andre-Islamize 
modern Muslim societies" to create a new society rather than to returnthe 
old one.1 It is therefore a political movement. Once this fact is taken into 
1 Joel Beinin and Joe Stark, "On the Modernity, Histarical Specificity and 
International Cantext of Political Islam" in Political Islam: Essays Emm 
Middle East Report (London: I.B Tauris, 1997), 3, see also John Ruedy, 
"Introduction" in Islamism and Secularism İn North Africa/ ed. idem 
(London: Macmillan, 1996, [1994]), xv. 
account, if Islamism is still considered as a fundamentalist (political) 
mavement on the basis of its claims about the fundamentals of the society, 
many secular /modern counterparts (equivalents) of Islamism such as 
nationalism, which also is about the fundamentals of the society as well, 
must be considered fundamentalist as well. As such, fundamentalism is not 
a peculiarity of modernizing Muslim societies. It is visible in both the West 
and the Rest. Therefore, contrary to the opposite claims, fundamentalism 
does not necessarily occur "on the soil of traditional cultures or cultures in 
which people perceive and daim that they simply inherit a world view and 
way of life."2 The term fundamentalism is also a pejorative anda non-
discerning term putting all Islamİst movements into a single basket. As such, 
the term fundamentalism is incapable of grasping the empirical reality of 
Islamism. 
It is also better not to employ the term political Islam in referring to 
Islamism. This is because the public/ private distinction which the term 
"political Islam" relies on isitselfa political construction that should not be 
taken for granted and that has recently been questioned. The term political 
Islam reveals the underlying acceptance of the Enlightenment' s prescription 
that the proper sphere of religion is the private sphere and the public realm 
isa realm of rationality. Consequently, the emergence of political 
2 Martin E. Marty, "Fundamentals of Fundamentalism" in Fundamentalism 
in Comparative Perspectiveed. Lawrence Kaplan, (Amherst: The 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 18. 
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movements utilizing religion, "political Islam", is defined asa pathology by 
those who subscribe to the Enlightenment and modernizing regimes based 
upon the Enlightenment. As will be in the next chapter, the modern idea that 
religion is politically irrelevant in conditions of modernity is misleading. 
Modernity, indeed, is about various utilizations of religion. What is taken to 
be the non-political religion is itself a political construction as well. Also, 
given the fact that the distinction between public and private is a political 
construction, "political Islam" could bring an issue removed from political 
sphere back into politics. In other words, a de-politicized issue can be re-
politicized by "political Islam" and there may be nothing intrinsically 
contrary to the democratic trendsin this. 
Below, an attempt will bemade to elaborate what Islamism is. This study 
will employ the term Islamism because it indicates a political stance that 
claims to be informed by Islam. As will be seen below, in this study Islamism 
is taken as primarily a political phenomenon and the term Islamism is 
preferable in this respect as well. This is because it allows us to consider it in 
same terms with other ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism.3 Also, the 
term Islamismincludes the variations within Islamism as, for example, the 
term liberalismincludes variations within liberalism. 
3 Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of 
Islamism, (London: Zed Books, 1997), 17. 
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1.2. The Substance and Modernity of Islamism 
The modernity of Islamism is something beyond being a response to modern 
circumstances, i.e., contemporariness. The modernity of Islamism is also 
something beyond valiciation of religious knowledge on secular 1 rational 
grounds, for example, rationalization of fasting on the basis of its healthiness 
rather than on the basis of religious duty. Islamism represents a deviance 
from Islamic tradition for two reasons. First, under Islamism, Islam is 
------
inte~prete_q. _ _!?_yjl1t~Jlgc_t_l}_als ;;md politicians who are usually products of 
, secular education and who a.ı:~ ~~ınili~rwith tJ::ıes~cgJ~:r ic1~9logi~ş .. Second, 
Islamİst interpretation of religion is in social, economic and political terms 
rather than spiritual norms and values. Islamism is not a mavement about 
Islam but about society and politics. Asa mavement of reaction, rather than 
protest, Islamism presents religiously inspired solutions to the 
contemporary problems created by:~en_moder]Jization. It also 
problematizes what is taken for granted. Tn this sense, the rivals of lslamism) 
are other secular ideologies addressing the same problems but not other ; 
religions.4 
4 See, in ter alia, Mumtaz' er Turkone, Siyasal Ideoloji Olarak Islamciligin 
Dogusu/ [The Emergence of Islamism asa Political Ideology], (Istanbul: 
Iletisim, 1994). 
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Islamism shares many similarities with other religio-political movements in 
suggesting moral/religious resolutions to the pressing political problems. 
Islamism could be seen as a variant of these religio-political that are visible 
world-wide. Once seen from this u global" perspective, i.e. since it isa 
variant religio-political/ culturalist movements that are visible in both West 
and the Rest, Islamism could not be seen asa peculiarity of non-Western, 
traditional or Muslim societies. This is one of the reasons why Islamism 
should not be explained in terms of Islam or Muslim society. 
Islamism also shares many similarities with culturalistmovements that are 
visible in different parts of the world. Culturalist movements are self-
conscious about identity, culture and heritage. Culturalist movements 
articulate the problematique of the time on cultural and moral grounds by 
underplaying social and economic struggles.5 Islamism, too, consciously 
mobilizes Muslim identity against the extemal forces and moral 
degeneration on the basis of its difference from other identities and of its 
consciousness about identity, culture, heritage. At the center of Islamic 
alternative lies Islam and Muslim identity. Islamism is related more to 
uidentity" than to "ideas." Indeed, it could be suggested that the only 
religious aspect of the "religiously inspired solution" of Islamism is the 
5 See Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of 
Globalization (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
1996), 15. See also Salwa !smail, "Confronting the Other: Identity, Culture, 
Politics and Conservative Islamism in Egypt" International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, 30,2 (May, 1998): 199-225, 202. 
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Muslim identity. Yet, the definition of "Muslim identity" is stili an ongoing 
process and, therefore, sornewhat vague now. 
Islamism could be considered as a political stance that represents an 
alternative 6 way of utilizingreligion by self-claimed conscious Muslimsfor 
acquiring political power and for the revitalization of Islamic civilization 
based on a concept of golden age. Islamisation of society is a part of this 
"political project" and serves the revitalization of Islamic civilization and re-
presentation of Islamic identity vis a visthe West. The reference to a past 
golden age in Islamİst discourses does not mean that it is an attempt to 
return a past order, because the conceptions of future plays a more 
important role than those of the past and the concept of golden age serves as 
a model and as a confidence-building measure for the current 
circumstances? Islamism is actually about (re)construction of Islam and 
Muslim society here and now. 
6 I have deliberately used the word alternative to indicate that modemity is 
not solely about the decline in the social significance of religion but various 
utilizations of religion, that religion has always played a role in modern 
politics and that those who accommodate religion in their political 
discourses are not restricted to Islamist or other religio-political 
movements. Also historically, Islam was appropriated by the pre-
modern(izing) state which deseribed the opposition as heretic. The 
contemporary Islamism, as Ayubi pointed out, "now reverses the histarical 
process -it claims 'generic' Islam for the protest movements, leaving to the 
state the more difficult task of qualifying and justifying its own 'version' of 
Islam." Ayubi's argument points to the centrality of politics and 
concomitantly to the centrality of hegemony in "neutralizing" a particular 
interpretation of Islam. See Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and 
Politics in the Arab World/ (London: Routledge, 1991), 5. 
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Islamism is a modernizing movement, and to the extent it could be defined 
as an ideology, it isa modernizing ideology. What it challenges is the 
equation of modernization with Westernization, an equation established not 
only by the modernizing elite but also by the Eurocentric social theory.8 
Islamism asserts that one does not have to Westemize in order to 
modernize. The statement of the former Prime Minister of Sudan, Al-Sadiq 
Al- Mahdi, illustrates the point: 
7 Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West/ (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 32, notes that "some European monarchs have 
flattered themselves that they won the respect and even good will of the 
Ottoman Sultan." Islamism isa yearning for the similar terms of 
relationship with the West today. For two different concepts of Golden 
Age, Asr-i Saadet of the Prophet Muhammad and the dassic and Ottoman 
versions, see Ira M. Lapidus, "The Golden Age: The Political Concepts of 
Islam" in The Annals/ 524, (November, 1992): 13-25, 18. Lapidus notes that 
the first canception of golden age is integralist, in the sense that it seeks a 
unified state and society under the leadership of Caliph, whose authority 
extends to all realms of personal and public concerns. The second one 
tacitly recognizes the institutional division between the structures of state 
and religion. In this paradigm, Lapidus argues, "Muslims look for the 
religious sphere for personal and communal fulfillment, to Islam as a 
personal and social ethos and not a concept or constitution of political 
regime." The latter canception of Golden Age allows for a secular and 
imperial notion of state. According to Lapidus the current Islamism tends 
to be based the latter. 
R On the Eurocentism of social theory, especially modernization theory, see 
Jeffrey Alexander, "Modern, Anti, Post and Neo", New Leif Review/ 210, 
(March/ April, 1995): 63-101,69, Anthony D. King, "The Times and Spaces 
of Modernity (or Who Needs Postmodernism?)" in Global Modernities/ 
eds., Mike Featherstone et al, (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 110. John 
Brohoman, "Universalism, Eurocentrism and Ideological Bias in the 
Development Studies: From Modernization to Neoliberalism", Third 
World Quarterl~ 16, 1, (1995): 121-140. Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental 
Fea~ chapters 3 and 4. 
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"Westernization is the West's version of modemization. It isembeddedin 
Western culture and interests .... Modernization can and must be divorced 
from those cultural and histarical expressions of it."9 
The anti-Westernism of Islamism springs from this challenge which alsa 
includes a yearning for similar structures with that of West. For example, 
practicing religion is no more important that setting up an economic 
community of Islamic states. The maintenance of Islamic identity, according 
to Islamİst discourse, is not just possible in the modernization process but it 
is rather essenhal for a successful (Islamic) modernization project. Islamism 
aims to appropriate modernity in Islamic, authentic, indigenous terms. As 
such, Islamism is a rejection of the Orientalist conceptualization of Islam as 
an obstacle to progress. In this respect, Islamism could be considered as a 
continuation of the trend set by the "Islamic reformism" of the Iate 
nineteenth century. The Muslim thinkers of this era, who are considered to 
be the pioneers of Islami c revival, 10 held that it was not true Islam but the 
prevailing Islam which was an obstacle to progress. Current Islamism 
asserts the same point, but ina manner of "reinstating" the Islam that was 
9 Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, "Islam: Society and Change" in Voices of Resurgent 
Islam/ ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 239. 
See alsa Nilufer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamİst Politics: The 
Case of Turkey", in Civil Society in Middle East/ Richard A. Norton, ed. 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 24, for a definition of Islamism asa challenge to 
the equation established between Westernization and civilization. See alsa 
John Obert Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World/ 
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994, 2nd edition), 291. 
10 Ali Rahnemena, ed., The Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 
1994). 
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denied by the Westernizing elite rather than reforming the prevailing Islam. 
In other words, it is not the current practice and interpretation but the 
negation of Islam that is the problem. 
Pointing to a continuity between current Islamism and i ts "origins," 
however, does not mean that current Islamism is the same with Islamism of 
the nineteenth century. Otherwise, the employment of the terms such as 
revival and resurgence would have been adequate terms for Islamic 
movements. Although Islam is a common reference point, Islamİst 
movements differ in space and time. They operate under dissimilar 
conditions and derive different inspirations from religion in addressing the 
contemporary problems. 
In order to achieve Islamic modernization, and thereby re-present Islam as a 
civilizational model that relies not solely on reason but also on divine 
inspiration ( vahy), Islamism utilizes technology and science. Based on the 
definition of modernity as consisting of two dimensions, the social 
organization and the Enlightenment derived ideas, Islamism is considered to 
besemi-modern or hybrid of modernity and anti-modernityY It is so 
11 Fred Halliday, "The Politics of Islam: A Second Look", Britishjournal of 
Political Studies/ 25, 3, (July, 1995): 399-417,400,416-417, and passim. 
Basam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Pre-Industrialist Culture in the 
Scientific-Technological Age (Salt Lake City: University of U tah Press, 
1988) and Basam Tibi, "Culture and Knowledge: The Politics of 
Islamisation of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project? The Fundamentalist 
Claims to De-Westernization" Theor~ Culture/ and Society, 12 (1995): 1-24. 
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because in its alternative modernization project, Islamism rejects the cultural 
underpinnings of modernity, which are essentially Western, while accepting 
the instrumental and organizational dimensions. In this respect, the 
explanations depicting Islamism asa reaction to alienation created by 
overmaterialization of social life understates the fact that Islamism operates 
within the same parameters of modernization that gave rise to the problem 
alienation. What Islamism represents is an attempt for an alternative 
legitimation of the "rationality" and "modernization." Here, Islam functions 
like Weber's Protestant ethic. It could be suggested by using Marxist 
terminology that salvation in Islamİst politics is through "Muslims for 
themselves" rather than "Muslims in themselves." Being a conscious 
Muslim, according to Islamists, requires an awareness of the principle of 
tawhİd. The principle of tawhİdis revitalized by the Islamist, or selt-elaimed 
Muslims, to turn their "this-worldly" concerns into Islamic concerns so that 
these concerns could be ma de 1 depicted as benefidal also for the hereafter. 
What might be called the magic power of Islam to turn sacred into profane 
and profane into sacred is used in the following way: since Islam covers all 
aspects of life, a shift to this mundane world does not necessarily mean de-
Islamisation. Indeed, Islam has never been a world-rejecting religion. The 
issue is not being either a this-worldly Muslim, or a 'monkish' pious one. 
Rather, the crucial thing in being this worldly is the consdousness. In these 
circumstances, for example, aspiring for wealth in this world is not 
necessarily relegating Islamic concerns to a secondary place, if wealth is 
created for the sake of re-building the Islamic civilization. In this picture, 
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Islam seems to function like a provider of meaning for the modernization 
process, thereby resolving the W eberian issue of legitimation of rationality. 
But, behind the seeming similarity between the functions of Protestant ethic 
andIslamismin the W eberian issue of legitimation of "rationality," there is 
an important difference that might render the characterization of "semi-
modern" and "hybrid" for Islamism ineffective. While Protestant ethic 
justifies the seeking of wealth for the sake of wealth, Islamist justification is 
goal-oriented, that is, seeking of wealth is for the sake of revitalization of 
Islamic civilization. In other words, Islamİst rationality and legitimacy are 
goal-based, that is rational and legitimate are defined in terms of the 
contribution to the revitalization of the Islamic civilization. Islamic 
rationality, therefore, may not fit the Weberian type of rationality.12 For 
example, an Islamist entity might prefer to develop economic relations with 
another Islamist entity even though it is more benefidal for him/her to do it 
with secularists, atheists or Jews. But, whether the concept of rationality 
should be the same as W eberian type of rationality in order to call Islamİst 
rationality as modern and Islamic movements in general as hybrid isanother 
question. For example, Japanese society, which beaten the West in its own 
game, is not rational in the W eberian sense because the objective features of 
modernity, i.e. capitalist rationality, are managed in cultural norms.13 
12 See Sami Zubaida, "Is There a Muslim Society? Ernest Gellner's Sociology 
oflslam" Economy and Society 24,2 (May, 1995): 151-188. 
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The term serni-modern could also be inappropriate and less meaningful if 
we bear in mind the fact that it is not only Islamism that rejects the 
Enlightenment derived idea(l)s of individualism, secularism, 
cosmopolitanism, gender equality and so on. Originally, conservatism was a 
rejection of these ideals. There are also many right-wing movements which 
are doubtful about the capability of reason to improve society.14 In this 
context, Islamism could be considered asa variety of right-wing movements. 
By this token, the right-wing rnovernents deserve to be called as semi-
modern as well. But, only for Islarnisrn the adjective serni-modern is 
employed as if there are no sirnilar rnovements in the West and as if the 
practice of rnodernity was a srnooth application of the Enlightenment 
derived ideas solely. One rnust not forget that fascism, political 
dictatorships, rnilitarism and authoritarianisrn are all practices of modernity. 
More irnportantly, assessing Islarnisrn in terrns of its relation to modernity, 
is not very meaningful as far as its contribution to our understanding of 
Islamism' s political aspects are concerned. The fact that Islamic movements 
are modern and modernizing does not tell much about whether these 
rnovements are dernocratic-pluralist or whether they envision a change in 
13 See John Clarnrner, Difference and Modernity: Social theory and 
Contemporary ]apanese Society, (London: Kegan Paul International, 1995), 
6, 8-9, 120. 
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the dominant power relations.15 Therefore, the relationship between Islam 
and modernity could not be a sufficient ground for the evaluation of 
Islamism. This is because unless one employs an essentialist definition of 
modernity, the substance of modernity itself is sornewhat mixed. 
Considering Islamismin terms of modernity seems to operate within an 
Orientalist framework which portrayed Islam as a religion hindering 
modernization. Now that Islamist mavement are not hindrance to 
development falsifies the Orientalist portrayal, but within the Orientalist 
framework. (A critique of the essentialization of Islam will be advanced in 
next chapter .) Furthermore, Islamism is a matter of positioning vis a vis the 
modern(izing) state whose modern nature does not tell us much about its 
political character. It is perhaps more accurate to look at the location of 
Islamismin the overall political configuration, and i ts positioning vis a vis it. 
In this respect, what kind of state-society relationship is envisioned by 
Islamists is a more fruitful question for discovering and assessing the 
political nature of Islamism. 
14 See Roger Batwell and Noel O'Sullivan, eds., The Nature of the Right: 
European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789/ 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1989). 
15 The fact that the relations between Western modernity and Islam is 
deepening and getting more complex in the course of Islamist challenge to 
the equation of civilization with Westermzation is not explanatory as far as 
the political posture of Islamism concerned. For a sociological study that 
misses the political dimension see Nilufer Gole, "The Quest for Islamic Self 
within the Cantext of Modernity" in Rethinking Modernity and National 
Identity in Turkey, eds. S. Bozdagan and R. Kasaba (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1997). 
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In the light of above discussion, we could suggest that, Islamİst movements 
can be considered as modern ideological movements in the sense that they 
propose new "fundamental principles which organize behavior, frame of 
choices, constitute a world view and are considered to be the means of 
achieving ... the goal."16 But, Islamİst movements could not be considered as 
ideological if by ideological movements we mean those movements 
struggling to change whole the form of sociallife.17 This is because Islamİst 
movements actually offer an alternative "ground" for the legitimation of 
capitalİst rationality or the maintenance of the communal character of an 
actually differentiated society. Islamists usually are willing to work within 
the established order and promote hierarchical and partriarchical values that 
reinforce the status-quo.18 In this respect, Islamism could also be 
conceptualized as a conservative movement, because while accepting science 
and technology, it tries to fill the void in our souls created by rnaterialism. 
This is because it is assumed that "[a]s modernization proceeds spiritual 
needs are also expanded." 19 In other words, Islarnism rationalizes the 
reordering of a society on some ideological grounds such as revitalization of 
Islamic civilization by emphasizing the imagined pastas a blueprint for 
16 Clammer, Difference and Modernity 12 
17 Terry Eagleton, Ideology An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 8 
18 Salwa Ismail, "Confronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics and 
Conservative Islamism in Egypt" International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 30, 2 (May, 1998): 199-225. 
26 
future, by asserting the primacy of community and moral principles over 
political, economic and social ones?0 Islamİst political ideal is characterized 
by hierarchy, harmony, unity, order virtue, reciprocity, shared values and 
mu tual concern. Yet, Islamism could not be defined as conservative, if by 
conservatism, we mean an orientation against change, respect for established 
(secular) institutions, hierarchies and the elite. The fact that they work 
within the established order and promote maintenance of status quo and 
power relations may lead us to conclude that Islamİst movements are 
conservative movements, but Islamist work through the established 
institutions to alter the substance of them. Islamism is an alternative 
modernizing mavement and its ideological aspects spring from its offer of 
an alternative legitimation for the modernization/capitalism. Islamism's 
divergence from conservatism springs from this (lslamist) aspect of it. In this 
respect, if we are to employ the term conservative Islamism in referring to 
Islamism, the conservative implies maintenance of the institutional set up of 
politics while Islamism implies altering the substance that the institutional 
set up pursues. 
Islamism, it could be suggested, resembles neo-conservative movement, 
because, unlike the conservative stance, neo-conservative/lslamist stance is 
19 Serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Turkey: The Case of 
Bediuzaman Said-i Nursi(Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1989), 221. 
20 See Louis J. Cantori, "The Islamic Revival as Conservatism and Progress in 
Contemporary Egypt" in Religious Resurgence and Politics in 
Contemporary World/ ed. E. Sahliyeh (Albany, SUNY Press, 1990) 185. 
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radical and reactionary and sees politicsasa means of rescuing society from 
its crisis. Thus, Islamism/neo-conservatism differs from conservatism in its 
more ambitious aims. Also, Islamism, like neo-conservatism, believes that 
ideas shape the society but it wants its ideas to shape the society. Therefore, 
both Islamism and neo-conservatism relies on state power to shape the 
human activity and thereby neglect the importance of limited government.21 
1.3. Holding the Society Together: Islamism asa Project of Construction 
The culturalist reassertion of Islamİc İdentİtyfor the purposes of 
Islamic/indigenous modernization implies a process of the construction of 
the Islamic identity and Muslim society as well. There is an Islamist 
imagination of society as Muslim society. Indeed, as noted above, Islamists 
seek secular salvation through first and faremost construction of Muslim 
identity and Islamic awareness. Ideas are irrelevant to the "solutions" of the 
Islamist movements as culturalist mavemen ts. What is usually meant by 
Islamisation, however, is not necessarily areturn to Sharİa rule but a modern 
construction of Muslim society anew, which, in turn, is depicted as a return 
to "our roots" in Islamİst discourses. It could be suggested that Islamism 
represents the same aspiration with nationalism inthesense that it involves 
an alternative definition of the society and an alternative ground on which 
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society is united. In this sense, Islamism could better be thought as a 
substitute for nationalism. Mark Jurgensmeyer rightly deseribes Islamic 
movements as religious nationalİst on the basis of the fact that they fuse 
their religious perspective with the economic and political destiny of the 
nation.22 
While Islamİst movements could be considered as religious nationalİst 
movements, contrasting them with secular nationalism may well be less 
meaningful than it seems at first sight. In Jurgensmeyer's comparison 
between religious nationalism and secular nationalism, for example, the 
dominant paradigm of secular nationalism is the idea that legitimacy of the 
state is rootedin the will of people and divorced from any religious 
sanction. Jurgensmeyer problematized religious nationalism and prefers 
secular nationalism as an ideology of order in a manner reproducing the 
modern vs. traditional dichotomy. He seems to take for granted the arguable 
positive correlation between secularism, democracy and pluralism, whereas 
the relation between them is not necessarily positive. On points crucial to 
pluralism, secularism too could become "de-differentiating," that is, 
fundamentalist. Jurgensmeyer seems to neglect that the so-called "secular" 
nationalismisa de-differentiating and homogenizing ideology as well. 
21 See Shedia B. Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right(London: 
Macmillan, 1997) for aspects of neo-conservatism. 
22 Mark Jurgensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism 
Confronts the Secular State/ (Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 
1993), 20-41. 
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Therefore, the fact that the grounds of de-differentiation is not religious in 
secular nationalism does not make it more pluralist. 
Moreover, neither the so-called secular nationalism is assecular as it seems, 
nor the religious nationalism is as religious as Jurgensmeyer thinks. Politics 
and political concerns reigns supreme in both kinds of nationalism, and the 
overall pattern is subordination of both religious and secular principles 
whenever the exigencies of politics require. As will be seen in the following 
chapter, modernity is about various functionalizations of religion and 
religion and "secular" nationalism have been interactive in different ways. It 
isa commonplace fact that nationalisms have religious components. It is the 
so-called secular states that produced "Protestant America" or "99 percent 
Muslim Turkey." The difference between secular and religious nationalism 
is not the degree of de-differentiation or homogenization, let alone the lack 
of promotion/ preference of a model man on the basis of either takva, or 
modern dressing, or the American way of life that fits into the ideology of 
the state, but the ground on which homogenization will take place. In this 
sense, religious nationalists are not anymore or any less de-differentiating 
than secular nationalists. The comparison of different formulations of the 
same aspiration, that is, religious and secular nationalism thereby becomes 
less meaningful. Also, Islamists link the legitimacy of the state to the will of 
the people as well. The definition of "the people" as Muslims does not make 
an important difference because secular nationalism too defines "the 
people" as Muslim. In this sense, religious nationalists are not canfronting 
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an entirely secular state?3 But, most importantly, if we accept the argument 
that the imagined community of na tionisa site of ideological contestation 
and power struggles, there is nothing extraordinary in the challenge of 
Islamİst politics to the "secular" nationalism. Ernest Renan's daim that "the 
existence of anation is an everyday plebiscite" actually illustrates the fact 
that unity and fixity of nation cannot be taken for granted.24 Therefore, 
whether or not the challenge of Islamism to the secular state is made on the 
basis of a pluralist/ democratic outlook is a more important question than 
the distinction between religious and secular nationalism. Is, for example, 
the differentiated nature of society is recognized? 
Islamism as alternative nationalism and as an alternative legitimation of 
capitalist rationality, has in its imagination a particular model of society, and 
thus mode of societal integration, idea of common good and common 
values. It is in this sensethat Islamic movements are considered to be 
ideological or anti-systemic movements. But, Islamic movements should not 
be problematized on the grounds of being ideological, anti-systemic. This is 
because modern politics is not just about who gets what, when and how. 
Such a definition of politics misses the essence of modern condition; the 
23 see for example Edward A. Tiryakiyan, "The Wild Cards of Modernity," 
Daedalus/ 126,2 (Spring, 1997): 147-181, 165-176 for the interaction of 
religion and nationalism under modernity. 
24 ibid., 153. For Ernest Renan see John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 
eds., Nationalism/ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17. 
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contradiction between is and ought.25 Hence, moral criticism, questioning of 
the political system, conflicts about the meaning and nature of comman 
values and comman good are also part of modern democratic politics, which 
is about the search for a good society. It is in this respect the fact that 
Islamism challenges to "the system" cannot perse mean that Islamism is a 
pathology. The opposition (but not necessarily the alternative) of Islamic 
movements may broaden the sphere of politics, that is they may open 
certain issues that are defined by the political system as above and beyand 
politics to democratic deliberation by questioning the system. To what 
extent Islamism contributes to the realization of freedam in the public 
sphere and to what extent the current structuration of public sphere allows 
such a contribution of Islamism are more meaningful questions. 
If Islamİst alternative could be considered as an ideology concerning the 
fundamentals of a political community, like nationalism, then the proper 
ground for the assessment of Islamism is their definition of the political 
community and legitimate politics. To what extent Islamİst mode of 
integration limits the sphere of political and to what extent Islamİst 
alternative allows for the realization of freedam inthepublic sphere? What 
are defined as above and beyand politics and removed from the sphere of 
democratic deliberation by Islamists? 
25 Agnes Heller, "The Concept of the Political Revisited," in PoHticallJıeory 
Taday ed. David Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 337. 
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The crux of the issue concerning Islarnisrn, therefore, lies in the Islamİst 
definition of the "political" and we can not assess and judge the National 
Outlook Movernent (NOM) or Islarnisrn in general solely on the basis of i ts 
"Islarnicness" or in terrns of its relation to rnodernity. If rnodernity is about 
rationalisrn, Islarnists could be considered as rational. If rnodernity is about 
religious tolerance, individualisrn, decline in the social significance of 
religion the practice of rnodernity itself is sornewhat rnixed. Hence, Islarnisrn 
could be defined as thoroughly modern rnovernents but stili we would not 
know about the political aspects of Islarnisrn. In other words, rnodernity of 
Islarnisrn does not necessarily points to a positive aspect of Islarnisrn from a 
norrnative-dernocratic perspective. The rnodernity of Islarnisrn does not tell 
us anything about whether it is an ernancipatory political rnovernent or not 
because it does not say anything about the stance of Islarnisrn towards the 
dominant power relations in society. 
At this stage, a brief critique of the talking about Islarnisrn in terrns of Islam, 
as indicated by such titles as "Islam and Dernocracy"26 can be advanced. The 
assessrnents of Islarnisrn in terrns of Islam and Dernocracy seerns to 
essentialize Islamasa political religion andasa culture that could not be 
dernocratic. However, the real question as far as dernocracy and rnodernity 
are concerned is not Islam per se, but the specific interpretation of it and the 
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perceptions of democracy and freedam by those groups and movements that 
utilize and instrumentalize Islamintheir political discourses. In other 
words, the relation is between Islamists and democracy but not between 
Islam and democracy. Why then, one should search for conditions of 
democracy in Islam as if it has an autonomous essence? The view taken in 
this study fancies neither confinement of religion into the private sphere nor 
the defense of religion inthepublic sphere. The issue is not "whether 
religion essentially is good or bad for politics, functional or dysfunctional for 
social system, historically progressive or regressive."27 This study pays 
attention to the purposes and ways of utilization of religion and does not 
consider the emergence of movements/ groups in the name of religion/Islam 
on the political stage as something essentially negative for democracy. 
Therefore, Islam inthepublic sphere is not something that should be 
avoided per se for the sake of maintaining democracy since not all political 
movements are democratic in the "established" Western democracies. 
When considering the more important relation between the Islamİst and 
democracy, the conditions of democracy should not be searchedin Islam as 
26 See for example Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy" Atlantic 
Monthly, 271 (February, 1993). 
27 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modem World (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1994), 66. Casanova argues that only those public 
religions at the level of civil society, as opposed to theonesat the level of 
political society and at the level of s ta te, are consistent with the modern 
universalistic principles and with modern differentiated structures. (p. 
219). This view too could be challenged because Casanova seems to 
essenhalize all movements at the level of civil society as democratic. 
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if it has an autonomous essence and the political context/ configuration 
within which Islamist act should be taken into account as well. Otherwise a 
risk of over-abstracting and decontextualisation will be faced and the forces 
that shape Islamİst politics will be underemphasized. There are recent 
studies that link 11radicalism" of Islamism to the totalitarian or non-
democratic contexts they live in.28 Also, ata general level, it could be 
suggested that a party' s contribution to democracy should not be considered 
without taking into account the other fields, which hinder or promote the 
parties' usefulness in advancing democracy.29 In other words, parties' 
contribution to democracy is possible if other fields are democratized as 
well. To the extent that Islamism is shaped more by its context than by Islam 
itself, the question of whether Islamic movements are democratic 
movements should be asked in conjunction with the broader structuration of 
the political sphere. 
What is proposedin this study is that not only the 11İdeology" or the Islamİst 
"alternative" and the political behaviour of the Muslim politicians but also 
28 See Ahmed S. Moussali, ll Modern Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses on 
Civil Society, Pluralism and Democracy" in Cİvİi Society İn Mİddle East/ 
ed. Augustus R. Norton (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), see also Mary-Jane Deeb, 
"Islam and the State in Algeria and Morocco: A Dialedical Model" and 
William I. Zartman, ll The Challenge of Democratic Alternatives in the 
Maghrib" both in Islamİsm and Secularİsm İn North Africa/ ed. John 
Ruedy (London: Macmillan, 1996 [1994]). Sayyed V. Nasr, "Democracy 
and Islamic Revivalism" Politİcal Science Quarterl~ 110,2 (1995): 261-285. 
29 Alan W are, Cİtİzens/ Partİes/ and the State: A Reappraİsal (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), 242. 
35 
the cantext within which Islamists movements emerge should be taken into 
account when evaluating Islamism. In this way, we could assess Islamismin 
political rather than religious terms and allow for an accidental contribution 
by Islamİst to the further democratization without glorifying Islamism. 
When considering the relationship between Islamists and democracy, it is 
important to bear in mind that a mere non-violent accommodation of 
Islamists within the secular-democratizing polity should not be confused 
with the consolidation of democracy or with the democratic character of 
Islamism. The participation of Islamİst movements in the eleetaral processes 
should be associated neither with the consolidation of democracy nor with 
the inevitable dilution of the Islamİst ideology.30 This is because Islamİst 
movements can de-legitimize and undermine the political system in the 
process of their (pragmatic) participation. Therefore, participation cannot be 
associated with the legitimacy given by Islamist movements to the system. It 
could be instrumental for a non-democratic form of state-society 
re la tionship. 
Democracy could be taken as a regulative idea of modern politics, aiming 
the expansion of freedam and participation. W e lack an empirical reality of 
democracy asa eriterian for the assessment of Islamism unless we freeze the 
30 See for example Ali Kazancigil, "Democracy in Muslim Lands: Turkey in 
Comparative Perspective" Internatİonal Social Sdence journaL 43, 2, 
(1991): 343-360, 357. 
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concept of democracy by neglecting the fact that democratic development is 
an ongoing and never-ending process, consolidation of which is pretty 
impossible. The question of the relationship between Islamists and 
democracy then is not a question of successful accommodation of Islamİst 
movements within a democratic system at any given moment so as to 
consolidate democracy. Rather, the question is about the political attitude 
concerning the issue of further democratization, which is an eternal issue of 
politics. In other words, democratization is a never-ending project, and we 
can evaluate Islamİst alternatives better by pasing the question as to what 
extent Islamists cansicler democracy as a never-ending project. As noted 
above, the essence of modern condition is the contradiction between "is" 
and "ought." The political life of modernity and political actors must be 
aware of the centrality of the contradiction between "is" and "ought" to the 
operation and dynamics of modern society.31 To what extent Islamİst are 
aware of the centrality the distinction between is and ought? Closely linked 
to this is the Islamİst canception of the political, because an issue should first 
be considered asa political issue in order for it to be democratically 
resolved. The concept of the political in turn is determined by the proposed 
mode of social integration, which removes certain issues from the legitimate 
jurisdiction of politics, and its concomitant state-society relationship, which 
gives us clues about the possibilities of democratic resolution of the issues. 
This argument will be elaborated in next chapter. 
31 Agnes Heller, "The Concept of Politics," 337. 
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1.4. Personalism of Islamism 
The immediate target of Islamism as an alternative modernizing project is 
the so-called Westernizing state, which is depicted as alien and oppressive 
on the basis of its "secularity." The following quote illustrates the point: 
Westernization in Muslim lands tried to super-impose the values of 
Western liberalism on Muslim society with the result that the grip of 
traditional values was weakened; but no new morality could be 
developed to fill the gap .... Islami c resurgence represents a re bellion 
against this state of affairs. It standsfor a reaffirmation of Islamic morality 
anda rededication of the sources of the ummah -material as well as 
human- to the achievement of social justice and self-reliance. 32 
Islamism draws two conclusions from this state of affairs. First, it aims to 
obtain and maintain the control of the state33 and second it proposes to 
resolve the issue of alienation through a cultural "re-unification" project 
which might be called Islamisation process rather than through a political 
project such as democratization. The second aspect is about the substantive 
aspect of Islamism and it involves construction of the Muslim society, but is 
32 Khur-Shid Ahmad, "The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence" in Voices of 
Resurgent Islam/ ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford and New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 227. 
33 Ghassan Salame, "Introduction: Where are the Democrats?", and John 
Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats?: The Potential for Political 
Liberalization in the Middle East", both in Democracy without Democrats: 
The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim Worlci ed. G. Salame (London and 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994). It must be noted here that politics in general 
and Islamic politics in particular cannot be reduced to struggles for the 
attainment of the power of the state. The target of Islamism and its political 
project Islamisation is broader than just the attainment of power of the 
state. It comprises political actions at the level of civil society and 
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not a reconstruction since it does not necessarily imply a return to Sharia 
rule. Once the source of allproblemsis defined as cultural alienation, it then 
becomes comprehensible why Islamism does not question the 
institutional/political set up of the polity and why Islamists donotoffer 
democratization as a resolution to actually political problems. If the problem 
is cultural, so is the solution. As will be seen below the cultural resolution, in 
turn, is misleadingly associated with democracy. The cultural resolution 
necessitates not only an intellectual Islamist activity but also power-seeking, 
which results in the flexibility of Islamism. In both of these aspects, the 
question of democratization is underplayed if by democracy we do not 
mean rule by a certain group or cultural integration of state and society. To 
the extent that the question of democracy is a question of institutional set up 
or structuration of politics, Islamism is not about democratic politics in this 
sense, though Islamist depict themselves as the vanguards of democratic 
forces and their cultural projectasa democratic project. The priority is given 
to Islamisation of all public spheres, for example, of professional syndicates, 
the Bar Associations and so on, rather than to the etaboration of the cultural 
project. Hence, what the cultural project involves will be defined on an ad 
hoc basis. It is in this sense that Islamism is less about the politics of ideas 
than politics of presence as a way of empowerment_34 But, this is not to say 
intellectual debate as well. Otherwise, we would not, for example, be able 
to speak of Islamİst intellectuals. 
34 for politics of presence and politics of ideas see Anne Phillips, "Dealing 
With Difference: A Politics of Ideas, or a Politics of Presence? " in 
Democracy and Difference: Cantesting the Boundaries of the Politica.L ed. 
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that the presence would not be followed by actions towards establishing an 
Islamic society. It only points to ad hoc nature of Islamism. 
It could be suggested that, the crux of Islamİst politics is "personalization" of 
all issues. The problem, according to Islamists, is that those who hold power 
are not the true representatives of the "Muslim society." Islamism challenges 
the secular /Westernizing state, but conceives the state notasa particular 
institutional configuration. Islamism, in reality conflates the state with the 
group that inhabits it. Its challenge, therefore, to the incumbents of the state, 
which is essentially the Westernizing modernizing elite, the ruling class. The 
(incumbents of the) state criticized for they lack a concern about the well-
being of people and material as well as spiritual development of society. 
They are depicted as extensions of colonialism, as alienated from their own 
society. In effect, the challenge to the equation of modernization with 
Westernization, turns out to be a challenge to Westernizing elite only and 
the realization of democracy tums into replacement of modernizing elite 
with the pious Islamİst cadres. Meanwhile, the form or the terms of the state-
society relationship is left out of debate. This signals the possibility of the 
maintenance of the "same" form of state-society relationship with a different 
(Islamic) substance. Hence, the challenge of Islamism is not to "the system" 
as an institutional set up or political configuration but to the system as 
people. The core of Islamİst alternative is, thus, a group of pious and 
Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
139-152. 
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conscious people who are by definition competent and concemed potential 
rulers. 
The portrayal of the current state of affairs in personalized terms represent a 
continuum with the traditional Islamic political theory, which focuses on 
types of statesmen and conflates it with the category of politics.35 All 
contemporary Islamist reduce the social problems to the moral character of 
leadership. Institutional arrangements are considered to be secondary, for 
they are unimportant?6 Islamism, in reality, lacks a philosophical 
background for its aims and claims. Islamism is a discourse about 
ethics 1 morality of both the rulers and ruled. This "personalization" of the 
issues, however, enables Islamism to derive support from different social 
classes. For example, since social inequalities are not portrayed asa 
consequence of capitalism, Islamist are able to derive support from both 
businesspeople and workers. 
35 Ayubi, PoHtical Islam/ 8. See also Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the 
Liberal Age: 1798-1939(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984 
[1962), 15-16, for an emphasis of al-Ghazali on the rule by best men. This 
emphasis on the rule by best men could be considered as a continuum of 
the Greek philosophy for which the ruler should be the perfect man as 
well. Another continuity was the Greek doctrine that there is an inherent 
harmony between human nature and society and man can only attain his 
natural end in the community. To the extent that these two aspects 
continued in republican thought, Islamism could be located within the 
context of republicanism as well. Republicanism will be discussed in 
chapter 2. 
J(, A contemporary Islamist thinker Mawdudi is an exeruplar. See Charles J. 
Adams "Mawdudi and The Islamic State" in Voices of Resurgent Islam/ ed. 
John L. Esposito (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1983). 
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The personality based alternative of Islamism explains the reason why 
Islamists are primarily power-oriented. But Islamist politicians are seeking 
power not like the other politicians, who are "greedy and unconcerned." 
Islamist politics and politicians are above and beyond conventional politics 
and politicians. They have a mission. To make this point clear, Islamİst 
differentiate between politics and politicking. The latter refers to 
conventional politics in which politicians work for themselves, show lack of 
concern for people, are scandalous, greedy, filthy and guilty. In the former, 
politics includes a mission concerning the well-being of people and is 
dedicated to the realization of a pre-defined notion of good life and its 
concomitant common good and so on. The success of Islamism, therefore, 
lies in degrading the ruling elite and convincing the people that Islamists 
and/ or pious people are better rulers. It is for this reason that Islamism tries 
to make the most of the political scandals of the secular politicians. In its 
degradation, Islamism employs conspiracy theories, identifies the ruling 
elite as villains and depicts its own cadres as superior to others. The 
personalistic alternative of Islamism also points to the "negativism of Islam" 
as well.37 Islamism is capable of successful opposition and delegitimation, 
but it cannot produce concrete and constructive alternatives. 
37 Patrick D. Gaffney, "Popular Islam" The Annals/ 524, (November, 1992): 
38-51, 49. 
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The Islamİst depiction and degrading of all rulers apart from themselves as 
an alienated and corrupt political class is often followed by (strategic) 
alliances to advance the 'cause' within the framework of the 'alien' state. 
This seems perplexing when we bear in mind the fact that Islamİst depict 
their opponents not as adversaries but enemies to be destroyed. This 
"collusion" also reveals the flexibility of Islamİst movements in choosing 
their strategies. Islamİst cadres exempt themselves from the moral standards 
they impose on others and their political maneuvering call their morality 
into question. However, such a seemingiy paradoxical behaviour of Muslim 
politicians does not represent a shift from the original discourse for two 
reasons. First, as pious and therefore rnorally sound people, Islamİst 
politicians offer thernselves as the alternative. Hence, there is no political 
prograrn that could be usedas a eriterian to check the consistency of Muslim 
politicians. What is irnportant is the accessian of Muslim politicians to 
political power who are by definition cornpetent rulers. Closely linked to 
this is the fact that participation in Islamİst rnovernents is interpreted as an 
end in itself. Participation in Islamİst mavement is depicted as the 
expressian of person's values and demonstration of a comrnitment even 
though it has no role in policy rnaking. Second, Islamİst politicians legitimize 
themselves on the basis of the achievernent of a goal, which is an ambiguous 
cultural project. As long as the goal is kept in sight, Islamists do not lose 
their legitirnacy and the seerning shifts from the goal can be justified as 
instrumental/ strategic shifts for the achievement of the goal. lt is in this 
sensethat the participation of Islarnists in the eleetaral processes does not 
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necessarily lead to the saftening of the Islamist ideology or to the 
recognition of the society as differentiated as it is. 
The daim that Islamİst cadres are the true representatives of (Muslim) 
society, points to a future Islamisation of society as well. This intention of 
Islamisation is justified on the basis of democracy, i.e. rule by (the true 
representatives) of people. The reason behind the integration of democracy 
into the Islamist discourse could be the status of democracy as a universal 
comman good of the modern world?8 However, democracy is adopted ina 
nominal fashion. Democracy is a means of expressing the will of an 
essentially Muslim na tion vis a vis the so-called alien s ta te. Islamİst 
politicians, as the true representatives of the people, will be able use political 
power to mould the society in accordance with their own imagination, and 
this will be legitimate for they are the true representatives of society. In 
effect, it is not the people but the Islamİst elite that determines what the 
"will of people" is. Islamists deserve to dominate, but damination is 
regarded as the reassertion of the true self.39 This is, in reality, a distorted 
and misleading understanding of democracy that, in effect, is a form of 
populism rather than democracy. It alsa points to a disrespect for different 
political choices, to a depiction of other political choices as manifestations of 
false-consciousness. Conscious people choose the true representatives of the 
~8 John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam" 
Middle East]ournat 45,3, (Summer, 1991): 427-440,438,440. 
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society, the Islamists. Islamist notion of democracy is, therefore, limited to 
eleetaral processes and neglects such issues as limited government, 
pluralism and accountability. In this respect, that the source of legitimacy is 
secular, that is the people, does not make Islamİst politics democratic, plural 
because "the people" is not recognized as it is but defined ina homogenous, 
de-differentiated fashion. According to Islamists, government is a product of 
society, society and government are not partially interdependent and 
partially autonomous. Hence, there is no need to be cansensus-seeking when 
ruling. Islamist politics neglects the differentiated structure of the society. 
Consequently, the notion of political liberties are interpreted ina way that 
valorizes democracy for a particular anti-democratic ideological current.40 
This, however, does not spring from the nature of the religion, Islam, but 
from the lack of any "adoptation of either the ethical and legal precepts of 
Islam, or the attitudes and institutions of traditional society, to democracy", 
despite the contrary claims of Islamists.41 But still, in their struggle to gain 
the power of the state to re-built the 'golden age', or Islamic civilization, 
Islamists, per accidens, may contribute to democracy, if the state they are 
challenging is not a democratic state either. 
39 See Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernİties (London: Verso, 1993), 29. 
40 See ibid., 115, 121 for an eloquent description of Islamİst understanding of 
democracy. 
41 See Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the 
Shi'i and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century(London: Macmillan, 
1986, [1982]), 135. 
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2. ACCOUNTING FOR ISLAMISM: P ARADOXES, CRISIS AND 
FAILURES OF MODERNIZING STATES 
By some established scholars, Islamism is explained in terms of the inability 
or dedining capabilities of the modernizing regimes to control Islam. More 
accurately, Islamism is explained asa response of "Muslim society" to a 
number of erises such as identity, socio-economic, legitimacy and 
meaning(lessness) crises.42 Such accounts takefor granted the durability of 
"Islamic bedrock."43 These accounts of Islamism actually differ in the factors 
to which they link the crises, inability or dedining capabilities of the 
modernizing regimes/states. Hence, there isa deterministic link between the 
failures of the states and the rise of Islamism, even the recent attempts to go 
beyond the modernization paradigm and essentialist conceptualization of 
Muslim society, as will be seen below, seems to bestrandedin this same 
view. There is actually not much difference between linking the rise of 
Islamism to the economic disparities or globalization, to which economic 
disparities are linked to in this era. In both, it is the state that fails and in 
-ı2 Emile Sahliyeh, "Religious Resurgence and Political Modernization," in 
Rehgious Resurgence and Poiİtİcs İn Contemporary World/ ed. idem 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), Emmanuel Sivan, "The Islamic Resurgence: 
Civil Society Strikes Back" in FundamentaHsm İn Comparatİve 
Perspectİve/ ed. Lawrence Kaplan (Amherst: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1992), 98-101. 
43 This is the view taken by, for example, Richard Bulliet Islam: The Vİew 
from the Edge (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994). Bulliet argues 
that Islam persisted at the periphery ("the edge") of the society and the 
center of society was unable to strike a deal with them because of its 
secular language. 
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both failure could be economic. Similarly, there is little difference between 
linking the emergence of Islamism to the postmodern deconstruction or 
universal erisis of modernity and the dedining capabilities of modernizing 
regimes to secure their legitimacy because the former eventually boils down 
to the latter. The only difference is the level of erisis is now higher. Most of 
the accounts that will be reviewed below are not mutually exclusive but 
overlapping. 
2.1. Islamism asa Conservative Reaction of Muslim Society to 
Modernization. 
Islamic resurgence ... is the result of the disorientation caused by rapid 
economic development and the disaffection with social change brought 
about by the transplantation of certain aspects and appurtenances of 
modernity [which is Christian] 44 
In this perspective the focus is on "Muslim society," in which Islam revives 
or resurges. Islamism is depicted asa conservative reaction of Muslim 
society to the unsettling social and economic consequences that accompany 
modernization or to the modernizing state itself on the basis of its' alienation 
from Muslim society. Islamismisan assertian of Muslim people against the 
West or Westernizing regime, but not, for example, against the 
44 P. J. Vatikiotis, "Islamic Resurgence: A Critica! View" in Islam and Powe~ 
eds. Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hilal Dessouki (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 193. 
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authoritarianism of Westernizing regimes. The underlying (Weberian) 
assumption in this approach is the definition of modernity as essentially 
Christian and a view of Islam as a religion that could not act as an agent of 
change.45 In other words, Islam is defined asa pre-industrial defensive 
culture, while the modern Western European culture is scientifically and 
technologically based industrial culture.46 Since Islam could not be an agent 
of change, it could not become the basis of a modern political order.47 
Therefore, if modernization is to take place, it will take place in spite of 
Islam. Asa corollary, the modernizing state is (has to be) by definition a 
"secular" or more accurately Islam-unfriendly state. Hence, thisisa view of 
politics with a non-accommodating, uncompromising attitude towards 
Islam. 
This approach is misleading in i ts Orientalist48 portrayal of Islam as a 
religion that could not be an agent of change. Linked to this is the 
caricaturized portrayal of Islamist movements as regressive and 
45 Vatikiotis, "Islamic Resurgence: A Critical View," 177, see also William 
Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended 
Survey(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985 [1962]), 160 and W. 
M. Watt, Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 119-120 . 
.ı6 Bassarn Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam, 5, 24, and passim. 
47 Vatikiotis, "Islamic Resurgence: A Critical View," 193 
4
s See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1987 [1978]), for a 
critique of Orientalism, which portrays the Orient, for example, as "holds 
48 
conservative movements, rejecting modernity. Islamist movements are 
considered as conservative, regressive solely by virtue of their utilization of 
religious languageintheir discourses, whereas, Islamism isa kind of 
movement aiming to reformuiate and regulate modernity by daiming the 
relevance of the Islamic principles to politics and by appropriating Islamic 
identity and values to address pressing social issues.49 W e, therefore, cannot 
say that Islamism isa rejection of modernity solely on the basis of its 
utilization of religion. The portrayal of Islamİst movements as anti-
modernization legitimizes the non-compromising and non-accommodating 
attitude of "secularist modernizing" regimes towards Islamic movements. 
Muslim countries within this framework have two options: either 
(authoritarian) modernization or Islamisation. The paradox here is that the 
uneven process of modernization will constantly produce dislocations, 
which is considered to be the source of Islamic resurgence. As such, this 
approach is too "mechanical" inthesense that it neglects various 
possibilities of politics. Why is it, for example, that it is not the "secular 
ideologies" addressing the same issue of dislocation which do not resurge 
and why is it only Islam(ism) which resurges? The answer to these questions 
boils down to an Orientalist concept of Muslim society and/ or Islam, but is 
little belief in progress and change, and finds salvation only in the 
hereafter." 310, 310-314, and passim. 
4
'1 Lionel Caplan, "Introduction" in Studies in Religious Fundamentalism, ed. 
Idem (London: Macınillan Press, 1987), Haldun Gulalp, "A Postmodern 
Reaction to Dependent Modernization: The Social and Histarical Roots of 
Islamic Radicalism" New Perspectives on Turkey, 8 (Fall, 1992)15-26, C. E. 
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there a Muslim society and are modern societies culturally homogenous are 
the questions that are left unaddressed. 
2.2. Islamism asa Consequence of the Failures of Modemizing State 
This perspective on Islamism is the most often employed perspective and 
links the resurgence of Islam or more accurately the rise of Islamism to the 
failures of the modernizing state. The general picture of this perspective is 
that, in order to keep Islam in its "proper" place, a strong state is needed; the 
failures of the modernizing state in delivering the promised goods or in 
providing a meaningful Weltanschauung, weakens the state, which is the 
ageney to control Islam; therefore (civil) society, which turns out to be not 
only Muslim but also Islamist, strikes-back in the form of resurgence.50 The 
modernizing states could be liberal, socialist or Marxist, and we can 
understand where their strength is derived from by looking at what they 
mean by failure. Failure means either failure in delivering the promised 
goods of modernization or failure in overcoming the alienation of society 
from the state.51 In the latter case it may become visible asa consequence of 
Butterworth and I. W. Zartman, "Foreword" TheAnnals524, (November, 
1992) 8-12, and Halliday, "The Politics of Islam: A Second Look." 
50 Emmanuel Sivan, "The Islamic Resurgence: Civil Society Strikes Back," 98-
101. 
51 See for example Hasan Hanafi, "The Origins of Modern Conservatism and 
Islamic Fundamentalism" in Ernest Gellner, ed. Islamic Dilemmas: 
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modernization rather than the lack of it. Viewed from a different angle, the 
failures-approach associates the strength of state either with effective 
administration or cultural uunification." In both cases, the failures-approach 
converge with the claims of Islamism according to which state is culturally 
alienated from society and the country is undeveloped. 
2.2L:Eailure// as Cultura!Alienation 
For Emmanuel Sivan and Serif Mardin, failure is the inability of the secular 
modernizing state uto modify its people's corevaluesin relation to the 
ultimate meaning of life" in the process of modernization.52 It isimportant to 
note that failure here is not in carrying out modernization reforms but in 
giving a sense to them. In this respect, failure could be seen asa consequence 
of further modernization which produces "social mobility" and 
uimmigration." These, in turn, produce insecure people displaced from their 
own communities and desperately in need of a meaning. Kemalism, or other 
modernizing ideologies, fail exactly at this point. Because modernizing 
regimes are culturally alienated, they could not provide a social ethos that 
Reformers/ Nationalists and Industrialization: The Southem Shore of the 
Mediterranean (Berlin, Mouton Publishers, 1985). 
52 Sivan "The Islamic Resurgence: Civil Society Strikes Back," 100, Serif 
Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey" in Islam in the Political 
Processes/ ed. James Piscatori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 155-156, and Serif Mardin, "Islam in Mass Society" in Politics in the 
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appeals to the heart as well as to the mind of people.53 Modernization fails 
because it could not legitimize its own rationality. Islam persisted at the 
edge of the society, and only the center was secularized. Therefore, there 
appears a disjunction between "the people" and the political center. People 
ask questions to which Islamic answers are more convincing.54 Hence, 
Islamism occurs as a consequence of further modernization and it becomes 
an expressian of discontent about the alienation of the state from the 
(Muslim) society. 
This approach actually springs from the Weberian approach to religion 
which functionalizes religion as a meaning-provider and which links 
successful modernization to a proper (rationalist) culture such as "Protestant 
ethic."55 "Modernization", in this picture, "carries with it a canception of a 
relatively autonomous individual ... {who} requires a society in which he 
feels like a full participating member, whose goals he shares and can 
meaningfully contribute to" and the success of a modernizing society is 
"partly dependent on its success in the field of meaning and motivation."56 
Third Turkish Republic/ eds. M. Heper andA. Evin (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1994). 
53 Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey" 156. See also Hakan 
Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey" 
Comparative Politics/ 30, 1 (October, 1997): 63-82, 64 
54 See Bulliet, Islam: The View From the Edge, 189-200 
55 More will be said on W eber in next chapter. 
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What is assessed within this framework (of meaning provision) is the 
modernizing ideology in question, for example, Kemalism rather than Islam. 
For example, Kemalism as a meaning-provider has been meaningful only for 
a small educated/Westernized elite and modernization, therefore, failed. 
As such this approach underplays the importance of the role of the 
"modernization theory," or, should one say, the modernizing ideology, in 
providing meaning and motivation. Modernization theory, as Jeffrey C. 
Alexander argued, "functioned as a metalanguage that instructed people 
ho w to li ve" by turning "a historically specific categorical scheme in to a 
scientific theory of development applicable to any culture araund the entire 
world."57 In other words, to the extent that Kemalism has been a 
modernizing regime, not only its relations with the Muslim society but also 
international social theory had been a source of i ts legitimacy as well. 
It seems Islam could step in two different ways asa response to the failure of 
modernizing ideology to provide a meaning. Firstly, Islam could "softly" 
step in to redress the balance broken by the overmaterialization and 
overrationalization of life by providing a stable refuge. Hence, it has been 
suggested that psychological and cultural dimensions of the recent visibility 
of Islam are the most important aspects of relieving the everyday life of the 
56 R. N. Bellah, Be yon d Beli e!- Essa ys on ReHgion in a Post-traditionaiİst 
World//(Berkeley, L. A: University of California Press, 1991), 159,73. 
57 See Jeffrey Alexander, "Modern, Anti, Post and Neo", 69, 71. 
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masses from the austerity of modernization.58 Islam in this picture 
complements the material dissatisfactions with the ethical principles that 
could not be provided by Kemalism. Islam in this perspective counters the 
destructive tendendes of modernization. As such, Islam as ethic-provider is 
neither oppositional nor political nor ideological. Indeed, to the extent that 
Islamic modernization is possible, it could become a soft ideology providing 
a meaning to life and modernization. Here, a functional definition of religion 
is employed and religion, therefore, is equated with the political ideologies 
performing the same function of "meaning provision." 
Secondly, Islam could step in to resolve the (political) issue of cultural 
alienation of the state from the society and the erosion of indigenous cultural 
values due to Westernization, by attempting to replace the Kemalist project 
in a reactionist manner through political means. In this respect, Islam steps 
in not as a psychological religion but as a political religion challenging the 
current order so as to bring the state closer to the society. In this political 
stepping in, too, Islam could be a modemizing, but this time in a way that 
challenges to the s ta te' s version and aims to revitalize the Islamic 
ci viliza tion. 
The idea that the ("secular") state is culturally alienated from the society and 
therefore cannot integrate people into its modernization drive implies that 
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religion in some way has to be integrated to the modernizing ideology of the 
regime.59 This is because it is assumed that successful modemization 
requires a meaning. This might well be true. But unless we pose the question 
"w hat sort of accommodation/ deal," we might either play right in to the 
hands of Islamists or produce other problems that would spring from the 
communitarian nature of a deal.60 To pay attention to this question one must 
prioritize the institutional set up of politics rather than the cultural 
alienation of the modernizing state. This is because if one focuses solely on 
the cultural aspects of the modernizing-secular regime, the resolution of the 
above problem would likely to be cultural/Islamic unification of the state 
and society, which is precisely what Islamists daim. But, if in the resolution 
of the issue of cultural alienation a concept of homogenous society is 
58 Metin Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern 
Perspective" TheMİddleEast]ournal35, (1981), 345-363,363. 
59 By employing traditional-modern dichotomy, we might, alternatively, 
think that modernizing regimes aimed to turn traditional sectors of society 
by a project of social engineering so as to make all people subscribe to the 
values of the center, thereby resolve the issue of cultural alienation 
gradually. One can also draw the conclusion that the modernizing state 
should keep pursuing its project from the cultural alienation thesis. In this 
way, anti-participatoriness of the modernizing regimes could be explained: 
participation is based on the precondition of being "modern" first. Thus, 
seems to be a justification for anti-participatoriness. As Ghassan Salame 
pointed out "secularization too often meant the exclusion of those who, in 
the name of tradition, required this modern machine [the state] to be 
accountable." See his "Introduction: Where are the Democrats?," 13. 
Focusing on the cultural aspects of modernizing regime, or Islamism, may 
lead us to neglect/justify the undemocratic political consequences of 
modernization. Therefore, this study attempts to focus on political sphere 
to assess the regime/movement in question in terms of democracy and 
pluralism. 
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employed, in this case, society will be considered asa community and the 
differentiated structure of the society will be ignored in terms of not all 
sectors of society being culturally alienated from the state. The issue 
concerning the "problem" of Islamism is not cultural but political, and a 
political issue could best be resolved by political measures rather than 
cultural ones. Also, if we bear in mind the fact that modernizing regimes are 
not necessarily super-secular regimes and they, too, have often resorted to 
religion to legitimize their ends, the question of failure turns out to be a 
question of politics rather than of cultural alienation. The question could, 
therefore, be the political and institutional set up rather than cultural 
alienation. Even if we accept the point that cultural alienation from the state 
has been the issue, it is useful onlyasa starting point for studying current 
Islamism. Otherwise, we might misleadingly consider Islamist movements 
as the "true" representatives of society. 
2 2 2 Failure in Delivering the Promi2ed Good'i 
The term failure is most often usedin the sense of the failure of modernizing 
state in delivering its promised goods in responding to the socio-economic 
needs of society or as a product of the frustration with the promises of 
60 See below promotion of Islam by the state as an unsuccessful attempt to 
strike a deal with Islam. 
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Westernist modernization.61 These failures becomes apparent generally with 
the dismantling of the old "social contract" and the inability of secular 
regimes to maintain the clientalist ties, for example by neo-liberal economic 
policies.62 With this approach, "broken promises" becomes a representative 
of the erisis of Kemalist ideology and Islamism becomes an inevitable 
expressian of dissatisfaction rather than a political choice for the expressian 
of discontent. Hence, the relation between Kemalism and Islamism is in 
either 1 or terms and those who subscribe to Islamism are reduced to the 
economically marginalized sector of the society only. In this picture, 
Islamism is equated with the "losers" of the modernization process, be them 
the small bourgeoisie or the gecekondu settlers. The argument that Islamİst 
movements perform better in eleetaral terms because of their charity 
activities is based on this perspective. Alternatively, it is misleadingly 
suggested that, Islamİst perform better because "religious ideologies do not 
disappoint in the same way [as secular ideologies which offer material 
61 John L. Esposito, "Islam and Muslim Politics" in Voices of Resurgent 
Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), ll; 
Haldun Gulalp, "The Crisis of Westernization in Turkey: Islamism vs. 
Nationalism," Innova tion, 8, 2, (1995): 175-182; Mark Tessler, "The Origins 
of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy 
Analysis" in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, ed. John 
Pitelis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Jeff Haynes, Religion 
in Third World Politics (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), 145; 
Ayubi, Political Islam, 212; Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993", 
486; Basam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam,. Jurgensmeyer, The New 
C old War? 194. 
62 Assuruing that the old social contract was not democratic in the 
modernizing authoritarian regimes, the dismantling of it could be 
considered as an opportunity for a new democratic "social contract." 
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benefits] because they [i.e. the expectations created by religious ideologies] 
are not expected to be fulfilled in this world" 63 
Consequently, the solution to the "problem" of Islamism is some kind of 
equal distribution of wealth by the state or charity activities by the secular 
NGOs, or simply by more modernization.64 In other words, the solution for 
this perspective is administrative in the sense that a prudent government 
that will address the grievances of ordinary people will resolve the issue. 
Assuroing that only the marginalized sector supports the Islamist movement 
makes this approach is deterministic in the sense that it assumes certain 
economic facts determine certain political outcomes. This approach thereby 
does not heed political sphere as providing different channels for expressian 
of discontent. 
But more importantly, this approach deduces the failure of modernization 
solely from the presence of Islamism. This is because this approach employs 
an either 1 or logic and i ts underlying concept of secularism proposes the 
decline of religion as modernization proceeds. It is true that Islamists argue 
63 Mark Jurgensmeyer, The New Cold War~ 194 As noted above, Islamist 
movements are essentially this worldly salvationist movements, offering 
material goods. Therefore Jurgensmeyer's argument here seems to 
defective. The legitimacy of Islamist movements is at least partially 
dependent upon the delivery of the material goods. 
64 This is also the perspective Atatürkcu Dusunce Dernegi and the 
Republican Peoples Party in Turkey. See Kazancigil, "Democracy in 
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that modernization has failed but by which indisputable criteria can we 
judge thesuccessor failure of modernization? W as there a deadline for 
modernization to succeed by? W as the legitimacy of the state based solely on 
delivery, and if so why? In order for this argument to be convincing, it must 
first show how the modernizing s ta te based i ts legitimacy solely on delivery. 
The positive point of the failures thesis is that it does not link the emergence 
of Islamism to the religiosity of people but to their political experience. This 
approach, on the whole, has the merit of drawing our attention to double-
edgedness of modernization process and to the fact that resurgence isa 
reaction to unevenness in modernization, rather than modernization per se. 
In this way, this approach emphasizes the fact that Islamism is actually 
about daiming a stake in modernization process. But, since this is basically a 
political economy approach, it neglects the cultural dimension in daiming a 
stake in modernization process. 
2.3. Islamism as a "Paradoxical" Outcome of Modemization. 
Modernization, in above explanations is conceived "despite Islam," but 
modernization in both economic, social and political aspects creates an 
opportunity for the revitalization of Islam in a "Muslim society" as welL The 
presence of the modern state apparatus and increasing ability of state to 
Muslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective" for a similar 
argument linking the rise of WP to socio-economic inequalities. 
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control the lives of its subjects may lead to expectation of a responsiveness 
by the s ta te to the Islami c concerns of Muslim "citizens."65 Also, it could be 
suggested that modernization in communications and education enables 
Islam to revitalize itself better, i.e., it provides better opportunities for the 
expressian and representation of Islamic concerns. Gellner's sociology of 
Islam suggests that modernity led to renewal of the essence of Muslims 
under new conditions. Gellner identifies two versions of Islam: high and 
low. High Islam, under modern conditions, according to Gellner, functions 
like W eber' s Protestant ethic. It is therefore, compatible with capitalİst 
enterprise, accumulation and capitalİst development.66 
Alternatively, secular and therefore alien states may manipulate religious 
symbols to prop up their legitimacy and this may create an opportunity for 
Islamism (see below). Politically, in the case of Turkey, the 'liberal' 
constitution of 1960 has eased the birth of Islamism by allowing the 
emergence of political pluralism.67 Such democratization eventually led to 
the infiHration of peripheral, by definition Islamic, elements to the center, 
65 R. M. Burell, "Introduction: Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East -
A Survey of lts Origins and Diversity", in Islamic Fundamentalism, ed. 
Idem., Papers read at a seminar held at SOAS, University of London, on 
March 10th 1988.(London: Royal Asiatic Society Seminar Papers No. 1, 
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland), 10-11. 
66 See Sami Zubaida, "Is There a Muslim Society?" 151-188. 
67 Sabri Sayari, "Politicization of Islamic Re-traditionalism" in Islam and 
Politics in the Middle Easteds., Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1984). 
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which historicaily had kept Islam on the periphery. To the extent that 
Islamism is considered to be a "problem" as far as 
modernization/ democratization is concerned, this approach draws our 
attention to the trade-oH between Westernization and control, participation 
and stability if we are to remain within the paradigm of Westernization. It 
also implicitly suggests that modernizing regimes should never be 
popularized and pluralized, if modernization process is to continue. 
Economicaily, the National Outlook mavement was born asa consequence 
of further economic modernization, which was benefidal more to the big 
bourgeoisie than to the smail one. This economic modernization resulted in 
the widening of the gap between the interests of these two groups. National 
Outlook mavement emerged as an outspan of Justice Party, representing a 
conservative group of the smail bourgeoisie. The smail bourgeoisie, in this 
picture, is considered to be essentially Islamist. 
2.4. Promotion of Islam by the State 
In the case of Turkey, as will be seen below, Kemalism was not a super-
secular ideology, it persistently used religion for (legitimizing) its own 
modernizing ends68 and to maintain the political community. The official 
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appeal to Islam, it seems, was informed by Durkeimian-Parsonian views on 
the place of religion in modern society, i.e. civil religion that legitimizes the 
modernizing ends and maintains the moral community. In this respect, 
depoliticization of religion has been a myth. While real religion was 
considered to be an impediment to modernization, religion was also 
considered to be functional in holding the society together. In explaining the 
, 
rise ofIslamismin Turkey, some of the accounts point to the change in the 
official ideology of the state with regards to Islam. Heper points out that 
Islam along with "science" w as recognized as an element of Turkish identity 
in the 1980s.69 This change in the approach of the state, at first sight, could be 
considered as a compromising attitude of the Kemalist state towards Islam 
and an attempt by the state to bridge the gap created by the above 
mentioned cultural alienation of the state from society. It could also be 
suggested that the appeal of the state to Islam in the post-1980 period 
68 See Ataturlç Din ve Laiklik, 1968, Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi üzel 
Yayin, no:2 Istanbul, Mentes, for one of Ataturk's speeches illustrating the 
point here. Also, the President of the Turkish Republic in 1960s, Cemal 
Gursel, stated that "[t]hose who blame religion for our backwardness are 
wrong. No, the cause of our backwardness is not religion but those who 
have misinterpreted our religion to us. Islam is the most sacred, most 
constructive, most dynamic and powerful religion in the world. It 
demands of those who believe in this faith always to achieve progress and 
higher wisdom. But for centuries Islam has been explained to us negatively 
and incorrectly. That is why we are lagging behind the nations of the 
world" cited in Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1982)150. This statement illustrates what the 
official appeals to Islam was informed from. See also Bahir M. Erureten, 
"Turk Devrimin ve Islama Bakisi" Cumhuriyet February 13, 1996 for an 
illustration of Kemalism's view of Islam from a Kemalist perspective. 
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contributed to the rise ofIslamismin Turkey by "normalizing" Islamic 
discourses inthepublic sphere?0 
The shift, however, was an instrumental accommodation with Islam to 
maintain political community in accordance with the Kemalist visian of 
classless society, maintenance of which became impossible due to the 
liberalization of the economy in the 1980s. Asa consequence, Islam was 
promoted both as the unifying factor and also in order to disguise the 
differentiated nature of society in the 1980s. The strength of Islam, in this 
picture, is an unintended consequence of political volte face of the 
republican elite, rather than revival of a latent cultural item.71 To the extent 
that the Islamist mavement in the 1990s get out of the control of the state, it 
could be suggested that Kemalism has fallen into its own trap by 
legitimizing Islamİst discourses. This approach is accurate in not linking 
Islamism to Islam and/ or Muslim society and emphasizing the role of the 
"secular" state in the normalization and revitalization of Islam. However, it 
tells little about the better performance of the mavement whose 
69 Metin Heper, "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in 
Comparative Perspective" British Journal of Mi d die Eastern Studies/ 28, 
(1991): 38-55, 53-54. 
70 Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals: Revalt against Industry and 
Technology" in Turkey and the West: lmages of a New Political Culture 
eds., Metin Heper et. al.(London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1993), 
243. 
71 Faruk Birtek and Binnaz Toprak, "Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal 
Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: Hazards of 
Rewriting Modernity" Praxis InternationaL 13, 2 (1993), 192-212, 194. 
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interpretation of Islam is not only among many others but also challenging 
to that of the state. 
2.5. "Fundamentalism" asa Reaction to Globalization(s) 
There are recent attempts for alternative accountings of Islamism going 
beyond the cantext of nation-state as the sole circumstance of Islamism. The 
starting point for these attempts is the Giddensian belief that globalization 
should have a key position in the lexicon of social scientists because there 
has been a steadily increasing trend of globalization in the last decades so 
that world has become increasingly interconnected and "societies are no 
longer simply tied to single places or particular times." 72 Hence, since we all 
share a common social environment, boundaries are losing their meaning 
and the concepts (East vs. West, Orient vs. Occident) we have thus far used 
are made redundant. The rhetoric of globalization claims that the autonomy 
of the national states losing i ts meaning in the face of increasing 
globalization because the power of the state under globalization shifts 
upwards to international organizations such as the IMF, sideways to 
international corporations and downwards through decentralization to local 
72 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1990), see also Evan Luard, The Globalization of Politics: The 
Changed Focus of Political Action in the Modern World, (London: 
Macmillan, 1990), R. Friedland and D. Boden, "NowHere: An 
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governments?3 There are many "independent" nation-states devoid of 
substance in economic, military and political terms. States arenolonger able 
to provide cultural identity, physical security and economic well being. 
Since issues such as the ecology and poverty are now global problems, 
affecting not only the people who face them, there are hardly national 
solutions to them. As a consequence, the sphere of politics is extended 
beyond the nation-state, the traditional domain of politics?4 Globalization 
basically means a new structuration of the playing field of politics?5 Hence, 
in the light of this sea of change, it is asserted, approaching Islamism from a 
globalization perspective would gave way to a better understanding of the 
Introduction" in NowHere: Space/ Time and Modernity eds., idem 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 
73 Susan Strange, "The Defective State" Daedalus/ 124, 2, (1995): 55-74 on the 
dedining capabilities of the state see also David Held, Democracy and the 
Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Govemance, 
(Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 136, 176-185, David Held and 
Anthony McGrew "Globalization and Liberal Democratic State," 
Governmentand Opposition 28, 2, (1993): 261-288. Barrie Axford, TJıe 
Global System: Economics/ Politics and Culture/ (New York: St. Martin' s 
Press, 1995), 152-164. For a dissident view on the decline of the state thesis 
see Leo Panitch, "Globalization, States and Left Strategies," Socialfustice, 
23, 1-2, (1996): 79-90. Panitch argues that the decline of state thesis vis a vis 
capital overestimates the previous power of nation-state in controlling 
capital and ignores the role played today by the states in facilitating 
globalization. Also Philip Cerny takes globalization notasa decline of the 
state but transformatian of nation-state into a competition state, which is 
no longer able to pursue a common good but more powerful to monitor 
economic activity. See his "Paradoxes of Competition State: The Dynamics 
of Political Globalization" Government and Opposition, 32, 2 (Spring 
1997): 251-274, 251. 
74 Susan Strange, "The Limits of Politics" Govemment and Opposition 30, 3, 
(1995): 291-311 
75 Philip Cerny, "Paradoxes of Competition State .. " 253. 
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phenomenon. Below, first the discourse of globalization, then the 
accountings for Islamism on the basis of globalization will be reviewed. 
The process of globalization is defined ina number of ways and with each 
definition of globalization, conceptualization of Islamic movements changes. 
One of them is that globalization is a trend, culturally and institutionally, 
towards homogenization of the world. As such globalization is actually 
Westernization by another name?6 By homogenization it is usually meant 
the undebatable triumph of the Western liberal democracy. The end of 
history thesis, which depicts liberal-capitalist "democracy" as the last point, 
or synthesis, that the world society has reached, is an exemplar. From this 
perspective, Islamist movements could be depicted as both anti-Westernist 
and anti-modernİst reactions to globalization and as an outcome of the 
global delegitimization of the authoritarian modernizing regimes, which 
now turned out to be non-modernizing as well. The clash of civilizations 
thesis could be situated in this definition as well.77 In this picture, the global 
sphere is divided into civilizational spheres in which states collaborate along 
civilizational lines vis a vis other civilizations. The clash of civilizations 
perspective not only denies the possibility of modernization without 
Westernization but also signals the end of modernization as Westernization, 
76 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 'Globalization as Hybridization', in Global 
Modemities, eds., Mike Featherstone et al, (London: Sage Publications, 
1995). 
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for it takes culture as something that cannot be changed. It considers identity 
politics in general as an anomaly and therefore conflicts with the thesis that 
globalization isa process producing identity politics. It also seems to 
indicate a replacement of the cold war with the clash of civilizations. 
Globalization could also be considered as an extension of modernization 
theory inthesense that it argues that the modernization of the West has 
directly resulted in the spread of certain institutions of the West such as the 
nation-state and capitalİst economics. But, this global spread resulted ina 
new social unit which is more than the simple expansion of the Western 
modernity or homogenization?8 The structures such as the nation-state may 
well be the original products of Western modernity, but these structures 
produce distinct localities. As Talal Asad pointed out, "the idea that cultural 
borrowing must lead to total homogeneity and to loss of authenticity is 
clearly absurd, but the idea of projects' having translatable histarical 
structures should not be confused with it."79 
Globalization isa process that indicates an increasing awareness of the 
world becoming a single place, which in turn generates an awareness of 
77 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs/ 72, 3, 
(Summer, 1993): 22-49. 
78 Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture 
(London: Sage Publications, 1992). 
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cultural difference. It corrodes inherited or constructed identities and calls 
upon various collectivities to declare their identities because the process of 
globalization weakens the state and its ability to provide identity /meaning. 
Consequently, globalization is a process producing strivings for recognition 
of cultural differences, i.e. identity politics, at the global sphere.80 Islamism, 
in this picture, could be considered as a movement aiming at the global 
recognition of Islamasa legitimate, equal and respectful identity. In this 
sense, it makes little sense to consider Islamic movements as anti-modern 
movements in a context modern institutions are globally spread. This is one 
way of seeing Islamism from globalization perspective. As such, Islamism is 
an aspect rather than a reaction to globalization process. But, if/when 
Islamism involves a struggle beyond the recognition of Islamic identity, this 
approach becomes inadequate. 
Viewed from the globalization perspective, Islamİst movements are prone to 
be seen as conservative movements and are prone to be caricaturized as 
"fundamentalist" movements. Indeed, religious movements in the 
globalization perspective are generally referred to as de-differentiating 
79 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam/ (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993), 13. 
80 see for example Robertson, Globalization, 183, Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 
"Globalization and Culture: Three Paradigms," Economic and Political 
Week]~ (June, 1996): 1389-1393, see also Raymond L. Lee, 
"Modernization, Postmodernism and the Third World" Current Sociology, 
42, 2 (Summer, 1994): 1-64, Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State" 
Daedalus 124, 2 (1995). 
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fundamentalist reactions to the process of globalization, defined as either a 
trend towards homogenization or as postmodern ephemarality or as 
ambivalence. Even if the process of globalization is employed in other senses 
than Westernization, almost all varieties of globalization actually replace the 
traditional-modern dichotomy with the global-locaL They trace the origins 
of religious movements to the ascendance of modernity and reduce them all 
to the fundamentalist movements which attempt to use aspects of religion 
for coping and shaping the world. The globalization perspective, then, as 
will be seen below, tends to become "the old wine in new bottles," replacing 
the category of modernity with the category of globalization. It might be 
suggested that the explanation which offers globalization as leading to the 
rise of religious movements is inadequate, because the effects of 
globalization is not the same everywhere, which invites us to a study of local 
context as well. In other words, globalization perspective could be too 
homogenizing, for it may lead us to neglect the local contexts. 
2 .5. 1 Globa!ization as Postmodemity 
This perspective could be considered as an extension of the above 
mentioned account that portrays Islamism as a conservative reaction of 
Muslim society to the process of modernization. This approach differs from 
the above mentioned approach in the subject that fundamentalism reacts 
against. Islamism is portrayed as fundamentalism, which now reacts to the 
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process of globalization, multiculturalism, and postmodern pluralism. 
Postmodernization is actually associated with the process of secularization, 
"because it is difficult for religions to protect themselves from the critique of 
postmodern culture which regards all religious accounts of the world as 
merely 'grand narratives' ."81 In this picture, Islamism, in effect, tums out to 
be a reaction to secularism via reaction to postmodernization. As such, the 
only difference of this approach is the replacement of the dichotomy of the. 
modem vs. traditional with the dichotomy of the postmodern vs. modern. 
Indeed, Bryan S. Tumer suggests that "fundamentalism appears now ... as 
the defender of the project of modernity against the disjointed pluralism of 
postmodernity ."82 
In this approach, globalization involves the spread of Western life-style and 
consumerism to the Rest of the world in an hyperreal fashion, that is as free-
floating signifiers disengaged from its origins.83 In this context, religious 
faith is threatened and revitalized by the commodification of everyday life, 
which offers a range of possible life-styles that competes and contradicts 
81 Bryan S. Turner, Orientalism/ Postmodemism and Globalism/ (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 185. 
82 Bryan S. Turner, Orientalism/ Postmodernism and Globalism/ 80. 
83 Lee, "Modernization, Postınodernism and the Third World", 29 Timothy 
W. Luke, "New World Order or New World Orders: Power, Politics and 
Ideology in Informationalizİng Glocalities," in Global Modemities/ eds., 
Mike Featherstone et al, (London: Sage Publications, 1995). 
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with the uniform life style demanded by Islamism.84 In such a fragmented, 
fluid and differentiated context, which lacks a dominant ideology, 
fundamentalism is defined as an attempt of de-differentiation, asa collective 
nostalgia that seeks to restructure the world in terms of more simple entities 
and communal relations. Fundamentalism isa conservative reaction to 
maintain the local regulation of the life world vis a vis the postmodem 
ephemerality of consumerism.85 Fundamentalism, therefore, provides a rock 
standing out in an ocean of doubt. In this context, it is said that 
fundamentalism "is promoted not by social change, but by the pace of 
transformative process and by its magnitude that goes beyond culturally 
and intellectually determined possibilities to comprehend the world"86 
Islam, in this picture assumes the W eberian function of religion, which is 
meaning provision, but notina manner legitimizing the postmodernity. 
This approach is deterministic in the sense that it assumes that sociological 
aspects of modern society determines the political outcomes, whereas, in 
reality they provide the raw material of the politics, which is anather process 
of meaning-making. This sociological approach focuses on the capability of 
religion to supply ideas of orderliness, normative guidelines for action and 
84 Turner, Orientalism/ Postmodernism and Globalism/ lO, 90. 
85 Turner, Orientalism/ Postmodernism and Globalism/ 74, 78, 184-186. 
86 Bronislaw Misztal and Anson Shupe, "Making Sense of the Global Revival 
of Fundamentalism" in Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: 
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the ultimate grounds for meaning, but neglects "the societal forces which 
shape and constrain the social construction of meaning."87 In this 
perspective, fundamentalism seems to arise inevitably because the 
mesmerized people can not comprehend the things going around them and 
resort to religion to curb 1 control the speed of social change in a conservative 
way. By implication, those who are not fundamentalists are capable, 
intellectually, of comprehending the world around them, and happy with 
the changes taking place because they do not use religion to cope with and 
change the world. Hence, the pace of change is actually subjective rather 
than objective. 
25.2 Globalization as Vozd and Revitalization ofldentities 
The leading theorist of globalization, Roland Robertson, and his colleagues 
advanced a view of globalization in which there isa problem of order. While 
the world increasingly becomes a single place, a problem of "societal order" 
in relation to "global order" emerges, and cultures, doctrines, and ideologies 
becomes relativized.88 This is because, first, the process of globalization calls 
The Revival Religious Fundamentalism in East and West (London: 
Preager, 1992), 5, emphasis added. 
87 James Beckford, Religion and Advanced Industrial Sade~ (London: 
Unwin Hyman, 1989), 167 see also Daniel Levine, 'Religion and Politics in 
Comparative and Historical Perspective', Comparative Politics/ 19, 1, 
(1986): 95-102, 97. 
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upon the collectivities to declare their identities. Secondly, globalization 
undermines the capabilities of the state which is the main ageney providing 
order and Weltanschauung while there are frail global equivalents of it.89 
Consequently, the emerging "global society is anything but a stable 
harmonious, cohesive system in rough equilibrium."90 Globalization 
"produces yawning gaps between the ideological (even metaphysical) needs 
of peoples to maintain a rneaningful Weltanschauung and the capabilities of 
the culture-producing political regirnes to provide thern."91 This leads to 
"political-ideological and religious rnovernents ... in reference to the issue of 
defining societies in relationship to the rest of the world and the global 
circurnstance as a whole."92 It is in such a situation that religion steps in to 
provide a rneaning, identity and order vis a vis the chaos/ ambivalence. 
Religio-political rnovements search for fundarnentals, and the 'search for 
fundarnentals' is an aspect of, rather than a reaction to, globalization. In this 
sense, the 'search for fundarnentals' is universal and each 'search for 
fundarnentals' is actually the particularization of the universal 'search for 
fundarnentals'. These searches involves atternpts to enhance the power of 
the groups concerned. The enhancernent is to spring from representation of 
88 Robertson, Globalization, 69, 87. 
89 See inter alia, Zygrnunt Baurnan, "Searching for a Center that Holds" in 
Global Modernities/ eds., Mike Featherstone et al, (London: Sage 
Publications, 1995). 
90 Peter Beyer, Religion and Globalization (Sage, London: 1994), 105. 
91 Misztal and Shupe, 'Making Sense of the Global Revival of Religion', 8. 
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authenticity /identity, for the search for fundamentals means/involves, 
according to Robertson, identity 1 authenticity representation as a daim to 
power.93 This is the conservative type of publicly influential religion.94 The 
conservative option is a purifying, defensive and communitarian option that 
aims to maintain the control of local life vis a vis globalization. It is a 
particularistic revitalization of tradition. It is a political option seeking to 
restore the moral community by getting rid of Westoxification or by aiming 
to make "America great again."95 Conservative type of publicly influential 
religion is a vital element of globalization and is the most amplified and 
visible type of religion in today's world. New Christian Right in America, 
Islamic Revolution in Iran and the New Religious Zionism in Israel are the 
exemplars. 
Beyer also identifies a liberal type of publicly influential religion, which not 
de-differentiating and totalizing. Liberal publicly influential religion, 
functions as a cultural resource system for solving the problems generated in 
other spheres and akin to new social movements.96 It acidresses the ineome 
92 Robertson, Globalization, 69-70. 
93 ibid., 166-180. 
94 Beyer, Religion and Globalization 90-93. 
95 see for example Jurgensmeyer The New Cold War? on world-wide 
resurgence of "religious nationalist" movements which diagnose the 
source of all social problems as the lack of moral community. 
96 New social movements generally advocate a new social paradigm that 
contrasts with the dominant goal structure, intentionally remain outside 
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inequalities, the ethos of community ete. It is a more tolerant variant of 
publicly influential religion in that it "may, but need not be, 
'dedifferentiating'." It takes up the values of an emerging culture. The 
Liberation theological Mavement in Latin America and Religious 
Environmentalism provide are the exemplars of the liberal type of publicly 
influential religion.97 
If in Turner' s account fundamentalism is a reaction to postmodern 
ephemerality, here it is the revitalization of Islamic identity in reaction to the 
ambivalence/void created by globalization. However, as such, globalization 
does not adequately account for Islamism as a search for fundamentals. This 
is because by taking the weakening of the capacities of states for granted, 
globalization perspective rejects the possibility of search for fundamentals 
on different grounds. In other words, on what terms the identity of the 
society will be represented is a contingent (local) matter. Therefore, the 
globalization perspective only provides the ground on which the search for 
fundamentals has been made. But, it does not account for why this search for 
fundamentals and/ or authenticity is made predominantly through Islam 
nowadays. Why should the inability of the state to provide a stable identity 
be translated in to Islamic reassertion? In other words, why Islamismand/or 
the institutional framework of government, prefer to influence public 
opinion and violate the Olson's logic of collective action for their goals go 
beyond the goals of group members. See Dalton J. Russell and Manfred 
Kuechler, eds., Challenging Political Order: New Social and Political 
Movements in Western Democracies (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990). 
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Islamİst nationalism, and why not, for example, secular nationalism? The 
globalization perspective cannot adequately answer this question perhaps 
because it takes for granted the decline of the state, which is considered to be 
the patent-owner of the project of nationalism. But, the idea that the 
capabilities of the states are decreasing could be a myth. For example, 
Edward Tiryakiyan draws attention to East Asia, where "nationalism has 
effectively been used in the mobilization of the population to achieve global 
competitiveness on a par with the former "developed world" where 
economic prowess has provided a new channel for expressing the national 
pride anda determination to refuse kowtow to the Western daim of 
possessing a universal model of development."98 Therefore, as Clammer 
pointed out, the globalization perspective "is not a substitute for a detailed 
histarical analysis of examples"99 
2 .5.3 Neo-liberal G!obalization and Multi-valar Global Order 
:l 
In this picture, the dismantling of communist bloc results in the emergence 
of a polycentric world with a shared commitment to the market. 100 It also 
97 Beyer, Religion and Globalization 105-109, see also 135-159 and 206-224. 
98 Edward A. Tiryakiyan, "The Wild Cards of Modernity," 170. 
99 Clammer, Dillerence and Modemity, 125. 
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results in the dismantling of the old international"social contract." Hence, 
the clientele state system that was operative in thebi-polar world is 
dismantled. The USA is no langer the global hegemon because accumulation 
is globalized and other centers of economic power such as Japan have 
emerged. The links between the global cantext and the emergence of 
Islamism is based on the argument that when there was a clientele state 
system during thebi-polar world, the USA was able to support client states 
in keeping Islam in its proper place. In other words, the subjugation of Islam 
was done by the state and the capabilities of the state were dependent upon 
the support of the USA. Now that the USA is no langer a global hegemon its 
ability to support the states has declined, and the rise of Islam is linked to 
this fact. 101 Hence, Cyrus Bina proposed that "Islamic revivalism, therefore, 
can be regarded as a political response to decline of the client-state 
system."102 Alternatively, it is suggested, what paved way to 
fundamentalism was the former strategy of promoting conservative Islamic 
regimes in Muslim countries as a bulwark against communism and as a 
tactical resource for controlling Arab oil by Western liberalism.103 
100 John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, 
Territory and Intemational Political Economy, (London: Routledge, 1995), 
193. 
101 See Cyrus Bina, 'Towards a New World Order: US Hegemony, Chent-
States and Islamic Alternative' in Islam/ Muslims/ and the Modem State: 
Case Studies of MuslimsIn Thirteen Co un tries/ (New York: St. Martin' s 
Press, 1994) for such a framework. 
102 
"b"d 5 d . ı ı ., p .. an passım. 
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Globalization is also conceptualized as economic globalization, which 
diminishes the ability of governments to control their national economies 
and the decline of clientelism within Muslim countries can be linked to this. 
Economic globalization removes certain economic issues from the political 
agenda. The rhetoric of globalization claims that states are forced to comply 
with the dietates of the global economic powers. In effect, the abilities of the 
state to maintain welfare state and the clientelistic relations are hindered. 
Hence, the states fail in delivering their promised goods, and Islamism as 
well as right-wing extremism could be seen as a consequence of this process 
of globalization.104 
Within this perspective, but from a different angle, the rise of Islamİst 
movements could also be explained by taking in to account the effects of neo-
liberal consensus on politics.105 There is an overwhelming consensus on 
103 Fatema Mernissi, "Palace Fundamentalism and Liberal Democracy: Oil, 
Arms and Irrationality," Development and Change, 27, 2 (1996): 251-265, 
251. 
104 See for example, Ziya Onis, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence 
in Turkey: The Rise of the W elfare Party in Perspective" Third World 
Quarterly, 18, 4 (1997), 743-766. 
105 See for example, Alain de Benoist, 'End of Left-Right Dichotomy: The 
French Case, Telos, 102, (1995): 73-89, 82, Chantal Mouffe, 'The End of 
Politics and the Rise of the Radical Right' Dissent, (Fall, 1995): 488-502, 
Robert Cox, "Democracy in Hard Times: Economic Globalization and 
Limits to Liberal Democracy" in The Transformatian of Democracy? 
Global and Terrifarial Democracy, ed. Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: 
Polity Press in Association with Open University, 1997), 63-64. For an 
explanation of the rise ofIslamismin Turkey within this framework, see 
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liberal democratic capitalism as the only rational solution to the problem of 
organizing modern societies. Neo-liberal consensus, in this picture, signals 
"the end of politics," inthesense of rendering politics to administration "by 
shrinking the moral basis of liberal politics to a market guided model of 
narrowly circumscribed political discourse." 106 Politics, in this context, is no 
langer about the rival projects of society and revolves around different 
personalities, i.e., not the question of "what" but "who," and to some extent 
"how" are the questions of politics. The overwhelming cansensus creates a 
vacuum that taeilitates the growth of extreme-right. Only in such a context, 
Islamİst political parhes that address the problems created by neo-liberal 
economic policies in a personalistic manner could perform better in eleetaral 
terms. Furthermore, the secular state could play a function in the rise of 
Islamism by promoting Islam so as to maintain community in the face of 
conflicts of opposing ideologies.107 
2.6. Postmodernism and Islamism 
Based on the argument that "the fortunes of fundamentalist movements 
depend on the events and trends within their large societal context to create 
Birtek and Toprak, "Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction 
and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey .. " 
106 Birtek and Toprak, "Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction 
and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey .. " 193. 
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"symbolic capital" to be use d in their growth, as mu ch as they depend on 
the particular grievances of the persons attracted to them," it has been 
suggested that although fundamentalism is originally a reaction to 
modernity, "its current vigor must be attributed to the passage from 
modernity to postmodernity."108 Here the concept of postmodernism differs 
from postmodernity, the commodification of life. Postmodernism refers to 
the philosophical/intellectual critiques of messianic modern ideologies such 
as liberalism, Marxism and socialism. Postmodernism scrutinizes the claims 
of objectivity and rationality, and suggests that "the very production of 
knowledgeisa political enterprise that involves contests among conflicting 
interests."109 The postmodernİst critique, in other words, is an assertian that 
"we are far too ready to attach the adjective 'just' to cognitive, ethical, and 
political arrangements that are better understood as phenomena of power 
that oppress, neglect, marginalize, and discipline others."110 By suggesting, 
therefore, that it is no longer possible to generate universal solutions and 
answers, it renders the Enlightenment invalid and irrelevant.m 
Postmodemism allows for the possibilities of the non-Westem ways of 
107 
"b"d 201 . ı ı ., , passım. 
108 Misztal and Shupe, 'Making Sense of the Global Revival of Religion' 8, 12 
109 Scott, 'Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity', Octobe~ 61, (1992), 
p.12. 
110 Stephan K. White, PoHtical Theory and Postmodernism/ (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), 115-116 
111 Barry Smart, Modern Conditions/ Postmodem Controversies/ (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 183 
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modernization. Asa corollary, the project of Westernization and its 
concomitant social engineering and authoritarian modernization is rendered 
illegitima te. 
Given the fact that Islamism isa critique of Western modernity, postmodern 
critiques may well be functional for Islamists in advancing their claims.112 
Indeed, Islamist and postmodern critiques of modernity converge on many 
points such as secularism, rationality, the idea of impartial public sphere and 
so on. Also postmodernism could encourage tolerance towards Islam. In this 
picture, postmodern deconstruction of the West gives usa possibility of 
recognition of Islamic identity in reconstructing global civilization. But 
Islamism and postmodernism diverge at one important point: 
postmodernism does not really offer an alternative but Islamism does, and 
does so in a way that goes against the pluralizing ethos of postmodernism. 
Islamism as part of the postmodern critique of modemity is, in this picture, 
both a challenger and a beneficiary of the postmodern-turn. 
At a more generallevel Richard Faik argued that postmodernism 
emphasizes the severe problems created by the modernİst application of 
112 On the relation between postmodernism and Islam, see Jeff Haynes, 
"Religion, Secularization and Politics: A Postmodern Conspectus," Third 
World Quarterly, 18, 4, (1997): 709-728, Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism/ 
Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992), Akbar Ahmad, 
Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Fromise (London: Routledge, 
1992), Haldun Gulalp, "Globalizing Postmodernism: Islamistand Western 
Social Theory" Economy and Society, 26,3 (1997): 419-433. 
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science and reason, i.e. erisis of modernity whose secularism no longer 
inspires confidence.113 Religion, in this context, provides the materials out of 
which to fashion a response. Postmodernism, therefore, deseribes a new 
orientation to the nature politics as a result of the loosening of the modernİst 
grip on the political imagination. Modernism was about disconnection of 
religion and other spheres of life. Now that the compartmentalized 
modernity is under serious scrutiny, "sacred interconnections" have been 
established between religious and economic and political spheres. Religion 
has now been deprivatized and the autonomy of morality from religion is 
rejected.114 The religiously inspired respanses can be both constructive and 
destructive, or as Beyer pointed out, liberal and conservative. 
A more direct link between postmodernism as weakening of the foundations 
of modernity and Islamism is established by Bobby Sayyid.115 Sayyid's 
approach is a sophisticated and highly dialectical one and argues that rise of 
113 Richard Faik, "Religion and Politics: Verging on the Postmodern" in 
Sacred Interconnections: Postmodern Spirituali~ Political Economy and 
Art, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 85,93-98 see also 
Casanova, Public Religions ... 230 for postmodernism as a facilitating and 
legitimating factor of the rehabilitation of religious traditions which had 
usually been the target of rationalist critique. 
114 David Ray Griffin, "Introduction," in Sacred Interconnections: 
Postmodern Spiritualifj0 Political Economy and Art, ed. David Ray Griffin 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 3, ll. 
115 Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of 
Islamism/and Bobby Sayyid, "Sign O'Times. Kaffirs and Infidels Fighting 
the Ninth Crusade" in Making of Political Identities/ ed., E. Laclau 
(London: Verso, 1994) 
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Islamic identity as a daim to hegemony is a result of weakening of the 
foundations of Kemalism through postmodern deconstruction of modernity. 
In Sayyid's perspective Islamism isa product of Kemalism rather than 
failure of it. This is because Sayyid employs a relational, as opposed to 
essential, concept of identity. Islamİst identity, in this respect, isa 
construction of Kemalism. In this way Islamism is less linked to Islam than 
to Kemalism. Islamİst identity is constructed by Kemalism but Kemalism 
was able to put it in its "proper" place as long as it maintained its 
hegemony. The hegemony of Kemalism, which isa Eurocentric 
modernization discourse, in turn, was dependent upon the hegemony of 
Eurocentrism. The increasing discrediting of the Western modernity by 
postmodern discourses, therefore, has led to weakening of the Kemalist 
Westernization. This, in turn, gave rise to its internal other; Islam(ism).116 
Sayyid' s approach is sound in pointing to the relationship between the 
Eurocentric discourse modernity and Kemalism asa Westernization 
(Eurocentric modernization) project. It is also reasonable to emphasize the 
relationship between Islamic political identity and Kemalism. However, 
Sayyid' s perspective has i ts own shortcomings as well. First, Sayyid links the 
maintenance of Kemalism to the maintenance of Eurocentrism. As such, he 
takes the Kemalist state as a passive agent whose legitimacy is solely 
dependent upon other factors than its own performance, actions and nature. 
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Indeed, the most important defect of this approach springs from its 
deduction of the incapability of Kemalism to maintain its hegemony from 
the postmodern deconstruction of the West. By taking Kemalism only as a 
discursive formation, this approach does not heed the empirical reality of 
the ways in which Kemalism is maintained. But, Kemalism in reality is 
something beyand a discourse, it has its own institutions, dynamics and 
mechanisms to protect and reproduce itself. Above all, the emergence of 
Islamism does not necessarily signal the end of Kemalism but may provide a 
new opportunity for Kemalism to regenerate. Indeed, by fallawing Sayyid's 
logic we could suggest that if Islamism owes its raison d'etre to Kemalism, 
then the reverse is alsa true. 
Second, Kemalism, in his dialedical approach produces only Islamism as its 
anti-thesis, and therefore they are the only available political alternatives. 
This is an either Kemalism or Islamism logic that assodates all other political 
identities with Kemalism on the basis of their "Eurocentrism." As such, this 
perspective fails to explain why only Islamism emerges as an alternative to 
Kemalism, because it underplays the importance of the relationship of 
Kemalism with other political identities such as social democracy. It may 
well be the Kemalist state that hindered to development of other political 
identities as an alternative channel of expressian of discontent with 
Kemalism. Moreover, the question as to why Islam should be the only 
116 Bobby Sayyid, 'Sign O'Times. Kaffirs and Infidels Fighting the Ninth 
Crusade" 275 
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beneficiary of the decline of Kemalism in the face of increasing globalization 
which makes available a wide range of political discourses is unanswered.117 
It is precisely at this point "does Sayyid, unwittingly, employs an essentialist 
canception of Muslim society" becomes a legitimate question. 
Third, while pointing to the relationality of political identities is preferable 
in that it prevents us from considering Islamism in terms of Islam, the 
reduction of Islamic identity to the construction of Kemalism runs the risk of 
depicting Islamİst political actors as merely passive agents of Kemalism. In 
this way, we lack a ground to problematize Islamismin its own terms but in 
terms of Kemalism. Hence, the blame is solely put on Kemalism for the 
undemocratic and non-pluralist aspects of Islamism. 
117 Here I rely on Jeffrey Alexander' s definition of "reflexive modemization" 
as a new stage of modernity in which reflexivity is going beyond 
community-situated ethics and reflexive modernization is possibility of the 
construction of syncretic meanings and wide availability of options for 
different kinds of social actions. See Jeffrey Alexander, "Critica! Reflections 
on 'Reflexive Modernization'" Theory Culture, and Society, 13,4 (1996): 
133-138, 137-138. 
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CHAPTERTWO 
ELABORATING AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
STUDYING ISLAMISM 
The discussion in the previous chapter critically reviewed various 
accountings of Islamism and tried to define what Islamism is (not). Most of 
the accounts of Islamism opera te on an eİther Islamism ormodernization 
(modernizing ideology) logic. These are the only options of politics in 
modernizing Muslim societies. Behind this either 1 or logic lies two 
underlying frameworks. The first one is modernization paradigm, and its 
concomitant, the conventional secularization thesis, which proposed a 
decline in the social significance of religion as modemization proceeded, 
that is as society is organized along rational lines. Modernization paradigm 
regards religion as an epiphenemenon of traditional structures.1 
Consequently, to the extent Islamism is problematized, it is problematized 
as a return of the traditional or as a sign of being traditional and therefore 
irrational. But more importantly and not surprisingly, modernization 
perspective deduces the failures of modernization from the visibility of 
Islam(ism) in the public sphere. Hence, the success of modemization is 
actually assessed in terms of i ts ability to prevent public visibility of 
Islam(ism). 
The second underlying framework is a company to the modernization 
perspective and reveals the reason why modernization is associated with the 
public invisibility of Islam. It is a framework with a particular concept of 
"Muslim society" and an essentialist conceptualization of Islam as an 
inappropriate culture andasa religion that unites religion and politics. This 
framework leads to considerations ofIslamismin terms of Islam rather than 
politics. Islam in this picture could not accommodate modemization due to 
its essenhal features. The sources of such conceptualization of Islam could be 
traced back to the beginnings of modernity. 
In this chapter, an attempt will bemade to elaborate an alternative 
framework for the assessment of Islamism as a poHtical phenomenon and on 
poHtical grounds. In order to do this, first, the two underlying frameworks 
of most of the accountings for Islamism will be critically reviewed. The first 
underlying framework is the essentialist definitions of Islam as a religion 
that unites religion and politics. The second underlying framework is the 
perception of modernization as secularization, that is decline in the social 
significance of religion. What this chapter suggest is that there is no such 
thing as a culturally homogenous society and hence there is no such thing as 
1 Daniel Levine, 'Religion and Politics in Comparative and Historical 
Perspective', Comparative PoHtics/ 19, 1, (1986): 95-102, 96. 
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a "Muslim society;" that secularization does not necessarily mean a decline 
in the social significance of religion; and that in modern societies it is politics 
that defines the functions of religion. 
1. THE PROBLEM OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ESSENTIALISM 
One might suggest that the conceptualization of Islam as a religion that 
could not reach an "accommodation" with modem trends and that could not 
act as an agent of change could be linked to the Enlightenment tr adi tion' s 
distaste for religion in general and its belief in the capability of secular 
reason and scientific interrogation to deliver progress and freedom. But, as 
will be seen below, when we bear in mind the various functionalizations of 
religion in modern world by the founding fathers of sociology, the 
assessment of Islamasa dysfunctional or malfunctioning religion turns out 
to be a product of Orientalism. Most assessments depicting Islamism as 
contra-democracy are based on the Orientalist portrayal of Islam -and the 
values and institutions associated with it- as an impediment to 
modernization. In this picture, Islam could not be a "functional" religion like 
Christianity.2 Islam is an impediment to modernization and it could not be 
an agent of change? 
2 A notable exception in this respect is Ernest Gellner' s conceptualization of 
(high) Islam. Geliner suggests that "[b ]y various obvious criteria -
universalism, scriptualism, spiritual egalitarianism, the extension of full 
88 
In what might be considered as the inaugural theory of modernity, Kant, for 
example, assessed Islam negatively because his philosophy, according to 
Bryan S. Tumer, connected Christianity with the spread of global politics 
and the ideal of a common humanity.4 Similarly, Hegel contemplated that 
"Islam has long vanished from the stage of history at large, and has 
retreated into Oriental ease and repose." 5 According to Turner, Hegel traced 
back the origins of modern consciousness to the subjectivity of Christian 
spirituality.6 In this picture, Christianity had a dialectkal process by which 
self-consciousness could be achieved, whereas Islam lacked such a process. 
participation in sacred community not to one, or some, but to alL and the 
rational systematisation of social life- Islam is, of the great Western 
monotheisms, the one closest to modernity." See Ernest Gellner, Muslim 
Societ~ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984 [1981]), 7. 
3 Those who define Islamİst movements positively as modernizing 
movements on the basis of their observation that there is an 
accommodation between Islamism and modemity seem to have taken for 
granted previously the Orientalist/W eberian assessment of Islam as ina 
state of repose. Now that the Islamİst movements are modern and 
modernizing is quite astonishing for them and this "great" achievement of 
Islam(ism) could now be celebrated! But, such an accommodation, as will 
be seen below, does not tell us much about the relation between Islamism 
and democracy for example. 
4 See Bryan S. Turner, Orientalism/ Postmodernism and Globalism/ (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 137-140. 
5 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Histor~ trans. J. Sibree (New York: 
American Home Library, 1902), 456. 
6 Turner, Orientalism/ Postmodernism and Globalism/ 137-140. 
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It could be suggested that the guiding paradigm of postwar social research, 
the ideology of" developmentalism," had been the legacy of the nineteenth 
century assumption of Western superiority over non-Western societies. The 
American variant of this Western ideology is the modernization theory 
which combined scholarly inquiry with policy-oriented recommendations to 
foster the replication of liberal capitalist societies in the "Muslim societies."7 
Max W eber, it has been suggested, gave a social-scientific status to the 
construction of Islamasa culmination of deficits.8 Weber's work is 
considered as the classical statement of Orientalism. Orientalism could be 
defined asa way of thinking/studying the Orient. Based on the Foucauldian 
assumption that production of knowledge also involves production of 
power relations, Orientalism denotes an exercise of power /knowledge over 
the Orient. Edward Said in his seminal book, OrientaHsm/ showshow 
Orient is created and reproduced by the Orientalists so as to reflect the self-
image of the West on an Oriental mirror. In this image the West is rational, 
developed, humane and superior, while the East is aberrant, undeveloped 
and inferi or. 
7 See Lisa Hajjar and Steve Niva, "(Re)Made in the USA: Middle East Studies 
in the Global Era," Middle East Report 205 (October-December, 1997): 2-
10,3. 
8 Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity 
(Berkshire, Ithaca Press, 1997), 98. 
9 Edward Said, Orientalism, (London: Penguin, 1987 [1978]). 
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1.1. Cultural Essentialism 
The W eberian is associated with Orientalist,10 because of W eber' s account of 
the emergence of rationalist capitalismin the West in terms of Protestant 
ethic. This is because the corollary of accounting for the rationality of the 
West in terms of its culture is accounting for the irrationality of East in terms 
of i ts culture. But thisisa valid daim only if the same framework is 
employed in the analysis of the lack of rationalist capitalism in Islamic 
societies. In fact, whether W eber linked the lack of rationalist capitalism to 
the lack of appropriate culture, i.e. Islamic ethic, isa subject of controversy. 
It has, indeed, been suggested that "W eber' s account of the Islamic ethic is 
defective."11 It has also been suggested that when it comes to studying Islam 
W eber' s focus of attention shifts from cultural realm to political realm.12 Yet 
10 See for example Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in 
theArab World, (London: Routledge, 1991), 55-56. According to Ayubi, 
W eber thought that the warrior tradition, the Sufi orders, the 
unincorporated guilds, and even the self-indulgence and sexual appetite 
attributed to Muslims were all responsible for the lack of capitalİst 
development. cf. Mohammad R. Naffissi, "Reframing Orientalism: W eber 
and Islam," Economy and Society, 27,1 (February, 1998): 97-118. Naffissi 
challenges to the widespread view that W eber' s work isa classkal 
statement of sociological Orientalism. 
11 Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critica] Study, (London: Routledge 
Kegan Paul, 1974), 175. 
12 See for example Ralph Schroeder, Max Weber and the Sociology of 
Culture, (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 70,142. See also Naffissi, 
"Reframing Orientalism: ... " 
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the ambiguity in W eber' s analysis did not prevent some modernization 
scholars from focusing on Islamic culture. 
When the cultural realm has been the focus, "there isa close association 
between Christianity and the secular aspects of Western thought, such as the 
acceptance of science and of histarical methodology."13 Consequently, 
"Europe was able to conquer and reorganize a large part of the non-Westem 
world with the power provided by a culture based on science and 
technology."14 Islamic culture, whose substantive source is Islam, tends to be 
defined as "a preindustrial culture w hi ch is incapable of meeting the 
requirements of our technological-scientific age."15 For example, Islamic 
culture isa religiously dogmatic and defensive culture that makes no 
attempt to analyze the situation.16 Such a "Weberian" or essentialist 
portrayal of Islamic culture, as noted above, is possible thanks to W eber' s 
13 William Montgomery Watt, Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions 
and Misperceptions/ (London: Routledge, 1991), 131. 
14 Basam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the 
Sdentific-Technological Age/ trans. Judith von Sivers (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 1988), 2. 
15 ibid., 138. 
16 ibid., 5-6. 
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attempt to show how Christian religion furthered the rise of the modern 
individual, capitalism, the modern state and science.17 
Indeed, W eber suggested that "one of the fundamental elements of the spirit 
of modern capitalism, and not only of that but of all modern culture: rational 
conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling was born from the spirit of 
Christian asceticism."18 To the extent that it isa temptation to idleness and 
sinful enjoyment of life, the search for wealth, in Christianity, was ethically 
bad. But "asa performance of dutyina callingit [wealth] is not only morally 
permissible, but actually enjoined."19 Protestant asceticism "approved the 
rational and utilitarian uses of wealth which were willed by God for the 
needs of the individual and the community."20 By acting powerfully against 
the spontaneous enjoyment of passions, Protestant asceticism restricted the 
consumption, especially of luxurious. Combined with the release of 
acquisitive activity, the limitation of consumption resulted inevitably in the 
accumulation of capital.21 As such, Weber sees the original accumulation of 
17 Wolfgang Schluchter, Rationalism/ Religion and Domination: A Weberian 
Perspective/ tr. By Neil Solamon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1989), 253 
18 Max W eber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism/ trans. 
Talcott Parsons, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 180. 
19 ibid., 163 
20 ibid., 171 
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capital as "an unanticipated consequence of religiously induced self-denial 
coupled with the pursuit of workmanship as the m undane reflection of 
divine grace."22 
This line of thinking gives rise to the assumption that if it was the Christian 
religion that eased rise to capitalism of the West, it must be Islam that 
hindered the possibility of such development. Therefore, the absence of 
capitalism and the modern state in the East is explained by the religion of 
the East. Although the theological and ethical precepts of Islam were 
acidressed to urban strata initially, Islam turned out to be a "warrior 
religion" soon after.23 Therefore, "[t]he ideal personality type in the religion 
of Islam was not the scholarly seribe (literat), but the warrior."24 This ideal 
gave rise to an economic ethic that is significantly different from Protestant 
ethic. Unlike Protestant ethic, Islamic economic ethic was "purely feudal" in 
that it gave positive significance to attaining wealth by political or military 
means. As such, it is in diametrical opposition to the Protestant devaluation 
21 ibid., 172 
22 Zygmunt Bauman, Jntimations of Postmodernity(London: Routledge, 
1992), 171, emphasis original. 
23 Max W eber, Sociology of Religion trans. Ephraim Fischoff (Bostan: Beacon 
Press, 1964 [1963]), 262. 
24 ibid., 265. 
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of this worldly wealth and luxury in favour of religious salvation beyond.25 
In this picture, it is logical to agree with Weberthat "[t]he impediments to 
development must be sought primarily in the domain of religion, although 
certain purely political factors, such as the inner structural forms of 
domination, also played important roles."26 
1.2. Political Essentialism 
Focusing on the political factors, Weber's writings could be read inanother 
way. Nevertheless, the role attributed to religion is significant in this reading 
as well. W eber also argued that acquisitive drive of Muslim merchant, trader 
or artisan was no less than ascetic Protestant.27 In this respect, 
industrialization in Islamic societies "was not impeded by the Islam as the 
religion of individuals ... but by the religiously determined structure of the 
25 ibid., 263-264. 
26 ibid., 269. This translation should be compared with the translation in 
below mentioned edition Economy and Society. It reads, "impediments to 
rational economic development must be primarily sought in the domain of 
religion, insofar as they must not be located in the purely political 
conditions, the structures of domination." Max W eber, Economy and 
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociolog~ ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 630. 
27 W eber, The Sociology of Religion 269. 
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Islamic states/ their officialdom and their jurisprudence."28 The focus here is 
on the political character as the unique and central feature of Islam. 29 In this 
case, the reason why Western rationalism did not emerge under Islam is not 
that it did not create a suitable worldview anda way of life to encourage 
such development, but that the form of political doruination precluded such 
possibility. Islamic society is characterized by patrimonialism. According to 
Weber, the patrimonial ruler's own authority is rootedin the sanctity of 
tradition and his rule is characterized by arbitrariness and unpredictability. 
Weberstates that 
Both traditionalism and arbitrariness affect very deeply the 
developmental opportunities of capitalism. Either the ruler himselfor 
his officials seize upon the new chances of acquisition, monopolize 
them and thus deprive the capital formation of private economy of i ts 
sustenance, or the ubiquitous resistance of traditionalism is reinforced 
by them so as to hinder economic innovations that might endanger the 
social equilibrium or meet religious and ethical objections.30 
Patrimonialism also meant lack of political and procedural predictability 
which are indispensable to the capitalist development. In his own words: 
the arbitrariness and unpredictability of patrimonial doruination had 
the effect of strengthening the re alın of subjection to sacred law. And 
since, on the other hand, the theoretical rigidity and immutability of 
shariah w as "corrected" by the judges through subjective and often 
28 Max W eber, Economy and Sodety, 1095 emphasis original. See also 
Schroeder, Max W eber and the Sadology of Culture, 68. 
29 
"Equally political in character is the distinctive religious obligation in 
Islam, its only required dogma: the recognition of Allah as the one god and 
of Muhammad as his prophet." See W eber, The Sadology of Religion 264. 
30 Max W eber, Economy and Sodety, 1094. 
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quite unpredictable interpretation, the components of patrimonialism, 
equally hostile to capitalism, reinforce one another?1 
Thus, it could be suggested that W eber can be read in two different ways. 
First, by fallawing the same logic he employed in his account of the spirit of 
capitalism, it could be suggested that Islam has been an inappropriate 
culture for the development of rationalism and capitalism. Secondly, it could 
be suggested that W eber actually problematized not the Islamic culture but 
the Islamic political configuration that goes against one of the central 
ingredients of modernity, i.e. secularization inthesense of separation 
between state and society. In both casesIslam functions asa hindrance to 
modernization. 
The portrayal of Islamasa hindrance to modernization in terms of its 
essence is actually based on both political and cultural grounds. On political 
grounds the comparison is actually a comparison of the relations between 
31 Max W eber, Economy and Society, 1096. cf. Maxime Rodinson, Islam and 
Capitalism/ trans. Brian Pearce, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973). 
Rodinson argues that "there is nothing to indicate ina compelling way 
that the Muslim religion prevented the Muslim world from developing 
along the road to modern capitalism, any more than there is anything to 
indicate that Christianity directed the Westem European world along that 
road"(p.l17) In addition to this general challenge, Rodinson alsa argues 
that "European judge of the Middle Ages ... was not so very much more 
closely restricted by hard-and-fast rules, or so much less free to give rein to 
his own views of right and wrong, than the qadi of the Muslim world, who 
was himself guided, in principle, by the huge corpus of the fiqh which 
was much more thoroughly systematized, unified and rationalized than 
was Western custom" (p.106). The question of the origin of modern 
rationality and/ or capitalism is left unanswered by W eber because he 
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religion and politics in Islam and Christianity.32 Central to this political 
comparison is the Islamic principle of tevhid and the Christian doctrine of 
two swords. The doctrine of two swords, it is said, allowed Christianity to 
differentiate between the sacred and profane, between the sacerdotium and 
imperium, between the Church and the state. It also allowed a room for the 
development of the Roman idea of a fully legitimate secular political 
authority, the state and its secular laws?3 Hence, secularization, which is so 
essential for rationalization, is considered to be intrinsic to Christianity. 
The principle of tevhid, on the other hand, means not only the 
unity 1 oneness of God, but also unity of religion and state, religion and 
economy, religion and sexuality and so on. Islam, in this picture, is not only 
a religion but also a life style, a state style or more accurately a complete 
scheme for ordering life. Because politicsisa vital instrument for ordering 
life, Islam, it is said, is inevitably a political religion. Also, as a consequence 
of the principle of tevhici the ruler is held responsible not only for well-
"deseribes substantial features of higher rationality existing in Europe only 
in the modern age" (p.l17). 
32 It must be noted here that W eber failed to analyze the connection between 
religion and politics in Christianity. See Schroeder, Max Weber and the 
Sadology of Culture, 70. 
33 Antony Black, 'Classical Islam and Medieval Europe. A Comparison of 
Political Philosophies and Cultures, Political Studies/ XLI, 1, (1993): 58-69. 
See also Peter Berger' s "The Process of Secularization" (Chapter 5) in his 
The Sacred Canopy: Elemen ts of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New 
York: Anehor Books, 1990 [1967]). Berger argues that secularization has its 
rootsin the Western religious tradition. 
98 
being in this world but also in the hereafter.34 One, therefore, can be a 
Muslim only under an Islamic state. 
Indeed, it is said that the term din primarily evakes submission to God and 
obligations that God imposed on his "reasoning creatures," 35 while the Latin 
term religio evakes ties that bind men to God. Asa corollary, in Islamic 
theology this submission involves following the obligations, that includes 
wresting power for the righteous, the rooting out of evil and the bringing 
about of a good life, rather than mere passivity and acceptance.36 Islam, 
therefore, isa religion of obligation rather than confession or creed. 
1 .3. Political lmplications 
Therefore, in a "Muslim society" Islamic norms and values are key 
determinants of political behaviour due to principle of tevhid. In this case, 
none of the types/ aspects of secularization is applicable to the case of 
Islam:37 "Polity secularization" -institutional separation of religion and 
34 Ahmet Davutoglu, Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and 
Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theor~ (Lanham, New York: The 
University Press of America), 132. 
35 E.J BrilFs First Encyclopedia of Islam/ (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), 1913-1936. 
36 John L. Esposito, "Islam and Muslim Politics" in Voices of Resurgent 
Islam/ ed. Idem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 4. 
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polity and the denial of religious identity of the polity- is impossible simply 
because Islamisa state religion. "Polity-expansion secularization," that is 
the political regulation of the arenas of society formerly regulated by 
religion, is also impossible unless the state submerges it, because Islamisa 
whole life-style. Similarly, "political culture secularization" is impossible 
because in Muslim societies the political community is at the same time 
religious community and the values associated with the community are 
essentially religious. Decline in the salience and influence of religious issues 
and weakening of religious identity, i.e. "political-process secularization" is 
impossible because Muslims expect their state to uphold the sharia and keep 
the religion flourishing. In sum, Islamisa religion that cannot be the private 
matter of individual. In this case, only "polity-dominance secularization" is 
possible in Islamic societies. Such secularization refers to a radical program 
of secularization that recognizes no area of religious autonomy and refers to 
an effort to either eliminate the influence of religion entirely or to alter the 
contents of religion radically so as to bring it in line with the official 
ideology. 
But the fact that Islam is a political religion does not in itself explain the 
"polity-dominance secularization" because Islamasa political religion could 
also have been practically instrumentalized for the purposes of 
37 Types of secularization in this paragraph are borrowed form Donald E. 
Smith, see Donald E. Smith, "Religion and Political Modemization: 
Comparative Perspectives" in idem, ed., Religion and Political 
Modernization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 8. 
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modernization by the modernizing regimes -if only Islam has not been a 
modernization-resistant religion. But, it is claimed that the idea of 
development is part of Western outlook and there is "complete absence of 
the idea of development" in Islam?8 "For Muslims," Watt claims, 
"unchangingness is both an ideal for human individuals and societies, and 
also perception of the actual nature of humanity and its environment."39 This 
assumption of unchangingness of human nature blinds Muslims to the new 
problems created by technological advances and justifies the assertian of the 
finality of the rules and laws of human conduct which areexpressedin 
Qur'an and Sunna of the prophet. Islam' s daim to be the final religion, in 
turn, leads to the belief that all moral and religious truth necessary for all 
humanity is available in Islam. As such, Islamisa self-sufficient religion that 
does not need to borrow from other cultures. Hence, all that is not Islamic is 
subject to suspicion, and there is reluctance to borrow from alien cultures. In 
addition, the idealizatian of Muhammad and early Islam results in a 
community that fails to see and deal with the real challenges and problems 
of the present and that is obsessed with recreating something past. 
Fundamentalists, conservatives or traditionalists, according to Watt, are 
those who subscribe to the above description of Islam. Liberals are those 
who see a need for correcting such an understanding of Islam. 
38 See William M. Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity (London: 
Routledge, 1988), 3. The portrayal of Islam in this paragraph draws from 
Watt's portrayal on pp.l-23. 
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Hen ce, if a Muslim society is to be modernized/ secularized, Islam has to be 
kept under control40 for two different set of reasons. First, culturally 
speaking, Islam, as noted above, is considered as culturally resİstant to 
modernization. Indeed, most of the modernizing regimes adhered to this 
"Weberian" view that linked modernization to appropriate (Westem) 
culture.41 This in turn necessitated a top-to-down modernization of Muslim 
societies. Linked to this, second, politically speaking, by virtue of being a 
political religion Islam could be considered asa permanent potential 
regressive rival to the progressive modernizing regimes and ideologies. 
Therefore, the relation between Islam and the modernizing state could only 
be in terms of "submergence" or "resurgence." In most studies of Islamism, 
39 ibid., 3. 
40 Among many others, Binnaz Toprak' s Islam and Political Development in 
Turkey(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981) is informed from this perspective. For her 
"the history of secularization movement in both Ottoman and Republican 
Turkey is, ina sense, the history of the attempt to cope precisely with this 
problem of limiting Islam' s influence ina predominantly Muslim society 
where the belief system considers it heretical to separate the religious 
realm from the secular." "If in Islam religion and politics went together, 
the best means of making sure that religion played no role in political life 
would be to put it under control." See p.25 and 33. Hence, the 
characteristics of the Turkish secularization is explained by the 
characteristics of Islam. Thereby, whatever the anomalies of Turkish 
secularism are, they are justified on the basis of the daim that in Islam 
makes no distinction between secular and religious life. This, I believe, is 
an inadequate approach. A reading of Kemalismin the light of 
republicanism could show that this type of secularism could also be linked 
to the republican nature of Kemalism rather than political nature of Islam. 
41 Turner, Weber and Islam, 175. See also Bobby Sayyid, "Sign O'Times: 
Kaffirs and Infidels Fighting the Ninth Crusade" in Making of Political 
Identities, ed., Ernesto Laclau, (London: Verso, 1994), 269. 
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asa consequence, Islam is taken as an essentially political religion and 
therefore asa permanent rival to modernizing regimes. And, the emergence 
of Islamİst movements are explained by referring to the "Muslimness" of the 
society whose characteristics are determined by the "special" features of 
Islam which as noted above induces Muslims a propensity to seek for an 
Islamic s ta te, a yearning for "good old days of the early Islam" and for a 
static world. 
Consequently, the general picture is that there is a Muslim society; the 
Muslimness of society is "submerged" by the state for the sake of 
modernization; and when the state is weakened asa result of its failures or 
when Islam finds better opportunities to realize itself better as a 
consequence of further modernization, Islamism has "revived" or 
"resurged" inevitably to reassert Muslim identity. It resurged inevitably 
because Islam cannot legitimize the modemization in progress and because 
Islamic culture is modernization-resistant. The practical effect is the feeling 
of anxiety by Muslim people as a result of change that came about through 
Westernization. Hence, Muslim people assert their Islamic identity to protect 
themselves from the destructive effects of change. By implication, Islamism 
is explained in terms of Islam, which has remained at the level of society asa 
dormant political force. Neither the extra-ordinary effort of self-conscious 
Muslims nor the possibility of other forms of political expressian than 
Islamism in "Muslim societies," nor the interaction between modern 
structures/ideologies and Islamasa factor shaping Islamism are taken into 
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account. Consequently, to the extent that Islamic revival isa problem to be 
resolved, the resolution lies either in dismantling the Islamic bedrock or in 
the constant supervision of it by the (modernizing) state. By implication, the 
possibilities of a talk of secularization and a concept of democracy which is 
accommodating Islam or Islamism in the public sphere is foreclosed. 
In a seemingiy paradoxical manner the view of Islam as a religion that 
cannot be separated from politics is a picture not only of Orientalists but also 
of Islamists as well. Such a convergence on the conceptualization of Islam as 
an essentially political religion by two diametrically opposing alternatives 
could be explained by suggesting that the idea that Islam as an autonomous 
essence is actually part of the strategy of both the confinement and defense 
of Islam.42 From the perspective of Islamism, the defense of Islam as both 
religion and state is actually a strategy of upholding the religion, suggesting 
it asa communal ethos, collective identity andasa solution to (almost every) 
social, economic and political problem. Such a definition is also useful for 
the secularists and Orientalists, because only then could Islam be considered 
as something to be controlled for the sake of "modemization" and the so-
called "Islamic" movements could be depicted as deviance, if necessary, to 
be repressed. 
42 Talal Asad, Genealogİes of Relİgİon: Dİscİplİne and Reasons of Power İn 
Chrİsfİanİty and Islam/ (Baltimore and London: The J ohns Hopkins 
University Press), 29. Asad's argument hereisa general argument about 
the conceptualizations of religion. 
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1.4. Religion as Human Construction 
However, in reality, the link between religious theory and practice isa 
matter of constructing religion in this world rather than a matter of 
cognition.43 There is, in fact, no transhistorical definition of religion and the 
authoritative status of religious practices, such as the unity of state and 
religion, "are to be explained as products of historically distinctive 
disciplines and forces." 44 Islam has become an instrument of communal 
reference and a basis for the assertian of an authentically indigenous identity 
only in the 18th century.45 Initially, it was an ethical path and later, through 
Orientalist intervention, it become a civilization comparable to the Western 
Christian one.46 Islam could be taken asa "plural hermeneutics" of a 
complex civilization anda flexible medium of a collective identity centered 
on one Qur'anic keyword, Islam. By doing so, Armando Salvatore identifies 
seven different hermeneutic circles that interpret Islam either in a 
conflationist manner, for they conflate Islam and politics, or ina 
deconflationist manner, for they take Islam onlyasa religion centered 
around belief, that is iman. Hence, histarical evidence shows that not all 
interpretations of Islam are political and more importantly different political 
43 ibid., 44. 
44 ibid., 54. 
45 John O. Voll, Islam: Continuityand Change in theModern World(New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1994, 2nd edition), 83. 
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interpretations of Islam are possible. As Hamid Enayat has pointed out, a 
liberal would try to deduce from the Qur' an and the traditions all the 
necessary guarantees of individual rights while a socialİst would be more 
keen on demonstrating the collectivist ethos of IsiamY In fact, every religion 
isa joint creation of men and God.48 Islam, therefore, is not an independent 
variable. 
Also, the widely held belief that in Islam religion and politics is closely 
intertwined 
understates the close church-state relations of the Eastern Orthodox 
churches and of religion and politics inthepre-modem West ... In 
practice, despite the often-cited special role of Roman law and the 
existence of a clear relationship between church and state in the West, 
Christianity and Islam had rather similar levels of relations between 
religion and politics in pre-modern times.49 
Therefore, the differentiation between Islam and Christianity on an 
essentialist basis may be misleading. Indeed, Patricia Springborg has shown 
that the continuity of the Western political tradition vis a visthe despotic 
Orient is a work of the imagination.50 
46 Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modemity, xiv. 
47 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the 
Shi'i and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 
1986 [1982])/ 99. 
48 Bikru Paraekh, "The Concept of Fundamentalism" in The End of /'isms/~ 
A. Stormas ed. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 107. 
49 Nikki R. Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative 
Considerations and Relations to Imperialism," Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 36, 3, (1994): 463-587, 463. 
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The doctrine of two swords, for example, led to the recognition of secular 
authority as fully legitimate not as smoothly as it is supposed. What it led to 
was dual structuration of this world into "the religious" and "the secular." 
The rulers w ere to be legitimized by the church/ pope through consecration 
to gain the loyalty of God's creatures. And, this was not only due to 
Church' s position as the only representative of God on earth, but also due to 
the fact that it held significant secular power in terms of its wealth. This was 
in Christian West Europe where the influence of Germanic tribal traditions 
and Catholic church were apparent in the legitimation of the ruler. Since the 
jurisdictions of sacred and profane overlapped in practice, there were a 
series of centuries-long conflicts between the Church, the only authentic 
interpreter of sacred texts, and the state in Western Europe. These conflicts 
between the sacred and secular authorities eventually led to the emergence 
of modern state and nationalized churches as opposed to the universal 
church of the Holy Roman Empire. Secularization, here, refers to the 
breakdown of the dualistic system and replacement of it by an all 
encompassing secular sphere requiring the religious sphere to adapt.51 The 
50 Patricia Springborg, Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince/ 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 1, 4. Springborg points out that it was not 
until the post-reformatian period and the rise of the early modem 
European state that the East, asa constant reference point for the West, 
became definitively different and characteristically "despotic." 
51 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modem Worlci (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1994), 15. 
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so-called privatization and marginalization of religion was not something 
intrinsic to Christianity and Christianity has resisted the process until today. 
But, the same doctrine of two swords did not work in the same way in the 
Eastern part of Christian Europe. Here, the influence of Hellenistic and 
Orientalist elements merged and gave rise to a canception of the Emperor as 
representing the God on earth.52 Hence, the two swords were united in one, 
which had two edges and there were no restrictions on the jurisdiction of the 
holder of the sword except the internal matters of the church. Hence, the 
Western European experience with religion cannot be explained by 
Christianity alone. 
It is true that Islam was born simultaneously both asa religious and political 
community, and Muhammad was both God's messenger and political-
military leader. Also, the umma was both religious and political community. 
But, it is inaccurate to suggest that Islam does not have differentiated 
religious and political spheres. "The supposed near-identity of religion and 
politics in Islam is more a pious myth rather than reality for most of Islamic 
history," and the link has been symbolic and formalistic rather than real.53 
Indeed, the history of Islam could be viewed as the history of various 
52 See Reinhard Bendix, Kin gs or People: Power and Manda te to Rule 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 23. 
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institutionalizations of the religious and political charisma of Muhammad 
into differentiated religious and political institutions.54 There was a 
canceptual and a de facto, as opposed to institutional and de jure, 
differentiation of state and religion that was reflected in the depiction of 
them as twins.55 
Designated with the task of upholding the sharia and the maintenance and 
well-being of the political-cum-religious community, the state in the realm 
of Islam reigned supreme and ruled in reality, supposedly to keep the 
religion flourishing. The ulema took the state for granted and were 
motivated to ensure its stability. The legitimacy of the state/ruler was 
practically based on fulfillment of the deemed Islamic values and 
achievement of these goals/6 "even if this meant a more or less complete 
53 Keddie, "The Revalt of Islam, 1700 to 1993," 463, see alsa Ayubi, Political 
Islam ch. 1. and Sami Zubaida, Islam, People and the State, (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 1993), 41. 
54 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modem World, 48. 
55 Reinhard Schulze, "Günümüz Bati ve Islam Toplumlarİnda Laiklik ve 
Din" [Secularism and Religion in Contemporary Western and Islamic 
Societies] in Islam ve Demokrasi[Islam and Democracy] eds. Yurdakul 
Fincanci et. al. (Istanbul, Tüses Vakfi, 1994), 58. 
56 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, (London: Macmillan, 1991), 
193, and Davutoglu, Alternative Paradigms, 123. Bernard Lewis deseribes 
how the initial concept of legitimacy, which "meant that the ruler was 
qualified and entitled to the office which he held and that he had acceded 
to it by lawful means," changed in later centuries to the consideration of 
power as legitimate per se. Just rule was emphasized more than legitimate 
ruler. See Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 99. 
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separation between temporal affairs and spiritual concerns."57 Asa corollary, 
rather than being the norm to be followed, Islam had been mobilizedin the 
service of the state by the political leaders, although they "rarely sought to 
extend the purview of their faith to include politics."58 
It is only in theory that the Islamic form of government was a nomocracy in 
which ruler does not have any legislative power and only applies the Holy 
law. The Muslim ruler, in reality, exercised a considerable degree of 
legislative power. This was secular legislation based on the Islamic principle 
of maslaha, interest of the community. In reality, Muslims mostly paid lip 
service to the political directives of Islam, though formalistic links were 
present. It was perhaps for this reason that call for a return to the original 
message of Islam was a perennial problem of Islam after the period of the 
four rightly guided caliphs.59 
What was absent in the realm of Islam was an equivalent of institutionalized 
Church with a monopoly over the interpretation of the sacred text and with 
57 Bendix, Kingsor People .. ., 44. 
58 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The 
fama ~t-i Islami of Pakistan (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), 15-16. 
It must be noted that Islam in the course of history is not only 
appropriated by the state and rulers but alsa by those who are challenging 
the status quo. See M. Ayoob, "Conclusion: Discernible Patterns" in The 
Politics of Islamic Reassertion ed., idem, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1981). 
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secular power to force its claims. The ulema, evidently, took an acquiescent 
stance towards the priority of the state and even rationalized it on religious 
grounds by primitizing stability and by giving "pragmatic" advice to the 
rulers to maintain stability. Islamic political theory was ready to sacrifice 
Islamic political/ethical principles for the sake of stability. Ibn Taymiya's 
(d.1328) famous formulation that "sixty years with an unjust ruler is better 
than one night without a ruler" illustrates the point.60 Similarly, al-Ghazali, 
before Taymiya, held that 'necessity makes legal what would otherwise not 
be legal,' and even an unjust ruler should not be deposed if strife would 
follow, because unity will be lost.61 
The theoretical restrictions imposed on the ruler were moral rather than 
procedural and/ or legally binding obligations. Asa corollary, the theory of 
government in Islamic political theory actually addressed the conduct of the 
ruler by focusing on the types of statesmanship. The influence of Greek 
philosophy, more accurately the Platonic framework, is apparent here. Ina 
way, Islamic political theory as reflected in the Mirrors "perpetuated the 
classical 'republican' tradition ... asa model for the Islamic state."62 This 
model defined the virtuous state as the one in which all cooperate in pursuit 
59 Abdul R. Moten, Political Science: An Islamic Perspective, (London: 
Macmillan, 1996), 30, emphasis added. 
6° Cited in Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic PoliticalTJıought, 12. 
61 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1938, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984 [1962]), 14. 
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of comman good. Thus, in the Islamic Mirror of Princes, which could be 
considered as the technical manuals for the rulers, the ruler first and 
faremost had to be the best man, whose faculties included modesty, good 
temper, compassion, forgiveness, humility, generosity, sincerity, 
forbearance, gratitude, mercy, knowledge, reason and justice. It could, 
therefore, be suggested that Islamic political "theory" left the establishment 
of justice and enforcement of the limitations to the ruler's religiosity 1 
morality, or more accurately, to his mercy.63 These Mirrors also stated the 
terms of obedience to the rulers, though resistance to unfitting "tyrants" was 
rarely realizedin practice. In such a context, to the extent there has been a 
unity of religion and politics in Islam, it was surely not a unity of equals. 
Political concerns, or the hikmet-i hükümet (reason of state) during the post-
Asr-i Saadetperiod reigned supreme. Nevertheless, this supremacy was 
achieved in the formal name of Islam. 
62 Patricia Springborg, Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince/ 268. 
63 There is a striking similarity of this approach with that of Kant, who 
according to Habermas inaugurated the Enlightenment. Kant, too, in 
practice, placed no institutional constraints upon the operation of the 
executive. He placed only normative constraints, which the ruler might 
impose upon himself. The only help available to monarch in the 
observation of the norms was the existence of freedam of discussion 
among the philosophers- the guardians of the purity of the republic. See 
Gareth S. Jones, "Kant, the French Revolution and the Definition of the 
Republic" in The Invention of the Modern Republic, ed. Fontana 
Biancamaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 171. 
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1.5. Islamic Reformism asa Response to Essentialism? 
"Muslims entered the modern age with structures, ideas and religious 
beliefs quite similar to past ones"64 and reacted to circumstances ina 
"reformist" manner inthesense that they used European categories intheir 
attempts to revitalize Islamic civilization. As Salvatore pointed out, both 
Orientalism and colonialism delegitimized the indigenous Muslim 
intellectual traditions and thereby jeopardized their capacity to appropriate 
modernity selectively but reflexively. Since then any attempt at rejuvenating 
Islam had to be related either to European modernity through the concept of 
nahda (renaissance) or to the formative period of Islam through the concept 
of islah (reform) or to a blend of both.65 In either case European categories 
had to be used, and this could best be done by referring to original sources 
in the name of reinstating true Islam. In effect, the attempt of reinstating 
"true" Islam included arestatement of the motifs of the Enlightenment and 
positivism. It is in this sense that the so-called cultural conflict is actually an 
epiphenemenon to simultaneous cultural transition.66 
64 Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993," 464. 
65 See Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Politİcal Discourse of Modemity, 
75-76, see also Enayat, Modern Islamic Political11ıought 68 for how 
modernists' overconfident and intemperate mood hindered "whatever 
potential for reform existed inside the religious community." 
66 C. A. O. Nieuwenhuitze, "Fundamentalists of all Faiths: Decolonization in 
Suspense," Biblotheca Orientalis/ LIII, 1-2, (1996): 5-16,9. 
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Indeed, "Islamist thinkers" of the late nineteenth century were all 
dissatisfied with the prevailing Islam. This is because, for them, the most 
progress-prone religion, Islam, as it was practiced then actually functioned 
as an obstacle to progress. Thus, Jamal al-din Afhgani (1838/9-1897), one of 
the pioneers of Islamic modernism, concluded that "Muslims are weak 
because they are not really Muslims," for the true Islam is not only belief in 
transcendence but in reason as well.67 Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), a 
student of Afhgani, claimed that since Islam, unlike Christianity, 
propagated creation of a civilization in this world,68 the issue was not Islam 
but the lack of it. Such contentions were both converging with and diverging 
from the Orientalist claims. They were converging with Orientalist depiction 
in their daim that the prevailing Islam was functioning as a hindrance to 
progress. But unlike Orientalist claims they did not depict Islam as an 
essenhal hindrance to progress. The real Islam for them was progressive. 
It is in this period that Islam as iman was replaced by Islam as a suitable 
term for asserting an authentically indigenous identity and for constructing 
a framework of communal reference which was legitimized on the basis of 
67 Cited in Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age/ 129. for 
similar views of "Islamists" in the late Ottoman Empire see also Tarik 
Zafer Tunaya Islamcilik Cerayani [Islamism Movement] (Istanbul, Simavi 
Yayinlari, 1991), Isınail Kara, Islamcilarİn Siyasi Görüsleri[Political 
Opinions of Islamists], (Istanbul, Iz Yayincilik; 1994), 18, Mumtaz'er 
Türköne, Islamciligin Dogusu [The Emergence of Islamism] (Istanbul, 
Iletisim, 1994), 28. 
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rationality rather than wahy(divine revelation).69 Thereby, Islam began to 
com.pete not with other religions but with secular ideologies. Both Abduh 
and Afhgani, for example, focused on the necessity of creating a vibrant 
Muslim nation asa valid response to Western domination. They emphasized 
the need for the development of a new Muslim human grounded in moral 
and spiritual foundations of faith and the need to create a renewed Islamic 
society to be actualized through economic and social development.70 Rachid 
Rida (1865-1935), a Syrian-born Egyptian thinker, constructed Islamasa 
principle of social and political cohesion. As a follower of Abduh, Rida 
published a journal called al-Minarbetween 1898 and 1935. The journal 
became the organ of Islamic modernists.71 Abduh, aimed to show that Islam 
contained in itself the potentialities of the rational religion, the social science 
and moral code that could serve as the basis of modern life. Rida postulated 
that the duty of Muslims is to study the sciences and ways of modern world 
so as to be strong.72 The Young Ottomans, to whom "any serious attempt to 
68 The sources of the daim that Westem civilization is based on might could, 
I think, be traced to this daim. 
69 Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modemio/ 48, Türköne, 
Islamciligin Dogusu/ 25, Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change/ 83. 
70 Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Islamist Depictions of Christianity in the 20th 
Century: The Pluralism Debate and the Depiction of the Other", Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations/ 7,1 (1996): 75-89,79. 
71 Ali Rahnema, "Introduction" in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed., idem, 
(London: Zed Books, 1994), 3. 
72 See Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age/ for a detailed review of 
Afgani, Rida and Abuh. 
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reinject Islam into the foundations of Turkish state" today must refer,73 
admired the strength and progress of Europe and reinterpreted Islamic 
injunctions inaccordance with Western liberalism. Thus, the Islamic 
principles of shura and meshveretbecame parliament and democracy 
respectively, whereas, in the Qur'an, there are few and only advisory 
references to the term shura?4 In effect, the Young Ottomans, while setting a 
high value on the social morality of Islam, were trying to justify the adoption 
of Western institutions in Islamic terms?5 Ali ahd al Raziq, writing in the 
1920s, disclaimed Islamasa blueprint for government by daiming that 
religion had nothing to dowith the administration?6 In this respect, Ayubi 
suggest, Raziq could be considered as a Muslim theorist of secularism?7 
It has been suggested that the accommodating reaction of the Islamist 
thinkers was actually a reflection of the prevailing trust in modernity in 
Europe, because Islamic fundamentalist (sic) political thought is actually a 
part of the transcultural and multivocal reassessment of the value and 
73 Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the 
Modernization of Turkish Political Ideals/ (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1962), 3-4. 
74 Isınail Kara, Islamcilarİn Siyasi Görüsleri/ 166. 
75 See Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age/ 68. 
76 cited in Bobby Sayyid, A Pandamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the 
Emergence of Islamism/(London: Zed Books, 1997), 62. 
77 Ayubi, Political Islam/ 54. 
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definition of modernity?8 As the trust in modernity is eroding due to 
postmodern critiques of modernity, at present, Islamİst thinkers' relation to 
modernity changes as well. The depiction of current Islamism as a 
continuation of the Muslim' s response to colonialism in the 18th century is 
misleading in this sense as well. The link between the conceptualizations of 
modernity in the West and in the Islamİst circles was taken up in the 
previous chapter reviewing the relations between postmodernism and 
Islamism. The next seetion will focus on the relation between modernity and 
religion/ secularization as an other "conditioner" of the studies of religio-
political movements so as to prepare the ground for an alternative 
framework. 
2. MODERNITY, SECULARIZATION AND POLITICS 
If one of the determinants of account of Islamism is the above mentioned 
essentialist approach to Islamasa culturally inferior religion that unites 
politics and religion, the other determinant has been the discussions about 
"modernity and religion." Drawing from Ronald Robertson, we could 
suggest that religion has become a subject of scientific study with the 
emergence of the modern sociallandscape and the study of religion under 
modernity, i.e. sociology of religion, was divided over the question of 
78 Roxanne L. Euben ''Pre-Modern, Anti-Modern or Post-modern? Islamic 
and Western Critiques of Modernity," Review of Politics, 59, 3 (1997). 
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whether religion is central or peripheral to maintenance of social order and 
holding society together ?9 The question was brought up by the dismantling 
of the old forms of social control through increasing modernization, 
industrialization, individualization of (modern) societies and it was based on 
the assumption that religion used to play a major role in the integration of 
society in pre-modern times.80 Leaving aside the extent of truth in this 
assumption for a w hile, the dedining agreement on 'common' values, the 
pluralization of life worlds were either seen asa gain in autonomy and 
freedam or a loss of community and authenticity. Central to the de bates was 
the notian of secularization which could best be deseribed asa project 
proposing a decline in. the social significance of religion. 
By way of a discussion about the "place," "role," and "significance" of 
religion in the modern world, especially with regard to the question of 
"what holds society together" and the maintenance of social order, this 
seetion will critically review one of the determinants of the perceptions of 
Similar studies illustrating the new sensibility of globalization have 
mushroomed in recent years. 
79 Roland Robertson, "Community, Society, Globality, and the Category of 
Religion" in Secularİzatİon/ Ratİonaiİsm and Sectarİanİsm: Essays İn 
Honour of BR WHson ed. E. Barker, J. A. Beckford, and K. Dobbelaere 
(Oxford: Ciarendon Press, 1993), and Bryan S. Turner, Reiİgİon and Soda] 
Theory: A Materİaiİst Perspectİve/(London: Heinemann Educational 
Books, 1983), 135. 
80 Bryan S. Turner notes a point of convergence in the etymological origins of 
the terms religion and sociology: "the term 'religion' is derived from 
reiİgİo, the bond of social relations between individuals; the term 
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Islamism, that is, the conventional secularization thesis. But, the "coverage" 
of this section, however, is beyonda critique of the secularization thesis. This 
seetion aims to assert the primacy of political in "disclosing" the practice of 
modernity concerning the relations between religion and politics and by 
arguing that modern societies are held together neither by rational, scientific 
administration, which is the Enlightenment belief, nor by a common (civil) 
religion or cultural values. It aims to suggest that politics is the activity that 
holds society together by producing the common values and the common 
good society shares. The very idea of a common good or common values as 
something above and beyond politics is an impediment to politics and thus 
to the maintenance of society ina pluralist and democratic manner. The 
legitimate sphere of politics as well as the form of state-society relationship 
is determined by the mode of integration of society. This study aims to 
evaluate Islamism in terms of i ts canception of the political and in terms of 
the form of state-society relationship it proposes. 
'sociology' is derived from socius/ the bond of companionship that 
constitutes societies." See Bryan S. Turner, Religion and Social Theory .. 8. 
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2.1. The Enlightenrnent and Religion: The Rationalist Strand 
The modern age was inaugurated with the Enlightenment. The 
Enlightenment hoped to discover universal, eternal and immutable qualities 
of all humanityso that a universal civilization could be built up and 
progress, freedom and bliss in this world could be realized on the basis of 
scientific rationality and secular reason. As a corollary, the Enlightenment 
proposed to displace local, customary or traditional moralihes and all forms 
of transcendental faith by a rational morality, which was projected as the 
basis of universal civilization.81 Although not all of the Enlightenment 
thinkers were unbelievers, there was analmost unanimous opposition to 
theocratic government and to all forms of blind obedience to mystical 
powers among them.82 Religion was considered to be illusory and irrational, 
from which rationality would liberate us. It was proposed that religion 
would eventually disappear as rationalization/modernization proceeded. 
The Enlightenment thinkers assumed that reorganization of society along 
more rational lines would be adequate for social integration, and that the 
role of religion as the basis of legitimacy and social integration would 
decline. 
81 John Gray, The Enlightenment5 Wake/ (London: Routledge, 1995), 123. 
82 See "the Enlightenment" in Dictionary of Modern Political Ideologies/ ed. 
M. A. Riff, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 74-86. 
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The nineteenth century Enlightenment belief in science as an avenue to true 
happiness was, in fact, a continuity of the belief in science as an avenue to 
different "true" things in the history of Greek-Westem political thought. In 
Greek philosophy, for example, science was seen as an avenue to true being. 
During the Renaissance, science was an avenue to true art.83 The 
Enlightenment thinkers were, therefore, concerned with the institutional 
links between social theory (rationality) and practice. This concern could be 
taken as representing a similarity with Plato's ideal form of government 
under a 'philosopher king', who had both the power and knowledge. The 
sources of the assessment of religion as politically dispensable can be traced 
back to Plato as well. Plato saw the exercise of philosophy as the supreme 
way of gaining virtue and considered mere religious habituation as an 
inadequate way of gaining virtue.84 
83 Nevertheless, W eber considered all these views as illusions. See Wolfgang 
Schluchter, Ratİonaiİsm/ ReHgion and Domination: A Weberian 
Perspective/ translated by Neil Solomon (Berkeley, LA: University of 
California Press, 1989), 268-271. 
84 
"If aman ... always philosophizes ina healthy way and the lot for his 
choice does not fall among the last, it is likely ... that he will not only be 
happy here but also he will journey from this world to the other and back 
again ... through heavens" Allan Bloom, tran. and ed., The Republic of 
Plato/ (New York: Basic Books, 1991 {first published in 1968}), 302. See also, 
Ronald Beiner, "Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau on Civil Religion", 
The Review of Politics/ 55,4 (1993): 617-638, 638. 
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2 1 .1 Secularization as Modernization? 
According to "the orthodox model," secularization isa consequence of the 
modernization process which consists of three sub-processes: "social 
differentiation" of religious institutions from other social institutions, 
"societalization" which leads to privatization of belief and "rationalization" 
as decline in the social significance of religion.85 Social differentiation refers 
to the emergence of specialist institutions providing services that were 
previously in the domain of religious institutions. Societalization means 
organization of life not locally or communally but at the level of society, i.e. 
at the nation-state level. Since it is believed that religion has its source in the 
community, or more accurately it is the ideology of community, 
societalization strips religion of its communal functions. Both of these 
processes lead to a decline in the plausibility of any single overarching moral 
and religious system. Religion, thereby, becomes a matter of private choice. 
Lastly, with the pursuit of technically efficient means of securing this-
worldly ends, i.e. rationalization, the social significance of religion declines. 
The conventional secularization thesis has been a derivative of the 
Enlightenment thought on religion. It was deeply embedded in the 
Enlightenment's trust in the capability of reason and it saw religion as an 
85 See Roy W allis and Steve Bruce, "Secularization: The Orthodox Model/' 
Steve Bruce, ed., Religion and Modernization: Sociologist and Historians 
Debate the Secularization Thesis, (Oxford: Ciarendon Press, 1992). 
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obstacle to rational progress. According to this thesis, actions of rational men 
would improve society and rational bureaucratic impersonal administration 
would be a sufficient ground for social integration.86 Accordingly, if a society 
were rationally organized there would be no need for the "contribution" of 
religion to a stable order asa "factor of cohesion," because ina rationally 
ordered society there would be no need for common values of which 
religion is one. Therefore, the role that religion supposedly played once ina 
traditional, i.e., non-rationalized, society was to become obsolete. Asa 
corollary, religion would have "no major functions for the en tire society" in 
a fully rationalized/modernized society.87 Bryan Wilson' s thesis -that there 
is no need for religious ideology in increasingly rationalized societies 
because the logic of rationality, function, system and utility provides 
86 R. N. Bellah's comments on the contemporary Japanese society isa recent 
illustration/ application of both the Enlightenment approach and the 
conventional wisdom on secularization. Bellah observed that in the 
Japanese kanri shakai (administered society) the abolishment of state 
shinto did not lead to an ethical vacuum/ because of proper 1 good 
administration of society through technical expertise and engineered 
prosperity. In Bellah's perspective good (rational) administration itself is 
the basis of legitimacy rendering both politics and religion incapable of 
providing legitimation. Needless to say this perspective on the Japanese 
society is significantly different from the same commentators views on the 
American society, which led him to the concept of "civil religion." See 
Robert N. Bellah, "Legitimation Processesin Politics and Religion", 
Current Sociology 35,2 (1987): 89-99, esp. pp. 91-93. Also compare Bellah's 
views on the Japanese society with John Clammer, Dillerence and 
Modemity: Social Theory and Contemporary fapanese Society (London: 
Kegan Paul International, 1995), 120-122. Clammer puts some emphasis on 
the role of culture in Japanese modernization as opposed to "pure" 
ra tional administra tion. 
87 See Malcom B. Hamilton, The Sociology of Religion: llıeoretical and 
Comparative Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1995). 
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integration and purpose- could be situated within this strict Enlightenment 
perspective. For Wilson, religion belongs to the experience of the 
community, but in society religions will inevitably erode. The legitimacy of 
socialorderin rationalized society does not depend upon moral values, and 
thereby the maintenance of the social system becomes less dependent upon 
people being good, but more on people being predictable.88 
The Enlightenment and its derivations constituted the histarical site from 
which Westerners approach non-Western traditions.89 Hence, most studies of 
Islamism are informed by the modernization framework. As the above 
discussion implies, secularization and modernization are synonyms within 
the Enlightenment perspective. It w as believed that modernization breeds 
secularization, that is the disappearance of religion or, at least, a decline in 
the social significance of religion. Persisting religion was, therefore, a symbol 
of irrationality and being traditional, or at besta leftover from the past.90 The 
modernization paradigm, thus, took the visibility of religion as an 
epiphenemon of traditional structures.91 Logically, politically significant 
religion isa symptom of being traditional within this perspective. 
88 Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 165 cited in James Beckford, Religion and 
Advanced Industrial Socie~ (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 110. 
89 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 200. 
90 David Martin, "Sociology, Religion and Secularization: An Orientation," 
Religion, 25, 4 (1995), 295-303, 296. 
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2.1 2 Secularization as a Policy 
However, modernization alsomeant secularization notasa process but as 
poiİcies towards that end. Ina way, the original culture-structure 
relationship which proposed that if the social structures has changed the 
superstructure (religion) would change as well, was turned inside out: 
cultural change, i.e. secularization of culture, breeds modemization. The 
policies aiming cultural change were justified and promoted by the 
modernization theory, which functioned not only to explain the world in a 
rational way but also to interpret the world in a manner that provided 
"meaning" and "motivation."92 In this respect, modernization theory 
functioned like W eber' s Protestant ethic functioned in the modernization of 
the West. W eber, as noted above, linked the possibility of modernization to 
an appropriate culture and Islam, in this respect, was not a proper culture 
for modernization. The modernization school injected a hope by not 
rejecting the possibility of change in Muslim societies, but started by 
attempting to change the "Islamic" culture. Hence, the relation between 
Islam and political modernization is considered in terms of secularization. 
Since the contents of Islam as a culturally inferior and as essentially political 
religion could not be altered, since Islam could not be eliminated from the 
Muslim societies and since Islam was conceived as an impediment to 
91 Daniel Levine, "Religion and Politics in Comparative and Histarical 
Perspective," 96. 
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modernization, the success in modernizing has meant the success in 
marginalizing the religion. The modernization paradigm thereby legitimized 
the submerging of Islam. Politically modern turned out to be politically 
secular, which in turn meant a circumstance in which Islam is submerged. 
2.2. Religion under Modemity: The Practice 
In this seetion an attempt will be made to cansicler critically the idea of 
secularization asa progressive decline of religion and the relations between 
politics and religion under modernity. It will be suggested that separation of 
religion and state as secularization is a misnomer, that religion and politics 
has always been intertwined and that secularization as decline of religion is 
misleading. The general theme of the discussion converges with what 
Casanova has pointed out: conceiving the process of secularization as the 
progressive decline of religious beliefs and practices is actually reproduction 
of a myth that "sees history as the progressive evalutian of humanity from 
superstition to reason, from belief to unbelief, from religion to science."93 
92 Jeffrey Alexander, 'Modern, Anti, Post and Neo', New Leif Review_, 210, 
March/ April, (1995): 63-101, 69. 
93 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern Worlci 17. 
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2.2 1 Religion and state· reconfiguration or secularization? 
Separation between religion and politics as secularization is a misnomer 
because religion and politics had been two separate (but interrelated) realms 
in Christian world. The Christian doctrine of two swords divided this world 
into secular and religious realms, sacerdotium and imperium/ each 
represented by different institutions, the Church and the State. The 
Churchmen, however, were deeply involved in politics because their 
political theories and administrative techniques had a direct impact on lay 
government. Like the Islamic ulema, Churchmen were alsa teaching that it 
was the secular rulers' duty to give peace and justice. This doctrine 
concerning the duty of the rulers, Strayer suggests, logically demanded the 
creation of new judicial institutions.94 But, creation of new judicial 
institutions had to wait until the collapse of the Church hierarchy, which 
was central to the emergence of modern state. 
The emergence of the modern nation-state is one of the most important 
watersheds symbolizing the passage to the modern age. Given the fact that 
there was a dual institutionalization of the religious and secular spheres in 
the pre-modern period, what modernity signifies, as far as the relation 
between religion and the state is concerned, is the emergence of the secular 
94 Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modem State/ 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 16. See alsa Black, 
"Classical Islam and Mediaeval Europe ... " 
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sphere as an all-encompassing sphere, in which the religious sphere lost its 
power to legitimize and to w hi ch the religious sp here was to "adapt," rather 
than "separation." Modern state monopolized all the faculties and facilities 
pertaining to rule as far as possible.95 Such monopolization entailed the 
enforcement of toleration and definition of religion asa belief and religious 
belief asa personal/private matter.96 AsAsad pointed out "in the eyes of 
those who wanted a strong, centralized state, the disorders of the 
Reformation proved that religious belief was the source of uncontrollable 
passions within the individual and of dangerous strife within the 
commonwealth. It could not, for this reason, provide an institutional basis 
for a common morality -stillless a language of rational criticism."97 
The modern s ta te has also been a modernizing state because it was "a 
network of secular powers that assume[d] the task of remoulding the 
material and moral condition of its subjects in accordance with the 
Enlightenment principles."98 The modern state, thereby, penetrated deeper 
into society by regulating various spheres of life through its secular 
legislation and bureaucratic "rational" administration. However, that these 
95 Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of Modem State: A Sociological 
Introduction (London: Hutchinson, 1978). 
96 Asad, Genealogies of Religion 206. 
97 ibid./ 205. 
98 Asad, "Religion and Politics: An Introduction", Social Research 59, 1, 
(1992),3-16, 15. 
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spheres were previously under the control of religious and communal 
mechanisms and that now they are under the jurisdiction of the secular 
sphere, that is the societalization, does not necessarily point to secularization 
as decline in the social significance of religion unless we associate religion 
with the institution representing it, the Church.99 
It is true that with the emergence of the modern state, institutionalized 
religion (the Church) was detached from the apparatus of social control and 
legitimacy. But, this does not necessarily mean a decline in the social 
significance of religion. What was left behind with modernity, in reality, was 
the previous configuration of religious and secular powers, but not the social 
significance of religion. 100 In this new configuration, the Church was no 
longer the "subject" of control, and in certain respects it has become an 
"object" of the modern state's control by losing its autonomy. Also, asa 
result of "societalization" religion ceased to provide major values, moral 
constraints and legitimation in society. But this separation of religion from 
the apparatus of social control and legitimation did not mean that the 
religious symbols and values would no longer be (ab)used. It rather meant 
that the way(s) of the utilization of religion are now less predictable and 
more contestable and controversial, because religion is no longer associated 
99 Raimundo Pannikkar, "Religion and Politics: The Westem Dilemma" in 
Religion and Politics in Modern Worlci eds., Peter Merkl and Ninian 
Smart (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 55. 
100 Schluchter, Rationalism/ Religion and Dominatio4 251. 
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with an institution or age-old communities.101 "Secularization," in sum, did 
not eliminate religion from the political realm. 
The second criticism of the association of the "separation" of religion and 
state with secularization could bemade by showing various political 
"functionalizations" of religion in modern society. The functionalizations of 
religion represent the acceptance of the idea that religion is central to the 
maintenance of social order. In this respect, the functionalizations represent 
a divergence from the Enlightenment critique of religion. The sociology of 
religion shows various functionalizations of religion. 
2 2 2. Functionahzing Religion: The Sociology of Religion 
Many commentators on the social significance of religion have suggested 
different reasons for the (probable) persistence of religion, and the different 
roles of religion under secular modernity. James A. Beckford in his Religion 
and Advanced Industrial Society identified three distinct categories of 
contribution to the sociology of religion in the twentieth century. The first 
suggests that religion prornotes social system integration, social solidarity 
and social integration and the process of differentiation is the most 
101 Beckford, Religion and Advanced Industrial Socie~ 110, 170, see also C. 
C. Park, Sacred Worlds: An Introduction to Geography and Religion, 
(London: Routledge, 1994), 48. 
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important factor in this function. The second category finds religion socially 
relevant because of its (supposed) capacity to supply ideas of orderliness, in 
other words, normative guidelines for action and the ultimate grounds for 
meaning. The last one assumes that the social significance of religion lies 
primarily in its ideological effects, that is, in its ability to disguise the 
material interests of social dasses and class fractions. All these approaches 
follow the footsteps of either Durkeim, or W eber or Marx respectively and it 
was undertheir impact that the religion was functionalized. 102 Obviously, all 
of these categories of contribution are somehow related to the question of 
societal integration. 
222 A) Religion as the Bond: O" vi! Re/igion and Nationalism 
Modernity was not all about rationalism or rational administration or 
Enlightenment principles. It was actually a mixture of the Enlightenment 
and anti-Enlightenment as well as tradition and the modern.103 The modern 
state as an integrative framework was allocated the task of holding society 
102 For the ideas of Durkeim, Marx and Weber see Anthony Giddens, 
Capitalİsm and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of 
Marx/ Durkeim and Max Weber/ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984 [1971]), see also Beckford, Religion and Advanced Industrial Socie~ 
25-35, 166-169, and Turner, Religion and Social Theoıy. 
103 For the distinction between the myth and the reality of the modernity see 
Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Melange Modernities in the East: Modernization 
and Globalization", unpubHshed mimeo (1995), 9. 
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together, and it was clear that the societies could not be held together by 
rational administration only. Rather, modern society was an (imagined) 
community of people who supposedly share the same culture. Modern state 
assumed gemeinschaftHch and gesselschaftlich characteristics at one and the 
same time. Indeed, it was assumed by modern theorists that a viable modem 
society had to be culturally homogenous and must have a central value 
system.104 Social integration thereby was tied to the development of a 
cohesive political community, which was bound up with the concept of 
nation.105 Indeed, drawing from Greenfeld we might suggest that the 
constitutive element of modernity was neither industrialization driven by 
capitalism, nor organic solidarity, nor rational will, but nationalism.106 
Nationalism, which provided "the something in common" in modern 
societies, therefore, replaced the supposed role religion used to play in pre-
modern communities. But, the relation between religion and nationalism 
104 Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture 
(London: Sage Publications, 1992), 109, For T. H. Green, for example, 
society was a system of shared values, and common good can only be fully 
articulated in a society where i ts members are conscious of being part of a 
larger whole. For Green see T. Walton "Justifying the W elfare State" in The 
Idea of Modern State/ eds., G. MeLennan and D. Held (Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press, 1987), 126. Various social scientist can be added to 
the list, for example, Almond and Verba intheir civic culture argues that 
support for stability of a political system derives from the political culture 
and value-consensus. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic 
Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
105 Ronan Paddison, The Fragmented State: Political Geography of Power 
(New York: St. Martin' s Press, 1983), 58. 
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have not been in zero-sum terms, rather they have been "interactive in 
myriad ways," not necessarily as reactions to modernity but as part of the 
complex processes of modernity. 107 In this respect, religion could become a 
means through which anation expresses it identity, for it is a part of the 
common culture, common identity.108 
The principle of nationalism included resorting to religion as an integrative 
mechanism as well. But this time the religion resorted was not the "real 
religion" but "civil religion," w hi ch was functional for the maintenance of 
the secular social order and w hi ch confined itself to political power. The 
concept of civil religion can be considered as an extension of the Republican 
virtue tradition, for which the problem is "how to harness the integrative 
power of religion without exposing itself to threat of theocracy."109 It was 
expected that civil religion would serve asa genuine vehicle for natural 
religious self-understanding. The concept of civil religion is based on the 
assumption that a substantial degree of moral and civil religious 
106 Liah Greenfeld, "Nationalism and Modernity," Social Research, 63, 1 
(1996): 3-40, 4, 8. 
107 Edward A. Tiryakiyan, "The Wild Cards of Modernity" Daedelus, 126, 2 
(Spring, 1997): 147-181, 170. 
108 George Moyser, "Politics and Religion in the Modern World: An 
Overview" in Religion and Politics in the Modem World, ed., G. Moyser 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 4. 
109 The difference between Republican virtue tradition and the modern 
liberal political tradition will be shown below by comparing and 
contrasting each other. These differences will become of the main 
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consciousness is attainable. For example, R. N. Bellah, who popularized the 
term by using it for America, suggested that the relationship between 
religion and politics in America had been singularly smooth: churches 
opposed neither the revolution nor the establishment of democratic 
institutions. "The American civil religion was never anti-clerical or 
militantly secular ... it borrowed selectively from the religious tradition in 
such a way that the average American sa w no conflict between the two. In 
this way, the civil religion was able ... to mobilize deep levels of personal 
motivation for the attainment of national goals.110 As such civil religion binds 
all members of society, tell them their duties and even moves them to fight 
for their society where necessary. 
It could be suggested that there are two different definitions of civil religion. 
One of themis located at the level of society and therefore seems to be 
bottom-up. The other one is located at the level of state and seems to be top-
down.111 Sources of the first definition could be traced back to Durkeim. 
Sources of the other conceptualization could be traced back to Rousseau.112 
analytical tools in analyzing the National Outlook Mavement and the 
Republic in Turkey. 
110 Robert N Bellah Beyand Belief· Essays on ReHgion ina Post-Traditionalist 
World, (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 180-
181. See also Chris Park, Sacred Worlds/ pp. 54-55. 
m N. J. Demerath III, "The Moth and the Flame: Religion and Power in 
Comparative Bl ur", Sadology of Religion 55, 2, (1994): 105-117, 113. 
112 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract/ trans. Maurice Cranston 
(London: Penguin Books, 1968), book 4, chapter 8, pp. 176-187. 
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Rousseau was uneasy with a case in which there are two prevailing source of 
authority ina community, religious and civil. In this case, "men have never 
known whether they ought to obey the civil ruler or the priest." 113 That' s 
why he thought "Mahomet had very sound opinions, taking care to give 
unity to his political system, and for as long as the form of his government 
endured under the caliphs who succeeded him, the government was 
undivided and, to that extent good."114 Christianity, Rousseau contemplates, 
having no specific connexion with the body politic, leaves the law with 
only the force the law itself possesses, aciding nothing to it; and hence 
one of the chief bonds necessary for holding any particular society 
together is lacking .... far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the 
state, this religion detaches them from it as from all other things of this 
world ... 115 
Rousseau's argument on civil religion in his Soda] Contractwas based on 
the proposition that a true religion breeds bad politics and a good politics 
presupposes a false religion.116 He rejects the ideas that Christianity is the 
best support for body politics and that a state without religion is 
possible/preferable. He differentiated between natural religion (religion of 
men) and civil religion (religion of citizen) and discredited the former 
because it is universal and otherworldly. As such, natural religion fails to 
attach the hearts of the citizen to the state. Civil religion, on the other hand, 
113 ibid., 179. 
114 ibid. 
115 ibid., 182 
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was not subject to the defects of the natural religion because its dogmas and 
ri tes were specific requirements of faith for all who live within the 
boundaries of the state. Civil religion "is good in that it joins divine worship 
to a love of the law, and that in making the horueland the object of citizen's 
adoration, it teaches them that the service of the state is the service of the 
tutelary God." 117 Yet, civil religion suffered from "the lies and errors 
compounded in its doctrines and the intolerance which stems from 
exclusiveness and contempt for other beliefs."118 "[I]t deceives men, and 
makes them credulous and superstitious, it buries the true worship of God 
in empty ceremonials." 119 
In sociology of religion, the Durkeimian-Parsonian and even Marxian 
approaches considered religion as an integrative element of modern 
societies. Durkeim, by heeding de Toqueville's warning about the socially 
disintegrative effects of the decline in shared public virtues and increasing 
individualism, proposed that society is bound together "not by material 
relations but by the ties of ideas." For Durkeim, organic society, composed 
of increasingly autonomous individuals, was stili a moralorderin which 
neither the commonly held beliefs and sentiments disappeared altogether, 
116 Beiner, "Machieveli, Hobbes .. ," 637. 
117 Rousseau, The Social Contracf:, 181-182. 
118 L. J. Macfarlane, Modem Political Theory (New York: Barnes and Noble, 
1970), 68. 
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nor did the contractual relations become arnoral and are simply the result of 
self-interest. Religion was exceptionally important for Durkeim because he 
considered it as a mechanism which generated symbols that enabled all 
aspects of life to proceed in relative harmony.120 Otherwise, there is the risk 
of anomie that would jeopardize society. Durkeim's position was based on 
the dubious assumption that religion had an integrative role in pre-modern 
societies. He extracted a new role from religion's pre-modern role. He 
proposed that religious institutions may decline but the functions they fulfill 
may not. For Durkeim, it is religion that makes society possible. 
Parsons, following the Durkeimian logic, regarded religion as an 
indispensable factor of a stable social system as well, because he believed 
that stability is the product of value orientations. Value orientations, in turn, 
w as a function of religion, w hi ch is the chief source of the m eaning of life. 
The process of social differentiation, for Parsons, did not mean a decline in 
the role of religion, but a change enabling religion to fulfill its role better. He 
expected, in other words, a more efficient and effective performance from 
religion asa result of "the division of labour", i.e. differentiation. The 
performance expected from religion was in coping with the potentially 
adverse effects of differentiation. As will be seen below, dealing with the 
potentially adverse effects of differentiation/modernization isa task of 
politics, and "delegating" this task to religion reveals the underlying concept 
119 Rousseau, The Social Contract_, 182. 
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of "the political" as something moral, which is quite depoliticizing. This 
issue will be taken up bel o w. 
2.22 B) Religion as Fa/se Consciousness 
The Marxian approach, which focused on the ability of religion to conceal or 
distort the real world by neglecting the fact that religion could also be a 
vehicle for challenging the prevailing social order, converges with the 
Durkeimian approach on the function of religion in contributing to a stable 
social order. Marx considered religion as false consciousness, necessary for 
masking exploitation. Since Marx recognized the relationship between the 
real world and religion, his "theory of secularization" did not expect a 
disappearance of religion until the eradication of exploitation and alienation, 
which is masked by religion. It could, therefore, be suggested that in the 
Marxian approach, too, religion acts as a factor of maintaming the social 
order, though through the numbing effect of social opium. Since for the 
Marxian approach religion was an illusion disguising the material interests 
of social classes, the function of religion was assessed negatively.121 Durkeim 
and Parsons, on the other hand, assessed the function of religion positively, 
as something compensating for the "divisive" effects of pluralism and 
differentiation. It was perhaps because of the revolutionary zeal of the 
120 Beckford, Religion and Advanced Industrial Sade~ 28. 
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Marxism that a factor contributing to the maintenance of the capitalist order 
was not assessed positively. Consequently, the Marxian approach did not 
provide a basis for the concept of civil religion. 
2 2 2 Q Religiou5 Modernization 
The Enlightenment by seeing rationality itself as the basis of legitimacy 
underplayed the issue of legitimization of rationality. This is an issue first 
brought up by W eber and taken up later by Bellah, Berger, Luckmann and 
Luhmann. These theorists accept the basic processes of modernization, 
differentiation, rationalization, privatization. But, they do not foresee any 
disappearance of religion in the modern world. Instead, they focus on the 
functions of an essentially privatized religion, which supplies ideas of 
orderliness, normative guidelines for actions and ultimate grounds for 
meaning. But, they neglect "the societal forces which shape and constrain 
the social construction of meaning."122 
W eber expected that self-legitimized rationality would lead to charismatic 
forms of leadership, an irrational and therefore antipolitical form of 
leadership. Hence, it was, for example, Protestant ethic that made the 
121 See Giddens, Capitalism, 220-221. 
122 Beckford, Religion and Advanced Jndustrial Society, 166. See also Asad, 
Genealogies, 44. 
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capitalİst rationality meaningful, at the level of individual or inner-self, by 
justifying (or spiritualising) the seeking of the wealth for the sake of wealth. 
W eber' s religion w as thus a religion in harmony with the capitalİst ethos 
and secular rationality which would leave the real business of running the 
society to rational bureaucracy. It actually was a religion contributing to the 
modernization/rationalization by giving it a meaning. Especially Bellah's 
Meaning and Mademization is strictly within the W eberian tradition.123 The 
considerations of Islam as a religion that could not act as an agent of change 
because it cannot give a meaning to rationality can be situated in this line of 
thought. 
According to Peter Berger, religion was a kind of "compensation" for the 
most destructive effects of modern society. Religious organizations, he 
suggested, overcome the problems created by impersonality of bureaucratic 
administration, the atomization of privatized experience and 
exploitativeness of political and economic ideologies.124 As such, religion 
plays a psychological and/ or emotional role by providing a shelter from the 
modern world. Thomas Luckmann' s postulated that religion willloose i ts 
public functions, but will not inevitably decline/ disappear in the modern 
world. Also, American conservative Daniel Beli could be situated within this 
123 Bellah's "Meaning and Modernization" first published in Religiaus 
Studies, 4, 1 (October, 1968) and reprinted as chapter four in Robert N. 
Bellah, Beyand Belief 
124 See Beckford, Religian and Advanced Industrial Sade~ 106-107. 
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perspective as well. Beli argued that religion provides coherent answers to 
solemn questions that every individual confronts in post-industrial society. 
Consequently, religion is seen as essential to solve 'the meaning' problem 
(wo)men faces ina post-industrial society. In all these approaches, the 
function of religion was to enable the smooth proceeding of 
modern/ industrial society. 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK: THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS 
The discussion in the previous sections meant to prepare a ground for 
suggesting an alternative framework for studying Islamism that will enable 
us to studyIslamismin a different way than the studies emphasizing 
features of Islam as a religion and studies focusing on aspects of 
modernization. The alternative framework, suggested in this study, focuses 
on the politİCal sphere. Below, to illustrate the importance of political sphere, 
an attempt will be made to show the primacy of politics in holding the 
societies together. 
As the concept of civil religion and the views of the founding fathers of 
sociology on religion illustrates, the separation of the state and church does 
not mean separation of religion and politics. Neither does it mean a decline 
in the social significance of religion, i.e., secularization. Even if the 
"ideology" of secularization allocated only the private sphere for religion, 
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religion still has a societal role appropriate to modern circumstances.125 
Hence, secularization, in reality, was not a matter of total eradication of 
sacred or undebateable triumph of secular-profane.126 This is a fact 
illustrated by the functional definitions of religion; by attributing a constant 
function to religion, functional definitions of religion foreclose the possibility 
of decline in the social significance of religion.127 For example, people will 
always have ultimate questions that religions answer and if religion is seen 
as an answer to them, decline of religion may signal a social erisis and may 
become a threat to social integration. In effect, functional definitions suggest 
that it is impossible for a modern society to operate without religion. Be that 
as it may, but, on the other hand, functional definitions equate (the 
indispensable) religion with the functions it fulfills rather than with belief in 
supernatural, religious practices and dogmas. Therefore, similarly 
functioning "ideologies" of order /meaning could be considered as religious 
and vice versa. lt is at this point that we enter into the sphere of politics, 
because ideologies are subject to political construction, political questionings 
and challenges and so is the functionalized religion. In itself, this fact is a 
sufficient ground for asserting the primacy of politics in the definitions of 
the roles of religion. 
125 ibid., 116. 
126 Kenneth Thompson, "Religion, Values and Ideology" in Social and 
Cultural Forms of Modernity, eds., Robert Bocock and Kenneth Thompson 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992), 324. 
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It seems that the issue concerning the role of religion in modern society, 
boils down to two crucial questions. First, concerning the supposedly 
supportive role of religion in the maintenance of society and in giving a 
meaning to modernization, to what extent and in what circumstances 
religion can play such a supportive role? Second, whether religious or not, 
are comman values anda comman culture essenhal for the social integration 
and the maintenance of society? 
With regard to the first question, it could be suggested that perceiving 
religion as making a positive contribution to the sustaining of social 
solidarity and social integration assodates meaning, order and community 
implicitly with religion. This association, in fact, conflates histarical 
contingency with categorical necessity by taking it for granted that since 
religion in once stable communities was inseparable from social life, the 
decline of religion must mean the decline of community, or decline of 
community must mean the decline of the real religion.128 If the decline of 
127 See Steve Bruce, Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults/ 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7. 
128 Turner, Religion and Social Theor~ 145-146. The idea that religion had 
played a major role in providing stable communities in pre-modern times 
is disputable itself. It neglects the fact that, the mass of population was 
indifferent to religion in pre-modern times, and that secularization actually 
meant the loss of social significance of religion only from the cultural orbit 
of the dominant class. In other words, religious structures in pre-modern 
times does not tell much about individual religiosity of the people. The 
discussion of secularization or religious revival in terms of piety, Church 
attendance ete. is not very explanatory in this sense. 
143 
community is viewed as something negative, as loss of authenticity and as a 
sign of disintegration rather than gain in personal freedam and autonomy, a 
return to religion to restore the community is aimed. 129 As such, this 
perspective underplays the importance of material factors such as economic 
coercion, economic dependency, and legal compulsion in holding society 
together. 
Although secularization does not necessarily mean a decline in the social 
significance of religion, persistence of religion is not an intrinsic contribution 
to the maintenance of social order. It can also be a destabilizing factor in 
modern societies. For example, in his study of Western European 
experience, John Madeley found that religion has "failed to provide the 
social glue or cement which Durkeim and others regarded as its prime social 
function." 130 Religion, in the maintenance of social order, "may act as the 
vehicle of change, challenge or conservation."131 Hence, to the extent that 
cultural homogeneity and comman values are essential for the maintenance 
of modern society, the role of religion in providing them depends on 
creating a political cansensus on the meaning and function of religion. It is, 
129 Turner, Religion and Social Theory, 135. 
130 John Madeley, "Politics and Religion in Western Europe" in Religion and 
Politics in the Modern World/ ed., G. Moyser (London: Routledge, 1991), 
62. 
131 Beckford, Religion and Advanced Industrial Society, 110, 170. See also 
George Moyser, "Politics and Religion in the Modern World: An 
144 
therefore, the activity of politics that makes religion a positive contribution 
to maintenance of society. In this context, those who argue that religion isa 
positive contribution to the maintenance of order, social integration and 
modernization assumes that a substantial degree of political cansensus on 
questions concerning the function/role/meaning of religion has either 
already been attained or is attainable when needed. But, even so, once the 
political nature of this "moral" cansensus is recognized, it becomes open to 
political questionings and challenges. Hence, 'secularization' does not 
necessarily mean an inevitable loss of moral cansensus or shared cultural 
basis, it rather implies a need for the political construction and politicization 
of such a moral consensus, that is the role attributed to religion by a political 
cansensus is never secure and has to be reproduced continually. Depending 
on one' s position towards radical change as well as ones concept of "the 
political," this contingency or insecurity of social/political/moral cansensus 
is either a matter of concern or areason for rejoicing. 
Concerning the second question posed above, drawing from Bryan S. Turner 
it could be suggested that "the existence of shared valuesora common 
culture does not appear to be empirically a necessary requirement of the 
existence or continuity of actual societies ... common values or a dominant 
ideology are not necessary conditions of order."132 What is suggested here,133 
Overview," 2, . C. C. Park, Sacred Worlds: An Introduction to Geography 
and Religion 48. 
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however, is not the lack of but the political nature of foundations of a 
society /polity and questionability of them.134 The theoretical premise of this 
study is that modern societies do not need comman culture and comman 
values to survive in order to allow for the possibility of reproduction, 
reexamination of the "political center" that holds the societies together. In 
other words, this study proposes that the very possibilities of reproduction 
of modern society is dependent on the belief that society does not need 
reproduction in terms of up holding some fixed/ timeless comman values of 
which religion is one. Because modern societies are plural societies as far as 
the values of the members are concerned, politics is the mechanism that 
unites the "pluralities" in a meaningful but contingent "oneness." The very 
idea that comman values/common good as something above and beyand 
politics is an impediment to politics because it restricts the legitimate sphere 
of politics to a certain range of issues. To put it differently, the center of the 
132 Bryan S. Turner, "Conclusion: Peraration on Ideology" in Dominant 
Ideologies eds., Abercombie et al. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 242. 
There isa good deal of social research that does not link the reproduction 
of social order on cansensus on collective values, but rather upon cultural 
fragmentation and tensions. See Anthony Eliott, Social Theory and 
Psychoanalysis in Transition: Self and Society from Freud to Kristeva/ 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 79. See also John McGowan, Postmodernism and 
!ts Critics, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
133 Below discussion is informed mainly by liberal intellectual tradition, but 
the discussion eventually goes beyand this tradition by introducing the 
shortcomings of this tradition. To introduce the shortcomings I mainly 
draw from Chantal Mouffe' s criticisms of liberalism from a radical 
democracy perspective. I also compare and contrast liberalism with the 
republicanist intellectual tradition. 
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society is a political construction and giving the center of a society a moral 
statusisa restriction of the possibilities of the reproduction of the 
center 1 society (ina meaningful/ democratic way).* 
In reality, politics is not about rationality and reason but about the very 
definitions of them. Neither is the starting point of politics is common values 
or acceptance of a collective good by all actors. As, Bernard Crick, in his In 
Delense Of Politics, noted 
it is often thought that for this 'masterscience' [politics] to function, 
there must be already in existence some shared idea of a 'common 
good,' so me 'consensus' or cansensus juris. But this common good is 
itself the process of practical reconciliation .... it is not some external 
and intangible sp iritual adhesive, or some allegedly objective 1 general 
will' or lpublic interest.' These are misleading and pretentious 
explanations of how a community holds together; worse, they can even 
be justifications for the sudden destruction of some elements of 
community in favour of others -there is no right to obstruct the general 
will, it is said. But diverse groups hold together .... because they 
practice politics -not because they agree about 1 fundamentals' .... The 
moral cansensus of a free state is not something mysteriously prior to 
or above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing activity) of politics 
itself.135 
134 Chantal Mouffe, "Democracy, Power and the 1 Political'," in Democracy 
and Difference: Constesting Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 250. 
*If we assume that social reproduction isa matter of consent-generation, 
consent can be generated without recognizing the political nature of the 
center, that is by daiming that (for example, Kemalist) center is above and 
beyond politics. The above discussion is meant to differentiate between 
ways of reproducing social orders -democratic and not-so-democratic. 
135 Bernard Crick, In Delense of Politics, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), 
24. 
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Pluralist concept of society is contrary to the imagination of society as 
culturally homogeneous with a central value system. Its is not founded upon 
any particular canception of goodness and truth eternally which would 
exclude certain issues from the legitimate sp here of politics. It is pluralistic 
in the sense that it lacks a substantive idea of good life and it allows for the 
possibility of challenging the institutionalized canception of good life at any 
given moment_l36 The basis of the legitimacy of the state in a pluralist society 
rest not in promotion of any particular way of life but "showing equal 
concern and respect for each person' s pursuit of whatever way of life he or 
she may choose." 137 This is because conflicts among value systems and 
visions of the good cannot be resolved by reestablishing "a strong unified 
moral and religious code without forsaking fundamentalliberties in a value-
pluralist society."138 In this respect, to the extent that Kemalism denied the 
conflicts within the society and tried to homogenize society around Kemalist 
values of the "center," it did so at the expense of fundamental liberties. 
Relatedly, we could also suggest that cansensus on the role and place of 
religion may not be attainable. Indeed, the functionalist postulation that 
modern societies "need" a civil religion could both be untenable 
136 Mouffe, "Democracy, Power and the 'Political'", 246. 
137 Richard Bellamy, "Introduction: The Demise and Rise of Political Theory" 
in idem ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics: An Introduction/ 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 7-8. 
138 Seyla Benhabib, "Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic 
Legitimacy" in Democracy and Difference: Cantesting Boundaries of the 
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theoretically and undesirable normatively.139 In fact, a declared foundation 
on a civil religion, on moral appeal to individuals and value based nature of 
legitimacy could be considered as a decisive weakness in the constitution of 
societies.140 The legitimacy of a social order, therefore, should be conceived 
of being dependent on the ability of it to provide procedures that makes 
daily interchanges unproblematic or in providing a shared life-world that 
social members ratify each day in their routine activities. 141 It is perhaps for 
this reason that the procedures of democracy, rather than substantive beliefs, 
must have some extra-constitutional cultural basis if democracy is to 
survive.142 
Having said these, it must be noted that this study adopts the orientation 
to w ards the common good of society. There must be a kind of politics of 
common good so that meaningful politics can be possible, because politics is 
primarily about the substantive moral purposes that decision makers ought 
to pursue by conciliation as well as coercion. Otherwise the concept of 
PoliticaL ed., Seyla Benhabib, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), 
73. 
139 Casanova, Public Religions İn the Modem World, 61. 
140 Werner Meihofer, "The Ethos of the Republic and the Reality of Politics" 
in Machievelli and Republicanism, eds. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and 
Maurizo Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 289. 
141 McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics, 241. 
142 ibid., 235, and Benhabib "Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic 
Legitimacy," 73. 
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political vanishes.143 What is needed is, therefore, a substance that would be 
embedded in the procedures or structuration of politics and that would not 
restrict the fundamentalliberties, i.e. "the substantive must not be political 
in nature."144 Agnes Heller suggests that "the practical realization of the 
universal value of freedam inthepublic domain is the modern concept of 
political."145 Hence, substantive dimension of politics, the value of freedom, 
is not something concrete and any idea of comman good apart from the 
"morality of freedom" is subject to political questioning and revision 
provided that it results in further expansion of freedam for all. 146 This basis -
the ground on which of political questionings has to take place- forecloses 
the "anything goes" option w hile recognizing the possibility of challenge to 
143 Agnes Heller, "The Concept of the Political Revisited," in David Held, ed., 
Political Theory Today(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 337. 
144 ibid., 337. 
145 ibid., 340. 
146 This definition of politics could be considered as compatible with that of 
Kant and liberalism. According to Bielefeldt liberalism has a political 
purpose of expansion of freedam and autonomy which will be realized 
through politics. See Heiner Bielefeldt, "Autonomy and Republicanism: 
Immanuel Kant's Philosophy of Freedom," Political Theor~ 25,4 (August, 
1997): 524-558. The idea of expansion of freedam and autonomy could also 
be taken asa regulative idea in Kantian sense. Kant saw social contract asa 
regulative idea, asa norm, rather thanasa fact. As such, social contract isa 
target which could be reached by maximizİng cansensus and realizing 
equal freedam at the same time. See Karl-Otto Apel, "Normative Ethic 
and Strategic Rationality: The Philosophical Problem of a Political Ethics" 
117, 127 and Manfred Reidel, "Transcendental Politics? Political 
Legitimacy and the Concept of Civil Society in Kant" 33, 40 both in The 
Public Realm: Essays on Discursive Types in Political Philosoph~ ed. 
Reiner Shürmann (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), See also Jones, "Kant, The 
French Revolution and the Definition of the Republic," 170. 
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the already-existing foundations of truth and justice. The possibility of 
challenge to the already established values, in turn, depends on the 
establishment of basic rights and liberties and equality of status among all 
citizens which are essential preconditions for establishment of a democratic 
society .147 
Democracy, indeed, is not simply a form, i.e. decisions reached through 
certain pre-defined procedures does not necessarily make the outcome 
democratic. Democracy isa norm as well. More accurately, democracy is "an 
ideology" which allows diverse opinions about what should be done.148 And, 
such an "ideology" is possible only when the question of what should be 
done for the good of society is a subject of politics. In this study, Islamism 
and Kemalism will be studied in the light of this discussion of the primacy of 
politics which is informed by liberal intellectual tradition. Ina way, above 
discussion is an outline of the alternative framework of analysis suggested in 
this study. 
147 Heller, "The Concept.. .. ," 338 and McGowan, Postmodernism and Its 
Critics, 213. 
148 W. J. Stankiewicz, In Search of a Political Philosophy: Ideologies at the 
Close of the Twentieth Century(London: Routledge, 1993), 416. 
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4. DEMOCRACY ASA STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP 
Thus far, it has been suggested that under modernity politics took over the 
(integrative) function of religion, which is fragmented via secularization. To 
the extent that religion plays a positive role in the maintenance of social 
order and political community, it has been suggested, such a role is 
politically determined and defined. Also an attempt has been made to show 
that the idea that modern societies are in need of a common good, a single 
public orthodoxy 1 philosophy 1 morality in order to endure, is itself an 
impediment to politics, which, as this study postulated, is essenhal for the 
maintenance of society ina democratic way. This is because, public morality 
functions as a restraint on the legitimate sp here of politics. Yet, this does not 
mean that there is a need to build a center as a center of social gravity, but to 
assert that building a centerisa political task and the substance/nature of 
the center is not cultural or religious. Only when the political nature of the 
center is recognized can (a) politics -dealing with the questions of what is 
good life and how it could be achieved- be possible. This is because as 
Machievelli long ago remarked there is no such thing as perfect solution in 
politics, to which all individuals and groups shall subscribe.149 The point is: 
the possibilities of re-examination, re-definition of the already given concept 
of common good should not be foreclosed by an assertion of the finality of 
149 Nicolo Machievelli's Discorsibook 1, chapter 6 cited in Maurizo Viroli, 
"Machievelli and the Republican Idea of Politics" in Machievelli and 
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the given common good. Only then, a political set up that does not sacrifice 
individual rights and liberties, which include the right/liberty of challenging 
the common good, can be arranged. From a normative perspective, neither a 
concern for the common good of the society nor a concern for the protection 
and development of individual rights and liberties should be left out of the 
political agenda. 
The possibilities of reestablishing, reexamining and reconstituting the 
political jurisdiction and political center of society is determined by the 
mode of integration of the society as reflected in the "ideology" of the state. 
The mode of integration determines the institutional structures of politics, 
range of political options, the possibilities of political regeneration and 
reconstruction of "the center" that holds the society together, and the form 
of relationship between state and society. If democracy is about state-society 
relations, the mode of integration is of extreme significance and it is better to 
approach the question of democracy, or democraticness of a regime or of an 
Islamİst movement, from this perspective. Otherwise, we run the risk of 
associating democracy with its indicators such as elections or non-violent 
transfer of power. What if a particular conception "democracy" allows 
elections, includes non-violent transfer of power, but "forbids" different 
opinions about what should be done? What if elections has no effect on 
arbitration and choice or was not expected to bring social diversity into 
Republicanism eds. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizo Viroli 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 159. 
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political arena as in France in 1848?150 The mode of integration also reveals 
whether social contract is the goal and/ or norm of the state/politics or a 
histarical event_l51 There are kinds of politics that take social contract as a 
norm and there are kinds of politics that take it as a once and for all 
histarical event. 
The idea that the number of possible political theories canceming the state-
society relationship is infinite is an illusion: "there are political theories that 
aim at the elimination of society in the state, the elimination of state in the 
society, or reciprocal limitation of the two terms." 152 This "categorization" 
corresponds to types of state-society relationship mentioned by Reinhard 
Bendix: society is an object of state-craft, politics and government are 
products of society, and society and government are partly interdependent 
and partly autonomous spheres of social life.153 Sources of the first idea is 
traced back to the medieval tracts containing "advice to princes," and it is 
150 Pierre Rosanvallon, "The Republic of Universal Suffrage" in Fontana 
Biancamaria, ed., The Invention of the Modern Republic/ (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 204. 
151 I borrow the idea of social contract as a norm from Kant, or more 
accurately, from Gareth S. Jones' interpretation of Kant. See Jones, "Kant, 
The French Revolution and the Definition of the Republic", 170. See also 
footnote 146. 
152 Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, "Kant and Fichte," in New French Thought: 
Political Philosophy ed., Mark Lilla (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1994), 80. 
153 Reinhard Bendix, Embettled Reason: Essays on Social Knowledge (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 223-224. 
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closely related to the rise of absolutism. The masses are excluded from all 
participation and seen asa source of tax revenue. The second idea "come to 
the fore in the attacks of the Enlightenment philosophers on the established 
privileges of the church and the aristocracy." This orientation tended to 
sociologize politics by attempting to develop a scientific study of political 
community and human nature. But its application to the past politicized 
history, narrated asa story of ever-changing conflicts among vested 
interests. It was thus suggested that all governments are mere product of 
contemporary partisanship. The third perspective "reflects (and provides 
insight into) the structural transformatian of Western societies."154 The 
question of democracy as a form of state-society relationship could best be 
located in this third perspective. Ina way, the first two theories of state-
society relationship are two sides of the same coin. They both lack and/ or 
distort the concept of democracy as a relation between the two interrelated 
spheres. Both of them are prone to totalize and homogenize the social reality 
and shape politics accordingly. In other words, as far as the type of relation 
between state and society concerned, it does not make a significant 
difference whether the state is conceptualized asa product of society or 
society as an object of government. For example, elections may be conceived 
asa mechanism of legitimizing the consideration of "society as an object of 
government" by depicting "government asa product of society." It is in this 
154 ibid., 225. 
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respect that the perception/ conceptualization of social contract, i.e. mode of 
integration is significant. 
5. MODES OF INTEGRATION AND THE CONCEPTS OF THE POLITICAL 
It could be suggested that there are basically two traditions of political 
thought whose idea(l)s inform a social integra tion/ contract: liberalism and 
republicanism.155 Both traditions of political thought deal with the issue of 
constructing and maintaining a good community and civic life. Both the 
155 These two idea(l)s correspond to the typologies of both Noel O'Sullivan 
and Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss. O'Sullivan differentiates between 
civil assodation and social politics, while Offe and Preuss identify French 
and American ways of integra tion. Contents of these types of integration 
matches with what will be deseribed as republican and liberal models. 
Indeed, it could be suggested that social politics and French type of 
integration is actually republican types while civil assodation and 
American type of integration are liberal. See Noel O'Sullivan, "The New 
Right: The Quest for a Civil Philosophy in Europe and America" in The 
Nature of the Right: European and American Politics and Political Thought 
since 1789, ed. Roger Batwell and Noel O'Sullivan, (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1989) and Claus Offe and Ulrkh K. Preuss, "Democratk 
lnstitutions and Moral Resources" in Political Theory Taday, ed. David 
Held (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1991). Similarly, David Held 
identifies two emerging traditions of political thought during/after 
Renaissance: classkal republican or civic humanİst tradition. Against these 
stands the liberal tradition. The former maintains a firm foot in the 
political theory of ancient world, while the latter is more concerned about 
the problem of protecting the collectivity from despotism in the face of 
emerging modern states. These two traditions, in Held's study, have been 
evolved into protective and developmental models of democracy. Nicollo 
Machievelli (1469-1527) could be considered as the representative of the 
classkal republican thought while, for example, Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679) and John Locke (1632-1704) are the representatives of the liberal 
tradition. See David Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1987), 41. 
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republican and liberal enlightenment models limit the legitimate sphere of 
politics in their own ways. Both take the idea of social contract as a histarical 
event. But, liberal and republican models have different conceptions of 
common good and "the political." Both have positive and negative aspects. 
Below, these two different modes of integration that determine the political 
configuration or political infrastructure will be examined. Although there 
are many varieties and mixtures of both liberalism and republicanism, this 
study by abstracting and reducing these mixtures and varieties into two 
"ideal" models intents to demonstrate better the political set up of Turkish 
Republic. One might think that republicanism is a too broad category to 
study a specific case, for the range of republican regimes varies from fascism 
to parliamentary democracy. But, as will be seen, there are certain political 
things, or more accurately arisk-of sınathering politics, that could only be 
faced under a republican regime.lt is for this reason that a distinction 
between broad liberalism and a broad republicanism would suffice for the 
purposes of this study.lt must be borne in mind that what is suggested in 
this study is that politics is central to the maintenance of societies and 
production of the "center" that holds the society together and in which the 
idea of social contract is perceived as a normative goal. 
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5. 1. Liberal Mode of Integration 
In liberal model social integration is on the basis of self interest of free 
individuals. Individuals are expected to maintain this contract as long as 
their representatives maintain the original contract and its covenants "life, 
liberty and estate." However, liberalism assumes that social stability rests 
upon shared norms, beliefs and values. The endurance of social contract, 
which was initially based on self-interest of free individuals only, is 
explained in terms of liberal morality.156 What is moral, in liberal view, is the 
ground rules or procedures (of the pursuit of self-interest) that provide the 
basic principles of political association and that every reasonable member of 
society is expected to subscribe.157 The liberal core morality is identified with 
a set of basic rights and entitlements capable of ensuring maximum equality 
for all. 
In liberalism, those who challenge to security of property or market society 
threatens the realization of common good which will be possible through 
these mechanisms. Thus, the constitutional state, whose power is restrained 
by the liberal principles, is strongly committed to intervene to uphold liberal 
principles/mechanism. What is absent in liberalism isa substantive idea of 
common good to be pursued politically. The moral purpose in liberalism is 
156 Offe and Preuss, "Democratic Institutions ... ," 156. 
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refrainment from pursuing a political purpose for the fear that this would 
lead to trespassing of individual's moral autonomy.158 The liberal model, 
therefore, does not impose any aim or purpose on citizens, for it does not 
have an intrinsic or substantive purpose.159 It recognizes the pursuit of 
individual interests as legitimate. Liberal understanding of 
rationality /legitimacy is therefore formal/procedural. Such an 
understanding, however, may conceal a substantive irrationality. To the 
extent that politics is about the substantive issues, liberalism privatizes 
politics and denies the social dimension of it by reducing politics to pursuit 
of self-interest in the private sphere. Liberalism believes that an invisible 
hand will turn the enlightened self-interest to the greatest common good of 
all. 
As such, liberal position could be considered as a profoundly antipolitical 
position as the Enlightenment. The possibilities of politics and/ or 
challenging what is regarded as truth and justice are foreclosed in liberalism 
by the elevation of cansensus to a moral/ reasonable level.160 Henceforth, the 
157 Chantal Mouffe, "Democracy, Power and 'the "Political,"' 249. 
158 See Heiner Bielefelt, "Autonomy and Republicanism ... " 524-525. 
159 O'Sullivan, "The Quest for ."167-168. 
160 Asad, Genealogies of Religion 233. See also Seyla Benhabib, "Models of 
Public Space: Hannah Arendt, Liberal Tradition and Jurgen Habermas" in 
Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed., Craig Colhoun, (Massachusetts, The 
MIT Press, 1992), 82 for a critique of the "exclusive" characteristics of 
159 
questionings of the "core morality" are either immoral or unreasonable. As 
such, the Enlightenment stance encourages the end of ideology and 
emphasizes satisfaction or delivery of goods, i.e. efficiency, as the basis of 
legitimacy. It, thereby, denies the relevance of political philosophy and 
moral criticism to politics, which is an essentially antipolitical position. 
Disagreements with the liberal core morality, therefore, could be coercively 
met and this may not be considered as an oppression. Yet, first, politics is 
not a positive science and political problems could not be solved as simply 
as questions of hygiene.161 Second, questions of what sort of world we would 
like to live and what should be the common good that the state should 
provide are vital parts of politics that could not be excluded from political 
agenda legitimately.162 
However, the liberal-Enlightenment tradition focuses on the modern 
eriterian of liberty rather than ancient eriterian of virtue. Kant, for example, 
was unsentimental about "honour" and "virtue." For him, the state's role 
was not to organize happiness (the affluence of the citizens) and virtue. 
Similarly, The Spirit of Laws substituted the modern eriterian of liberty with 
the ancient eriterian of virtue.163 In liberalism citizens are expected to pursue 
political liberalism see also Mouffe "Democracy, Power and the 
'Political"', 249. 
161 Reinhard Bendix, Embettled Reason/ 225. 
162 Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society: An Histarical 
Argument (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 256. 
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their self-interest by complying with the ground rules. The liberal view of 
negative liberties guarantees freedom from external compulsion but not the 
possibilityof participation ina common praxis. Their active participation in 
the deliberation of common good is not sought. 
The legitimacy of political power is based on the compliance with 
constitutional forms. The essence of liberalism is hostility to arbitrary power 
and unlimited politics. It aims to promote human freedom and dignity by 
eliminating arbitrary power. The state is expected to prevent violence and 
maintain peace when individuals are pursuing their own interests. In this 
mode of social integration the bond which holds the society together is not a 
common purpose but a common peace. The liberal-Enlightenment line, 
therefore, allows a larger sphere for freedom, and favours a limited state, 
though it, too, removes certain issues from the political sphere and restricts 
the legitimate politics to certain issues. But more importantly, it could be 
suggested that, liberalism actually privatizes politics by lacking a concern for 
a substantive idea of a common good and by assuming that pursuit of 
individual self-interest will result in the greatest common good for all. It 
empties the politicallife of substantive argument. In liberalism the task of 
politics is to protect an already-established order of justice. 
163 Pierre Manet, "The Modern State" in Mark Lilla, ed., New French 
Thought: Political Philosophy(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994) 
123. Judith N. Shklar, "Montesquieu and the new republicanism" in 
Machievelli and Republicanism, eds., Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and 
Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 266. 
161 
The liberal view, in sum, conceives politics as founded upon self-interest and 
as the pursuit of power.164 The primary concern of liberal view is not 
realization of a common good but restriction of the powers of the state so as 
to allow a larger space for society free from state intervention. It is on the 
basis of this motivation that liberalism tries to define a "private sphere" 
independent of political interference. Liberalism, in all of its variants, 
therefore, united around the advocacy of a constitutional state - constitution 
being the mechanism of curbing the powers of the state. The task of state in 
liberalism is protection of the rights and liberties of individuals who are 
ultimately the best judges of their interests, but not pursuing a substantive 
idea of common good. Political activity secures the conditions of freedoru so 
that individual ends might bemetin civil society. 
5. 2. Republican Mode of Integration 
The republican mode of integration, too, takes social contract as an 
histarical event and stili focuses on the ancient eriterian of virtue. It could be 
claimed that modern republicanism represent a continuum with the classical 
republicanism of the ancient Greece, because the classkal view of politics as 
the art of establishing and preserving good community and/ or as debates 
164 Here I draw mainly form Held, Models of Democrac~ pp. 42-54, 67-68. 
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about the nature of good life endures in modern republicanism. Rather than 
"deserting" (or shying away from) politics, this model tends to smother 
politics of comman good. This is because, republicanism does not leave the 
issue of comman good to the invisible hand of market. The essence of 
republican politics is, therefore, a concern for or an orientation towards the 
good life of the community, which is conceived as the highest good. As such, 
republican view of politics stands in contrast to the liberal view of politics. 
Unlike the latter, in the republican view politics, by virtue of being 
concerned with the substantive issues of collective welfare and having an 
encompassing visian of comman good, is moral politics. The task of state is 
to uphold the idea of comman good and realize it. 
The task of politics in republicanism is to bring about an order of justice. In 
this sense, there is no natural or God-given rights and framework of politics. 
It is through political assodation that liberties are brought about. Liberties, 
therefore, do not precede the political association. One could only be free 
within a political association. Republican view of liberty requires 
participation of citizens so as to count themas free. To this end, participation 
considered to be a public obligation. This prevents the transfer of 
responsibility to the rulers for the well being of a community. Every member 
of society is held responsible for the good of community. This is because of 
the assumption "that unless we place our duties before our rights, we must 
163 
expect to find our rights themselves undermined." 165 In this sense, ideally, 
republican view of politics does not presuppose an already-given concept of 
common good to be pursued by "free" citizens.166 By placing an emphasis on 
the necessity of participation for the upholding of freedoms, republicanism 
recognizes the fact that civil liberties are not ahistorical natural rights but 
products of complex political and histarical processes. It thereby asserts 
morality of emancipation rather than morality of (already established) 
rights. This is because moralizing of an already established set of rights 
could suffocate the explanatory enterprise which is essenhal for furthering 
freedoms. 167 Republicanism, therefore, "conceives the citizen as sameone 
165 Quentin Skinner, "The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty," in 
Machievelli and Republicanism, eds., Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and 
Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 309. 
166 Quentin Skinner, "The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty," emphasizes 
the importance of individual rights and plurality of goods, which might be 
considered as a liberal injection to republicanism indeed, while stili 
keeping the republican ideal of political participation. This is contrary to 
the widely held belief that republican ideal of political liberty implies that 
there are certain specific goals to be pursued in order for citizens to be 
counted as being fully in possession of their liberty. The republican view of 
liberty, Skinner suggests, emphasizes that there are different dasses of 
people with varying dispositions who will value their liberty as a means to 
attain varying ends. See also Chantal Mouffe, Return of the Political 
(London: Verso, 1993), pp. 35-38 for a positive assessment of Skinner's 
conceptualization of "republican" liberty. Allan Patten regards Skinner's 
position as "instrumental republicanism" which values active citizenship 
not because it is good in itself but because it contributes to the maintenance 
of free society. Patten argues that instrumental republicanism has "no 
interesting disagreement" with liberalism, and therefore the critique of 
liberalism implied by Skinner fails. See Allan Patten, "The Republican 
Critique of Liberalism," Britishjournal of Political Science/ 26 (1996): 25-44, 
25, 26, 30-36. 
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whoplaysan active role in shaping the future direction of his or her society 
through political debate and decision-making."168 In the republican view "a 
citizen must besomeone who identifies with the political community to 
which he or she belongs, and is committed to promoting its common good 
through active participation in its politicallife."169 
To the extent that politics is primarily about the substantive issues such as 
freedom, justice, distribution and so on, republican view of politics prevents 
the vanishing of the concept of political. This is because, it recognizes the 
fact that there is no invisible hand turning the pursuit of enlightened self-
interest to the greatest good for all. It also recognizes that politics is neither 
about the provision of the optimum amounts of welfare nor about the 
rational administration of societies, both of which are often considered as the 
sources of legitimacy. What republican view of politics brings to the fore, by 
plunging into substantive issues, is the very basis of legitimacy and the 
concepts of rationality, welfare, freedom ete. It focuses on the very ends that 
the community and/ or state should pursue rather than on a pre-given 
concept of the common good. 
167 Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988 [1985]), 26. 
168 David Miller, "Citizenship and Pluralism" Political Studies, XLIII, (1995): 
432-450, 444. 
169 ibid., 444. 
165 
5. 3. The Republican Trap 
However, the republican idea(l) of politics runs a crucial risk mainly because 
i ts understanding of politics is oriented towards the comman good of the 
whole society. This risk could be called as "the republican trap." It is the trap 
of sınathering politics by moralizing the comman good, and thereby, by 
removing it from the legitimate sphere of politics. In this case, republicanism 
falls short of its ideals and tends to be authoritarian. 
In the republicans' ideal orientation towards the comman good of society, 
by actively participating citizenship means that the idea of comman good is 
subject to political re-examination and re-definition by citizens. When an 
idea of comman good is elevated to a level above and beyand politics by its 
moralization, subscription to this "moral consensus" becomes a precondition 
of politics and participation. In addition, concept of actively participating 
citizenship may result in lack of distinction between public and private 
spheres.170 Ina cantext where liberties are only defined in terms of positive 
liberties, if the concept of comman good is moralized, liberty might turn out 
tomean active subscription to it only. Hence, in the absence of negative 
liberties, no right to refrain from a given comman good is recognized. It is 
170 Patricia Springborg, Western Republicanİsm and the Orİental Prince, 
(Cambridge: Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), 239. 
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for this reason that the problematique of republicanism is to construct 
citizenship without the loss of private realm. 171 
As Jurgen Habermas points out, on this reading of the republican tradition, 
"the democratic process is dependent on the virtues of citizens devoted to 
public weal."172 The issue, therefore, can be enabling citizens to be "good 
citizens," i.e. citizens committed to common good, which will be produced 
through elite-supervised civic education.173 It is one of the stipulations of 
republicanism that republic is possible only if citizens are virtuous, i.e. 
capable of serving the common good. Hence becomes the precondition of 
republican government. As such, this model secures the outcome of the 
democratic deliberation process in advance, because the comprehension of 
the pre-given common good is the precondition of participation. 
Participation refers to capacity of the citizens to transeenci personal or group 
interests, comprehend the given concept of common good and act in the 
name of it. Public realm is the realm of virtuous citizens. 
171 Faruk Birtek, "Bir Cagdaslasma/Cagdaslasmama Projesi: Bir Deneme" 
Cogito, 15, (Yaz, 1998): 170-185, 175. 
172 Jurgen Habermas, "Three Normative Models of Democracy" in 
Democracy and Difference: Constesting Boundaries of the PoliticaL ed. 
Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 24. 
173 Offe and Ulrich, "Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources," 155. 
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Virtuous citizenry is complemented by a state-centered understanding of 
politics in which state, rather than citizens, acts for the good of the whole 
society. In this respect, s ta te is by no means a neutral s ta te but is seen as an 
instrument of implementing the social purpose for which society is 
integrated. The constitution, which according to Sheldon Wolin determines 
the amount of democracy to be let in,174 is seen as a machinery promoting the 
encompassing vision of common good. Political assodation is not the 
assodation of all under law, and equality before law but of those who have 
something in common. 
In this model, then, social integration is on the basis of adoptation of a 
shared vision of happiness and welfare, anda shared purpose, i.e. ideology, 
to which everyone and everything within the state is subordinated. 
Moreover, since the state has a morality, this morality functions asa 
eriterian of evaluating different life styles. The denial of a political status to 
the given concept of common good, in effect, results in delegitimization of 
opposition to it. Moreover, it legitimizes coercion which is depicted as 
something done for the good of the society but not as oppression.175 It is not 
174 Sheldon Wolin, "Fugitive Democracy" in Democracy and Difference: 
Cantesting Boundaries of the PoliticaL ed., Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1996), 39. 
175 Jane Mainsbridge, "Using Power /Fighting Power: The Polity" in 
Democracy and Difference: Cantesting Boundaries of the PoliticaL ed., 
Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996) identifies 
three different ways of justification of coercion. In the first one, justification 
is made through a hypothetical consent: dean-air is a desired by everyone 
168 
the common good that would adjust to the will of people, but the people 
who will adjust to the given concept of common good. Politics, then, turns 
out to be about what must be rationally (or conformingly) be willed by all, 
i.e. about transforming the will of people. Therefore plurality of interests 
and moralities is seen as divisive, as a threat to the substantive idea of 
"common good," around which the community is supposedly integrated.176 
Autonomy, participation and freedom of citizens are subordinated to the 
realization of the "common good." S ince the goal is construction of a 
particular kind of society, politics revolves araund the division of 
community into those who support the desirable society and those who do 
not. In this respect, republican politicsisa struggle between friend(s) and 
foe(s) of the republican regime and the moralized common good. 
It is one of the presumptions of this (republican) state that people make 
mistakes about what is good for them. Pluralism in the conceptions of 
common good is unthinkable, the ideal society is without class, without 
personal conflict. Politics involves not aggregation or reconciliation of the 
empirical will(s) but a rational cognitive process, which determines what 
must be rationally willed by all. Democracy turns out to be about the 
so coercing precautions is justified. Second way of justifying coercion is 
through an appeal to substantive justice as in the republican model, and 
the third one is through majority rule. 
176 See Pierre Rosanvallon, "The Republic of Universal Suffrage," 203-204 for 
a similar understanding of pluralism in France. 
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transformatian of the will of people until which vanguards would rule. 
Indeed, republicanism since the Greek political thought, 
emphasized/assessed the merits of rule by virtuous people.177 Its canception 
of democracy is, therefore, a state-centered one which equates democratic 
citizens with unqualified loyalty and faithfulness to existing arrangements. 
Law is an instrument of "making" people loyal to those arrangements, 
which predetermine the range of political options and/ or limits of politics. 
Since politics is only possible in the absence of truth, the structuration of 
politics according to a particular visian of truth acts as an impediment to 
politics. 
The source of authority of the state in the republican model turns out to be 
achieving the comman purpose for which the society has been integrated.178 
Citizens are expected to evaluate the efforts of the state in terms of the 
comman good.179 The focus is on the effective use of political power and not 
on public debate which is seen as blasphemous. Since the social integration 
isa goal-based one, efficacyis the concern, legitimacy is based solely on the 
delivery of goods and the most effective way of using power by approved 
groups and individuals is searched. This does not necessarily imply a 
177 Patricia Springborg, Western RepubHcanism and the Oriental Prince/ 186-
196, 239, 246. 
178 O'Sullivan, "The New Right.. .. ," 167-168. 
179 Habermas, "Three Normative Models ... " 27. 
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totalitarian state but lack of differentiation between public and private, and 
state and civil society. 
The implication of the presence of a non-neutral state and the lack of 
negative liberties is insecure survival -even oppression- of deviant identities 
and conceptions of comman good. It results in the non-recognition of, for 
example, Islamic identity asa legitimate identity, if a particular concept of 
secularism is moralized as the comman good of the society in question. This, 
in turn, results in the portrayal of Islamism as an enemy of the comman 
good of the society and conceiving politics in terms of war between friends 
and enemies of the moralized comman good. Such portrayal is supposedly 
essential for the maintenance of the comman good, but it is alsa prone to 
polarization of polity ona certain axis. U nder polarization, certain political 
options/issues will be left out of political agenda and political alternatives 
will be defined in terms of what they are against but not in terms of their 
policy alternatives. Hence, for example, little opportunity would exist to 
decipher what the Islamİst and Kemalist alternatives involve apart from 
their opposition to each other. But, more importantly, portrayal of, say, 
Islamism would not be based on an analysis of the dynarnics behind an 
Islamic movement. Indeed, it could be suggested that a concern for 
"understanding" those movements that deviate from the given concept of 
comman good is lacked. Islamism, in this case, is approached to ina non-
accommodating way and no political outlet is given to it within a democratic 
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pluralistic system. Politics of deviant movements, in our case politics of 
Islamism, in turn, may be shaped by the way it has been dealt with. 
Hence, an orientation towards comman good, a substantive idea of good life 
is indispensable forasound politics, but as seen above, it could also become 
a barrier to politics if it is moralized and/ or elevated to an above politics 
level. The republican trap, therefore, could be avoided only when social 
integration is informed by both liberal and republican ideals, which, as 
noted above, is done by Skinner in his description of republican ideal of 
liberty. A pure liberalism, as noted, avoids the risk of sınathering politics, 
but by emptying the political life of substantive argument, i.e., at the 
expense of politics. Yet, the liberal ideals protects the individual rights vis a 
vis the s ta te pursuing a substantive comman good and allows the possibility ~ 
of recognition of its political nature. What is needed therefore is an ı 
orientation towards comman good but ina liberal way, i.e. by securing 
individual rights and liberties and by recognizing the political nature of the 
comman good. 
These two mode(l)s of integration are also two different frameworks of 
politics. Islamism and Kemalism could be assessed in terms of these two 
models of integra tion, frameworks of politics and concepts of political. Only 
then we could observe the substantive differences and formal or 
grammatical similarities between the Islamİst and secularist altematives in 
Turkey. 
172 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE KEMALIST CONTEXT AS REPUBLICANISM 
1. THE IMFORTANCE OF THE CONTEXT 
The foregoing chapters have attempted to define what Islamism is and 
tentatively suggested an alternative framework for approaching and 
analyzing the politİcs of Islamism by critically reviewing the already-
existing accounts of Islamism. It has been suggested that Islamism should 
not be assessed in terms of either same "essence" of Islam or same arguable 
"failures" of modemization, but in terms of politics so that what gave shape 
to Islamism' s political aspects, characteristics and political discourse could 
better be comprehended. An attempt has alsa been made to assert the 
primacy of politics in holding the societies together in the modern world by 
studying the relation between modernity, secularization and politics. 
Without denying the importance of the penetrating effects of a particular 
understanding of modernization/Westernization on Islamic identity, it has 
been suggested that the deep and complex relations between modernity and 
Islam does not really enable us to decipher the political aspects of Islamism.1 
Modernity of Islamism, for example, tells us little about the vision(s) of state-
society relations of the Islamist mavement in question here, simply because, 
politically speaking, modernity is not all about democracy and pluralism 
and modern self is not necessarily congruous with the liberal-democratic 
identity. 
The standpoint in this study is that the politics of Islamism could best be 
comprehended in relation to its immediate political context, within which it 
emerges. An analysis of the Republican context ofIslamismin Turkey is 
indispensable from this standpoint. By analyzing the Republican cantext in 
Turkey one could see the general structuration of Turkish politics. The 
analysis of this general structuration will enable us to see Islamism's 
position vis a vis the political structures. It is an analysis of Islamism in 
terms of this positioning that would enable us to assess Islamismin more 
solid grounds than Islam/ conservatism or modernity. This is because, once 
the various aspects of the infrastructure of Turkish politics identified, we 
could, then, discriminate between reproducing, reforming and revolutionary 
character of the Islamist mavement in question. In other words, we could see 
the aspects that Islamism challenges the regime as well as the grounds on 
which this challenge takes place and the potential it carries for a 
1 For such a sociological approach focusing on the relations between Islamic 
self and modernity see Nilufer Gole, "The Quest for the Islamic Self within 
the Cantext of Modernity" in Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in 
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transformation, dernocratic or not. In this way, from a normative-democratic 
perspective, defects of both Islamism and the secular-republican state it 
challenges could be revealed. If we accept the argument, for example, that 
the regime it challenges is predominantly iliiberal and hinders further 
democratization due to its particular flawed understanding of 
modernization/ then, we can not associate any challenge to this 
Westernizing regime with antiliberal tradition. If this is the case, one is 
compelled, in principle, to recognize the potential democratizing effects of 
an opposition to an iliiberal Westernizing regime even if it is made on 
Islamic grounds. But, w hat if we accept, for example, that Islamisrn in its 
challenge reproduces the same iliiberal political features that were 
institutionalized by the secular-republican state and that gave rise to 
bottlenecks in democratic politics? What if Islamism is close to secular state 
on questions crucial for pluralisation and democratization? 
An analysis of the Republican context and its approach to and the waysof 
dealing with Islamism is vital also because political fortunes of the 
movement is determined to a large extent by the way the "secular" state 
structured politics and set the parameters of approaching it. Seyyed Vali 
Reza Nasr, in his study of the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan, argued the 
Turke~ eds., Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1997) 81-94. 
2 On the flawed understanding of modemization in Turkey, see Caglar 
Keyder, "Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s" in 
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potential success of Islamism can directly be correlated with the way state 
reacts to it and ultimately democracy serves as the best check to the rise of 
Islamism.3 Also, not only the rise but also the radical character of Islamist 
movements that emerge could be a product of the non-democratic context 
they live in.4 
Emphasizing the importance of the context in such a determinist way, 
however, depicts Islamism/Islamists as the passive agents of the context 
they live in. It, therefore, may rid Islamism of any responsibility for 
producing alternative/ democratic policy alternatives. To the extent that this 
argument sees Islamism as reproducing the same non-democratic context by 
simply reacting to it, it does not place any responsibility on the Islamists as 
relatively autonomous actors. The emphasis put on the context, therefore, 
runs the risk of underplaying the importance of actors/action by 
overemphasizing structures and renders political actors as mere puppets-of-
the-system. Hence, whatever the guilts and sins of Islamist movements are 
the blame is put on their political context. It is precisely this risk run by the 
studies emphasizing the relationality, rather than essentiality, of political 
Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey eds., Sibel Bozdogan 
and Resat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 
3 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolu tion: The fama /at-İ 
Islami of Pakistan (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), 218-220. 
4 For such an argument see for example Ahmed S. Moussalli, "Modern 
Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses on Civil Society, Pluralism, and 
Democracy" in Civil Society in Middle East Vol. 1 ed., A. R. Norton (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1995). 
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identities.5 Islamist identity should not be linked to Islam. But, it should not 
be linked to outsicler elements either, because, otherwise, the space available 
for the discretion and initiative to Islamİst actors in advancing their political 
claims may be ignored. Thereby, the Islamist vision of state-society relations 
tends to be linked to Kemalism, to which Islamism could only react ina 
manner reproducing the same Kemalist vision. It must be borne in mind that 
when we are studying Islamism we are not studying an autonomous Islamic 
political theory, but the attempts by Islamİst to devise a political solution to 
the current problems we face. One cannot, of course, propose that a 
mavement can be democratic just because it has an oppositional character. 
But more importantly, the character of the Islamİst mavement in Turkey 
should not be analyzed on the basis of the "religiosity" of the movement, 
nor solely on the basis of the cantext within which it emerges. In other 
words, Islamism cannot be considered as liberal by virtue of being in 
opposition to the iliiberal cantext within which it emerges. Nonetheless, 
Islamism should be located to the political cantext with which it emerges in 
a non-deterministic way. It is on the basis of these concerns that this study 
now turns to study the cantext within which Islamism has emerged as a 
significant political force, namely the political structure of the Turkish 
Republic. 
5 See for example Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the 
Emergence of Islamism, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1997) for a view that does 
not link Islamism to Islam but to the erosion of Kemalism. In this non-
essentialist account Islamism, Islamist identity is a construction of 
Kemalism. 
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One of the aims of studying the political nature/structure of the Republican 
regime is to examine critically the often repeated thesis in the studies of 
Islam(ism) in Turkey which is that "the republic had not been able to 
propagate a social ethic that was sufficiently meaningful to the rural masses 
to enable them to react positively to its modernization drive" because of its 
cultural alienation from the society.6 As will be seen below, this argument 
implies that the defect of the Republican regime was its lack of a successful 
public morality. If extended, this argument also implies that it was this 
defect that led to the arguable failure of modemization. 
This chapter aims to show that it is not cultural, but political alienation of 
the Republican regime from the (Muslim) society and that it is not the lack 
but the presence of a public morality along Republican political philosophy 
that lies at the heart of the problematic of the rise of Islamism. Once this will 
be shown, it will also become apparent that it is not the failures of 
modernization in delivering its promised goods, but the limited and 
6 For the inability of the Republican mentality to be a substitute for Islam 
and to provide a social ethos see Serif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in 
Turkey," in Islam in the Political Processes, ed., James Piscatori (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 156 and "Islam in Mass Society" in 
Politics in the Third Turkish Republic/ eds., Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 163, and "Religion and 
Secularism in Turkey" in Atatürk: Founder of a Modem State/ eds., Ali 
Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981). See also 
Metin Heper, "A Weltanschauung-Turned-Partial Ideology and Normative 
Ethics: Ataturkism in Turkey," Orien~ 25 (1984): 83-94, 93. 
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limitinlf nature of modernization with its concomitant concept of "the 
political" that foreclosed the possibilities of political accommodation and the 
regeneration of politics. It was, perhaps, this foreclosure that increased the 
eleetaral fortunes of Islamism rather than the failures of modernization, 
religious revival of a Muslim society or dislocating economic and social 
effects of globalization. 
Although the mark left by the state tradition, inherited from the Ottoman 
Empire, on this particular modernization project is recognized, it will be 
argued- on the basis of the assumption that endurance of institutions needs 
nurturing- that it is the limited character of this modernization project that 
reproduces the state tradition in Turkey, which is conceived as the main 
reason for the democratic bottlenecks by some students of Turkish politics.8 
An analysis of the Republican public morality will enable us to understand 
why, for example, political language in Turkey still remains communitarian 
despite the fact that modernization implies a transition from gemeinschaftto 
gesellschaft. Similarly, it will be possible to understand why Turkey is 
claimed not to fulfill basic standards of democracy despite the elite 
commitment to it and why the quasi-authoritarian features of Kemalism 
7 I borrow the notian "limited and limiting" from Talal Asad. Limiting is 
usedin the sensethat there are certain choices it would not allow, and 
limited is usedin the sensethat there are certain things it will not criticize. 
See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power İn 
Christianity and Islam/ (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993), 232. 
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were not restricted to the period of the consolidation of the Republican 
regıme. 
It must be noted that this study does not primarily aim to evaluate 
Kemalism. However, as noted above, an analysis of the Kemalist 
structuration of the political sphere is necessary for a better comprehension 
of the Islamİst National Outlook Movement. lt must also be noted that 
Kemalism in this study is taken neither as an ideology nor as a mentality but 
asa particular structuration of the political sphere along the republican lines. 
Since the focus of attention of is the structuration of the sphere of politics, 
this dissertation does not study the changes in the substance of Kemalism 
but emphasizes the continuity in the way of achieving the "substantive" 
changes. For example, the integration of Islam into the secular national 
identity in the 1980s is mentioned but not studied in detail, because the 
primary focus in this study is not the substance but the form of Kemalism, 
which to a large extent is determined by the republican mode of integration 
and which tends to see society as an object of government. 
Bearing in mind the discussion made in the previous chapter, for the 
purposes of consistency, the analysis of the Turkish Republic should start by 
posing the question whether the Republic had a public morality, that is, a 
single public orthodoxy, an idea of common good around which the society 
was integrated.lf so, how this public morality and concerns about protecting 
8 See for example Keyder, "Whither ... " 
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it structured politics and to which cleavages it gave rise to? An analysis of 
the political structure of Turkish Republic could best be made by locating it 
in the general cantext of republicanism. An attempt will be made below to 
argue that considering Kemalismin terms of republicanism will enable us to 
comprehend better both the nature of Kemalist regime and the current 
situation/ structuration of Turkish politics. 
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2. KEMALIST SOCIAL INTEGRATION AS REPUBLICANISM 
The crucial question is whether the republic' s institutional structure 
and the principles of democratic politics are ultimately compatible.9 
the question of what activities are open to the political jurisdiction of 
society as a whole is clearly a fundamental determination of legitimate 
action that must continually be established, reexamined, and 
reconstituted.10 
2.1. Kemalism as Republicanism 
Kemalism is republicanist not just because it represents a political stance 
against the Sultanate of the Ottoman Empire. Kemalism could be considered 
as a republican mode of integration by a histarical fact, because modern 
Turkish society it has constituted represents a rupture from the past in terms 
of creating a non-existent society. As Serif Mardin pointed out: 
"Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk] took up a non-existent, hypothetical entity, 
the Turkish nation, and breathed life into it. . .. Neither the Turkish 
na tion as the fountain head of a "general will" not the Turkish na tion 
asa source of identity existed at the time he set out on this task.11 
9 Faruk Birtek, "Prospects for a New Center or the Rise of the Peripheral 
Asabiyah?" in Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, Metin Heper and 
Ahmet Evin, eds., (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 223. 
10 John McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), 213, fn. 2. 
11 Serif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," 208. 
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Turkish Republic, thus, held itself responsible for constructing a modern 
society. Bearing such a responsibility was a general feature of republicanism 
to which the Enlightenment was linked.12 Hence, the status of citizenship 
and liberties were granted by the revolution to the former subjects of the 
sultan. It was a political will that turned the subjects into citizens of a 
modern state/society. Rights and liberties, therefore, did not precede the 
constitution of the Republic and the Republic was associated with the 
emancipation of people. This could be considered asa step toward the 
recognition of the primacy of politics in holding the societies together and in 
the recognition of the political nature of rights and liberties, mentionedin 
the previous chapter. However, the idea that modern Turkish society owes 
its inception to Kemalist revolution meant the moralizatian of Kemalism as 
the raison d'etre of society by its guardians. Henceforth, Kemalism, to which 
"[t]he political, social, and cultural development of modem Turkey since the 
early 1920s rests upon"13 has become the moralized common good of society. 
Kemalism had a republican view of politics also in the sense that it 
conceived politics as the establishment and maintenance of a "good society ." 
It did not leave the issue of deciding what the common good of the society 
12 See Steven B. Smith, Hegers Critique of Liberalism, (London and Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1989), 59-60 and Faruk Birtek, "Bir 
Cagdaslasma/Cagdaslasmama Projesi ... " 175. 
13 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Kemalism" in Turkei: Sudosteropa Handbuch Vol 
4, eds. Kalus-Detleu Grothusen, (Gottingen: Vondenhoeck and Rupert, 
1985), 237. 
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was to the individual interactions in public sphere with minimal state 
interference. For Kemalism, politics was a means of discovering and 
realizing what was good for the entire society. It is for this reason Kemalism 
sought collective sal va tion of society. According to republican principles, 
however, the collective idea/ common good of the society was to be defined 
through the participation of people/ citizens, which alsomeant that the 
common good is also a political construction but not a moral one. This has 
not been the case in the case of Kemalist integration of society. On the basis 
of their self-claimed rationality, the Kemalist ruling elite defined what is 
good for the whole society. Ordinary people, it was believed, do not know 
what is good for them, at least for the time being. It is in this respect that 
Kemalism fell in to the republican tr ap. In effect, Kemalist Westernizing elite 
doubled the Platonist philosopher-king who knows what is good for the 
whole society. Indeed, Ataturk stated once that 
every society has a collective idea. If it is not always expressed and 
explained, it should not be concluded that it does not exist .... True 
revolutionaries are those who know how to discover the real 
preferences in the spirits and consciousness of people whom they 
want to lead into revolution of progress and renovation.14 
Such a Platonist elitism was possible thanks to Ottoman modernization. 
Indeed, the actors of the revolution were both products and executors of the 
14 Ataturk cited in Ergun Ozbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political 
Culture in Turkey" in Political Culture and Democracy in Developing 
Countries/ ed., Larry Diamond, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 1994), 194. 
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Ottoman modernizing offensives.15 The political philosophy inherited from 
the Empire was sornewhat Platonic, for it posited that harmony in society, 
that is, keeping each individual in his proper place, is achieved by statecraft 
only, and therefore ruler should have the absolute power to determine the 
place of man in the social scheme.16 The society was, therefore, seen as an 
object of government. This basic philosophy gave way to the idea of a totally 
autonomous state as well as to the idea of the priority of the reason of state, 
i.e., hikmet-i hükümet. It could also be suggested that the sources of the 
emphasis put on justice could be traced back to this basic philosophy, which 
also underlies the peculiar concept of justice as keeping each individual in 
his proper place. The ancient ideal of preservation of state and the 
perception of society as an object of government, so as to secure social 
harmony, was apparent in Republicans as well. But, with the Kemalist 
revolu tion, the society was an object of a different government, thanks again 
15 On the continuity between the Ottoman and Kemalist modernization see 
Eric J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), part 
2. I have deliberately used the word offensive to avoid the neutralizing 
effects of process and to emphasize the aspect of consciousness in the 
modernization policies. 
16 Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey" in Political 
Modemization in fa pan and Turkey eds., Robert E. W ard and Dankwart A. 
Rustow (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964). See also 
Serif Mardin, "Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish 
Social Science" in Rethinking Modemity and National Identity in Turkey, 
ed., Sibel Bozdagan and Resat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1997), 68. According to Serif Mardin, the principle of the priority of 
the state explains why Tanzimatreformers fancied cameralism, which 
"represented the theoretical version of enlightened despotism and had little 
sympathy for democracy or representative institutions" and which saw 
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to Ottoman modernization. Although the Ottoman modernization was 
based on the "diagnosis" that linked the d eeline of the Empire to the 
degeneration of the institutions of the state and was restricted to the 
modernization of the institutions to regenerate the state, instilling skills to 
the bureaucrats primarily through education turned out to be paradoxical 
for it was changing the very basis of justice by injecting such new Western 
ideas as nationalism, constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy, to the 
future servants of the Sultan.17 Education also enabled the student-cum-
bureaucrats to thinkitalk about the social reality in terms of a future design 
and of an abstract societal model. Later on, this process culminated in a 
social engineering framework on the basis of the ideas of August Comte, 
Jean Jacques Rousseau and Emile Durkeirn.18 
The fact that vanguards, and indeed the only actors, of Turkish revolution 
were bureaucrats implied that it was a revolution that took place atsome 
level above society -a revolution from above. Thanks to Ottoman 
modernization, it first involved change in the culture of the elite and a 
change on the basis of their/state's legitimacy with the long term aim of 
changing the culture of the society on the basis of an utopia. In other words, 
the revolution first took place in the minds of the ruling elite and in the 
government "asa science of state to be applied by technicians and 
managers." 
17 Kemal Karpat, "The Transitions of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908" 
Internationaljournal of Middle East Studies/ 3, (1972): 243-281. 
186 
İdeology they attrİbuted to the state/ whİie theİr İdea of state remaİned the 
same. However, Ottoman modernization was indecisive with regard to the 
definition of modernization, that is, whether modernization is possible by 
retaining the indigenous, Islamic, culture or not. The Republic is 
distinguished by its conclusive answer to that question. It affirmed that 
adoption of Western technology and rejection of Western mores is not really 
a modernization. Civilization was associated with the West.19 It proposed a 
civilizational shift from "Islamic East" to "scientific-rational West" so as to 
achieve social progress. Henceforth, modernization included the 
transformatian of culture and Westernization have became a more 
appropriate termin referring to it. This was perhaps the most striking 
revolutionary aspect of the Turkish Republic that represented a change from 
the past. Henceforth, secularism and nationalism became the basis of the 
Republic and Islam was denied of the role it had hitherto played. But 
replaced it with Kemalism. As Ernest Geliner rightly put, "the spirit in 
which Kemalism was formulated and upheld was ... a kind of perpetuation 
of High Islam ..... The content was new, but the form and spirit were not."20 
The revolution, therefore, was not a social revolution changing the 
18 Serif Mardin, Turkİye/de Dm ve Sjyaset (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1993). 
19 Nilufer Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamİst Politics: The Case of 
Turkey" in Cİvİ] Soôety İn Mİddle East vol. 2 ed., Agustus R. Norton 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 22. 
20 Ernest Gellner, Encounters wİth NatİonaHsm (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 86. 
See also Ilter Turan, "Religion and Political Culture in Turkey" in Islam İn 
Modern Turkey: ReHgİon PoHtics and Literature İn a Secular State/ ed., 
Richard Tapper (London and New York: I. B Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), 50-51. 
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distribution of power, but a cultural "revolution" at the level of state aiming 
to change the culture of society gradually as proposed by Kemalism.21 If the 
distribution of political power can be regarded as the form, i.e. the way of 
getting things done, then the continuity in the Turkish revolution is in terms 
of form. The change, on the other hand, was in the substance of the state, i.e. 
what the state wanted to get done. 
Accordingly, modern Turkish society was integrated around a common 
good, which was defined by the elite. In this respect, modern Turkish society 
was not a "wandering" society ithada clear-cut political purpose around 
which it has been -supposedly- integrated. This purpose was the catching up 
with the West and Westernization was the means to achieve it. Hence, 
Westernization became the common good of the society. In reality, it was to 
diffuse society gradually through imposition from above downwards. In this 
respect Kemalism could be defined as a public morality modeled upon 
republican, rather than liberal, ideals. This is because, unlike the liberal 
model, it did not offer a thin theory of comman good so as to leave a large 
sphere for the pursuit of individuals' self-interest. It rather adopted a 
substantive idea of common good which entailed a certain life style and 
which could be summed under the heading of Westernization and 
secularization. By defining Kemalism asa republican public morality, it will 
be argued that Kemalism does not equal a Westernization project but 
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something more than that. Kemalism, in reality, is a particular way of 
Westernization that determines the institutional arrangements, range of 
political options and the legitimate sphere of politics. This is because, 
morality, as Steven Lukes points out, concerns 
the domain of right and good, and questions of obligation, duty, 
fairness, virtue, character, the nature of good life and good society, 
and behind these assumptions about the nature of man, the 
preconditions for social life, the limits of possible transformation, 
and grounds of political judgment.22 
Also, the endurance of state tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire 
could be explained in terms of Kemalist republicanism. Kemalist 
republicanism by equating the elite-defined common good with the 
collective will of people radicalized the idea of primacy of the state because 
the state, which saw the society as its object of government, could then be 
depicted as the product of society at the same time.23 Hence, the Republican 
state, which unlike the Ottoman state, had the task of educating people, is 
depicted as representing the society as a whole and acting on behalf of it and 
for the good of it. 
It is this moralizatian of Kemalism as the founding principle that determined 
the perceptions and "categorization" of Islamism notasa political 
21 Serif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution," 
InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies/ 2, (1971): 197-211,202. 
22 Steven Lukes, Marxism and Moralif)0 2. 
23 Serif Mardin "Projects .... " 69. 
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movement representing certain demands and grievances of the society but 
asa reactionary and regressive mavement created artificially by politicians 
abusing the religion for their own political purposes. Also, it is this 
moralizatian of Kemalism that resulted in the necessity, on the part of 
politicians, to reach a consensus on certain key issues such as secularism not 
between themselves but with the non-political guardians of Kemalism, i.e. 
the state elites. As Metin Heper pointed out, "anything relating to legitimacy 
was "high politics" - a matter pertaining to the state and thus the concern of 
neither the man in the street nor his representative."24 
2.2. The Substance of Kemalism: Westemization 
Kemalist ruling elite justified its cultural Westernization project on the basis 
of its scientific rationality. The emphasis put on the primacy of "culture 
shift" was based on the assumption that "the reasons behind the Western 
advancement could be located precisely in the Western practices."25 This was 
because Kemalism believed that Western society was scientifically rational. 
This property of Western society, in turn, was linked to its culture. And, 
24 Metin Heper, "Strong State and Democracy: The Turkish Case in 
Comparative and Histarical Perspective," in Democracy and Modemity, ed., 
S. N. Eisenstadt, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 160. 
25 Bobby Sayyid, "Sign O'Times: Kaffirs and lnfidels Fighting the Ninth 
Crusade," in Making of Political Identities ed., Emesto Lada u (London: 
Verso, 1994), 269. · 
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since what is scientifically rational is also universal and applicable 
everywhere and at any time, Western social organization was universally 
applicable too. The underlying assumption of the Westernization reforms 
was the positivist belief that science isa tool of ordering society and 
inducing change.26 As such, Kemalism was in line with the Enlightenment 
thought which preseribed science and rationality as the way to progress and 
freedom and which hoped to replace all local and customary moralities with 
rational morality as the basis of universal civilization. In this respect, 
Kemalism, long before modernization school, associated science and 
rationality with the Western culture, the substance of Kemalism was a 
cultural change along the Western lines. Thus, the rational reorganization of 
society was also Westernization of it. 
All links were severed with the past on the basis of the assumption that 
progress is impossible for "a na tion that insists on preserving a host of 
traditions and beliefs that rest on no logical proof."27 As such, until the 
principle of nationalism was made an integral part component of Kemalism, 
Kemalist Westernization was in line with the Enlightenment which "requires 
societies to forego their claims to exclusivity and open their doors to 
26 Resat Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities," in 
Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turke~ eds., Sibel Bozdogan 
and Resat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 26. 
27 Ataturk as cited in cited in Ahmet Davutoglu, Alternative Paradigms: The 
Impact of Islami c and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory 
(Lanham, New York: University Press of America, 1994), 7. 
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potentially beneficial effects of science."28 Indeed, in one of his speeches 
Ataturk, himself, stated that: 
we shall take science and knowledge from wherever they may be, and 
put them in the mind of every member of the nation. For science and 
knowledge, there are no restrictions and no conditions.29 
Hence, associated with science and rationality Westernization has become 
the common good of the whole society.30 This resulted in the removal of the 
question of what is good for society from the legitimate sphere of politics. It 
was pre-defined by the Kemalist elite who took science as the truest guide 
for inducing change. 
The complementary to this positivist assertian of scientific rationality, which 
in the case of Kemalism was associated with the Western society, was the 
French positivist motto of "order and progress."31 This motto, in tum, 
necessitated the institutionalization of the "scientific rationality" so that it 
could be implemented in an orderly fashion for the sake of progress. Hence, 
the state, as Metin Heper pointed out, has become the agent of rationality, 
and this was in line with the tradition of holding the state responsible for 
28 Steven B. Smith, HegeFs Critique of Liberalism 59-60. 
29 Cited in Ahmet Davutoglu, Alternative Paradigms 7. 
30 See for example Mahmut Esat Bozkurt' s speech in Grand National 
Assembly for the enactment of civil law which equated Westemization with 
the will of people: "if the laws are based on religion, if people insist on 
keeping their religious traditions, the will of the na tion cannot be realized." 
The speech is reprinted in Cumhuriyet 21.2.1997. 
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providing welfare and maintaining balance within the society.32 On the basis 
of the assumption that society could be improved by the actions of rational 
men, people turned into the objects of the state elite' s project who 
represented themselves as the sol e bearers of progress. 33 
Accordingly, policies were implemented to dismantle the inherited Ottoman 
institutions and to make the physical environment similar to their European 
counterparts on the basis of the assumption "that once the environment was 
altered, the behaviour of individuals could be easily moulded and made to 
fit the requirements of the newly created circumstances."34 Hence, Turkish 
Westernization involved primarily changes at the level of symbols that 
would later on culminate in qualitative changes in the behaviours of the 
people. It is this transformatian of symbols that led the students of Turkish 
politics to the observation that Turkish modemization is a wholesale 
Westernization. However, as such, Turkish Westermzation was rather a 
simulation without a semblance of traditional anchors of Westem society. 
On the this basis, it could be suggested that "transformation" isabetter 
word than revolution in describing the Republic.35 
31 See Gole, "The Quest ... ," 84. 
32 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Lexington: Eothen Press, 
1985), 50-51. 
33 Resat Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modem Ambiguities," 24. 
34 ibid., 24. 
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2 21. /Secu!arization //as Westemization. 
The primary Westernizing reform was secularization reforms, which aimed 
to change the predominantly Islamic identity to a secular-nationalist one. 
Underlying the secularization policies was the assumption that Islam and 
scientific/rational Western civilization were incompatible. The traces of the 
Orientalist depiction of Islam as a hindrance to progress is apparent in this 
assumption. Hence, Westernization policies were directedat the Islamic 
value system so that the old surface of society could be erased for the new 
inscriptions by the "rational" Republican elite so as to improve society. The 
secularization policies implemented to this end included symbolic, 
institutional, legal and functional aspects, all altering the environment to 
which people were to adopt.36 
Symbolic secularization included abolition of Caliphate which has been the 
symbol of Muslimness, anda number of adoptions such as Western style 
dressing, Gregorian calendar, European numerals, metric system and family 
names. The weekly holiday was shifted from Friday to Sunday as well. But 
more importantly, a language reform that sharply left whole society 
officially illiterate for some time was carried out. The Arabic script was 
replaced with the Latin script and attempts were made to "purify" Turkish. 
35 G. H. Jansen, "Turkey: The Need for Roots" Middle East Forum, 37,9 
(November, 1961):13-17, 41-45, 16. 
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Legal secularization had actually started by the Tanzimat reforms. Some 
secular laws were enacted while the Islamic law was being codified during 
the Tanzimat period. Legal secularization in the Republic included 
secularization of civil, commercial and criminal laws by replacing the 
already existing Islamic laws with corresponding laws of some European 
countries. Swiss civil code, for example, was translated into Turkish and 
enacted as the Turkish civil code. Functional secularization was a 
complementary to both legal and institutional secularization. Since there 
were new secular laws enacted, there was no function left for the Sharia 
(religious law) Courts. So, these courts were abolished in 1924. Educational 
functions of religious institutions were transferred to new secular 
institutions as well. The medreses (religious schools), which were under the 
control of Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations were closed. 
Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools were established to train religious 
personnel. Ministry of Education was held responsible for all education. 
As for the institutional secularization, in addition to the abalition of 
Caliphate, both the Office of Shayk-al Islam and the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Pious Foundations were abolished. These three institutions, 
Toprak points out, had traditionally provided the institutional basis of the 
din u devletconcept, which might be translated literally as the religious state 
in which source of legitimacy partly derives from religion. The new 
36 See Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey(Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1981), ch. 3 for a detailed description of the secularization policies. 
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Republican state was to derive its legitimacy from a secular source, the 
national sovereignty. In accordance, the act declaring Islam as the religion of 
state in the Constitution of 1924 was annulled in 1928. This severance of the 
links between the state and religion was a step forward to separation of 
religion and state. This, however, was followed by a step backward to 
reestablish din u devietona new (Westernist) basis, which is the 
establishment of a body with authority in religious matters and affiliated to 
the Office of Prim e Minister, the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Through 
this newly established institution, the links between state and religion 
continued and the state attempted to control religion. This administrative 
control over religion continues to-day and it is "the unique" feature of 
Turkish secularism.37 Control of religion -primarily through education and 
institutional arrangements- was to forestall the possibility of a potential 
opposition to the new regime. Since the old religious establishment was 
disestablished, Islam was no longer a source of state legitimacy of the state. 
But, liberating religion from the reign of state could also give religion an 
opportunity of opposition. It is for this reason that religion was to be 
controlled even if it contradicted with the classical concept of secularization 
as separation between religion and state. Secularization meant the 
politicization of religion for the sake of order -and progress. 
37 Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State 
Interaction in Republican Turkey" International Journal of Middle Eastem 
Studies, 28, (1996): 231-251. 
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The control of religion by the Republican state should not be confused with 
the primacy of the state over religion during the Ottoman Empire nor with 
the primacy of politics over religion under modernity.38 Ottoman state left 
the religion as it was at the level of society and did not interfere as long as 
the exigencies of the reason of the state required it to do so. The Republican 
state, on the other hand, controlled religion administratively and by virtue 
of being a Westernizing state, which perceived the prevailing Islam as an 
impediment to progress, it attempted to inject a new interpretation of 
religion so as to construct a uniform interpretation of religion which would 
ease the construction of a homogenous national community. Religion was 
treated asa resource that might be mobilized for the "purposes of state."39 
Westernization provided the tone of the official interpretation of religion. 
According to this official interpretation, Islam was defined as the most 
reasonable and rational religion. As Paul Dumont pointed out: 
the endeavor [was] to modernize religion and submit it to a vast 
range of reforms, transforming not only the exterior aspects of 
Islamic practice but even the contents of the message that clerics 
were to impart, so as to put Islam at the service of the new ideas that 
Kemalist revolution wanted to implant.40 
38 Binnaz Toprak argues that lack of separation between state and Islam was 
"very much in line with Islamic theology as well as Ottoman practice." It 
seem, Toprak confuses formal continuity with substantive difference. 
Modern Turkish state in maintaining the link between religion and state not 
only controlled a potential rival but also aimed to introduce and popularize 
a new interpretation of religion as well. This has not been the case before. 
See Binnaz Toprak "The Religious Right" in Turkey in Transition: New 
Perspectives/ eds., Irvin C. Schick and Ahmet. E. Tonak (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 220. 
39 Turan, "Religion and Political Culture in Turkey," 42. 
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Thereby, according to official interpretation, rational, scientific 
Westernization/secularization reforms were entirely in conformity with "the 
true Islam" as defined by the state.41 
Secularism, indeed, was a tool for construction of new Turkish national 
identity. By severing all the links with the past and Islam, and by controlling 
and redefining Islam, secularism turned out to be a tool for the construction 
of the model man that the Republic wanted to construct. As Kemal Karpat 
pointed out, the Republican regime wanted to bring-out a nationalist, anti-
traditionalist, anti-clerical" model man" who would approach all matters 
intellectually and objectively. Secularization played an im portant role in 
carrying out these reforms, because it was believed that the fundamental 
change can not just be achieved by separation of religion from the state. 
Secularization "had to penetrate deeper in order to extirpate the regressive 
influences of Islam from the society's and individuals' cultural, economic, 
40 Paul Dumont, "Islam As a Factor of Change and Revival in Modern 
Turkey" Turkic Culture: Continuity and Change ed., Sabri Akural 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Turkish Studies 6, 1987), 2. 
41 For a speech by Ataturk illustrating the point see Atatürk Din ve Laiklik 
Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi, üzel Yayin No. 2, (Istanbul, Mentes, 1968). 
See also, Sadi Borak ed., Ataturk ve Din [Ataturk and Religion] (Burhan 
Anil: Istanbul, 1997 [1962]), esp. p.36 "hafta tatili dine aykiridir" gibi hayirli, 
akla ve dine uygun meseleler hakkinda sizi kandirmaya çalisan alçaklara ilgi 
göstermeyiniz .... bizim dinimiz için herkesin elinde bir ölçü vardir. Bu 
ölçüye göre hangi seyin dine uyup uymadigini kolayca takdir edebilirsiniz. 
Hangi sey ki akla, mantiga, halkin menfaatine uygundur; biliniz ki o bizim 
dinimize de uygundur." 
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and social outlook."42 Hence, in addition to disestablishment of old religious 
institutions, at the level of society, all religious sects were banned and this 
was done for the purposes of redefinition of Islam in accordance with the 
official ideology of the state. By banning all religious sects, the state created 
a monopoly over the ability to define what Islam meant here and now. The 
attempts to redefine Islam, primarily through education, was an addition to 
the administrative control of religion. Education was to diffuse the Kemalist 
ideology /morality of state to society with its particular understanding of 
progress, secularism and national identity. Thereby, any interpretation 
diverged from that of the state has become illegitimate. Hence, after the 
abalition of the "old order," central to the process of constructing an official 
Islam, and more importantly to the construction of non-existent national 
identity, was the state-controlled secular education. 
Needless to say, cultivation of model men in the schools was a long-term 
project, if not ever lasting, that necessitated the withholding of political 
power from those who put the success of project at risk, i.e. from non-
Kemalist elements. However, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Turkish 
nationalism has never denied Islam as being one of its components.43 It is 
42 Kemal H. Karpat, Turkeyfi Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 54. 
43 Cf. David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: 1876-1908 (London: 
Frank Cass, 1977), 102. which argues that Islam was no longer seen as being 
part of a Turk' s identity and of Turkish culture. See also S. A. Salamone, 
"The Dialectics of Turkish National Identity: Ethnic Boundary Maintenance 
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true that language and culture were the bases of the new Turkish identity, 
but Islam was stili part of the culture, though only in the way that the state 
redefined. Accordingly, the devout Muslim was also the Westernized model 
citizen. As Sencer Ayata pointed out, the Kemalist ruling elite of the modern 
Turkish Republic, 
saw in Islam both positive and negative aspects. They clearly 
recognized that Islam was a significant part of Turkish society, that 
religious faith was important for national unity and mobilization, and 
that it could contribute to social and moral welfare. On the other hand, 
they also saw Islam as a traditional force and a source of conservative 
influence, superstition, false ideas, and dogmas that they felt were 
responsible for Turkey' s backwardness and were obstacles to the 
achievement of national ideals .... Their aim was to enforce a 
secularization program and make Islam compatible with the modern 
nation-state .... The government not only tried to contain the role of 
Islam in society, but also took steps to reform Islam according to its 
vision .... This required that Islamic teaching be rendered compatible 
with Western values and institutions to assist the government to 
develop intelligent, cooperative, patriotic, and moral citizens.44 
It could be suggested that Kemalism's repudiation of the then prevailing 
Islam is sornewhat similar to the nineteenth century Islamists' stance 
towards Islam. Islamİst reformists of the nineteenth century, linking the 
ca use of backwardness to deviance of society and state from the true Islam, 
repudiated the prevailing Islam as false and sought after the true Islam by 
re-interpreting it in terms of Western categories. The Republic's re-
and State Ideology" East European Quarterl~ XXIII, 2, (1989): 225-248,239. 
Salarnone suggests that argues that" Ataturk's reforms to homogenize 
Turkey has failed" because "new national identity was based on majority 
language and Western ideals," whereas "for the vast majority of people 
religion is inseparable from national identity." 
44 Sencer Aya ta, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in 
Turkey," Mİddle EastjournaL 50, 1, (Winter, 1996): 40-56,41,42. 
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interpretation, however, sounded much more radical because it was done 
for the sake of shift to Western civilization, rather than for the sake of 
regeneration of Islamic civilization. Perhaps it was this motive behind the re-
interpretation rather than the re-interpretation itself that caused to a deficit 
in the legitimacy of the new interpretation that was to be redressed when the 
culture of society was successfully alteredon the long run.45 
Secularism, as Gole suggested, was considered to be "the prerequisite of 
Westernization."46 The hub of the Westernization was thus secularization 
and the hub of secularization was the re-definition of Islaminaccordance 
with the new purposes of the state. This newly re-defined Islam was to lend 
support and give legitimacy to the Westernizing "offensives" of the state. In 
this picture, there are two dimensions of the Republic's stance towards 
Islam: Orientalist repudiation of the prevailing Islam as regressive and as the 
ca use of backwardness and an official interpretation of Islam which depicted 
Islam as the most reason-prone and rational religion in the world that could 
not be in conflict with any of the Westernizing reforms, which were by 
definition scientific. The controlling of religion for the re-interpretation 
could best be understood as an attempt to construct a civil religion along the 
lines of Rousseau's civil religion mentionedin the previous chapter. 
45 In the meantime distribution of the gains of economic development 
through a populist rhetoric was a means to extent the legitimacy of the state 
to society. See Keyder, "Whither ... ," 41. 
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2.3. The Political lmplications of Kemalist Westermzation 
1. Drawing from Bobby Sayyid, it could be suggested that, one of the 
implications of Westernization was that it paradoxically led to 
Orientalization of society. This is so because the identity of the West had 
been constituted vis a vis the Orient, and by embarking a project of 
Westernization, Kemalism "necessarily (re)produced an Oriental subject."47 
Hence, Kemalism first divided and rendered the society into a mutually 
exclusive dichotomy, traditional and modern. Then, it tried to overcome this 
division. Since it was this division that constituted Kemalism, i.e. since 
Kemalism was defined in opposition to traditional and/ or Islam(ic), the 
division could not be overcome lest the foundation of Kemalism crumbles. 
This meant if Kemalism was to survive, its "the other," Islam, has to survive 
as well. Asa corollary, it alsomeant that politics would revolve around the 
friends and enemies of Kemalism. Consequently, Kemalism is defined by 
w hat it is not, because Kemalist identity, as Sayyid states, "could only be 
fixed by reference to what opposed and undermined its unity."48 This 
analysis of Kemalism reveals the internal contradiction of Kemalism: the aim 
of overcoming the division between Westernized and Islamic, while its very 
survival dependent upon the existence of such division. It cannot explain, 
46 Nilufer Gole, "Secularism andIslamismin Turkey: The Making of Elites 
and Counter-Elites," Mi d die East journal, 51, 1 (1997): 46-58, 49. 
47 Sayyid, "Sign O'Times .. ," 270-1. 
48 ibid., 271. 
202 
however, why Kemalism has to survive. It only shows that Kemalism needs 
its "the other" if it has to survive. Below, an attempt will bemade to explain 
why Kemalism had to endure by suggesting that Kemalist goals have been 
the raison d'etre of society. Also, as notedin the first chapter, it seems wrong 
to suggest that Islamic identity is solely shaped by Kemalism. Yet, current 
Islamismin Turkey, as represented by the Welfare/Virtue Party, could be 
located in the binary logic created by Kemalism with a reservation, i.e. by 
bearing in mind that political parhes are not epiphenomena reflecting the 
cleavages in society.49 In other words, while the role of Kemalismin 
constructing a certain portrayal of Islam(ism), the role of Islamists in 
constructing "the Islamİst alternative" should be heeded as well. 
2. Another political impact of Westernization in Turkish politics concerns the 
de-linking of center and periphery and the cultural alienation of the state 
from society. In this picture, painted mainly by Serif Mardin, by 
disestablishing the religion at the level of state Kemalism removed the link 
between center and periphery, because religion provided the link between 
center and periphery and legitimated little men' s religion in the Ottoman 
Empire.5° Kemalist disestablishment of religion meant insecurity for the 
survival of the religion at the level of society. Also, Kemalist mentality, by 
virtue of ignoring the role Islam played in the society, could not replace the 
49 Alan W are, Citizens/ Parti es and the State: A Reappraisal (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), 129. 
203 
patterns of association and solidarity provided by Islam. To the extent that, 
an "ideological argument becomes authoritative when it is partly 
determined by the values its potential adherents hold,"51 Kemalism was 
"ideologically disabled" by virtue of be ing a project aiming to change the 
culture of its potential adherents.52 Consequently, the implication is that not 
only the center and periphery was de-linked but also the Republic became 
unable to integrate masses into its modernization drive. This is because 
Kemalist public morality or vision of common good was not appealing to 
people, for it rejected the prevailing values of the society with a long term 
aim to transform them. Hence, Kemalism created an "ethical vacuum ina 
society where religious and ethical commands had been important. The 
inability of Kemalism to provide a social ethos that appealed to hearth as 
well as to the mind was more disorienting than would appear in the first 
sight."53 
What is eventually problematized in the cultural alienation thesis is, in fact, 
the lack of a popularized public morality in Kemalist regime that would 
50 See Mardin, "Ideology .. " 204. 
51 David Manning and Ysanne Carlisle, "The Ideologies of Modern Politics" 
Political Studies/ XLIII, 3 (1995): 482-496, 495. 
52 Whether Kemalisıri lacked a concern for establishing a public morality or it 
was concerned but unable to do because of the contents of its alternative 
morality is anather question. But suffice it to say that the latter is the 
implication of previous studies of Serif Mardin, while the former is a 
position taken by him in a recent study: "The reform movement had no 
identifiable philosophical foundation." See Mardin, "Projects .. ," 65. 
204 
enable individuals to differentiate between good and evil. The thesis of 
cultural isolation assumes that societies are held together by common values 
and stability depends on value consensus. While not denying the fact that 
the contents of Kemalist morality diverged from that of society, it is the view 
that sees value-cansensus as essential for holding the societies together and 
for a functioning democracy that has been and will be questioned in this 
study. This assumption could not only be misleading but also undesirable 
from a normative perspective, because such a value cansensus is not possible 
without oppressing and marginalizing other values to the benefit of the 
preferred one. Moreover, cansensus on "common" valuesis itself a political 
activity.lf this is the case, than the ground of problematizing Kemalism on 
the basis of its cultural alienation would be erroneous, because upholding of 
any set of values as common values would mean the political 
marginalization of certain other values in a society where value pluralism 
prevails. 
When viewed from this angle, whether Islamic or Kemalist, the contents of 
the value cansensus promoted by the state makes little difference. This is the 
most important point missed by the cultural alienation thesis. The practical 
political implication of cultural alienation thesis is "cultural unification." The 
goal of cultural unification is not only the political alternative of Islamism 
but also what Kemalism has been pursuing since the beginning of the 
Republic. But as previously noted the very idea of culturally unified society 
53 Serif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey," 156. 
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is a hindrance to political activity, which is the activity that holds the 
societies together. As such cultural alienation thesis is an inappropriate 
approach forasound analysis ofIslamismin Turkey, or any other political 
mavement for that matter. Moreover, cultural alienation implies that 
Islamİst mavement in Turkey as represented by the W elfare Party isa grass-
roots movement, representing the Muslim society. Cultural alienation thesis 
also runs the risk of taking for granted the Islamists' daim that they 
themselves are the true representatives of the people. It, therefore, neglects 
the relation between the party 1 organization and the people it represents. It 
may well be true that the cleavage is between the state and society, but this 
cleavage may not necessarily be a cultural one, but a political one. In this 
case, non-participatory dimensions of the state -and the party- should be 
taken into account. In addition, the ground on which cultural alienation 
thesis problematize Kemalism could be misleading also when we bear in 
mind the fa ct that the political problems endured/ aggravated during the 
post-1980 period, when the Kemalist state tried to strike a deal with Islam. 
That is, when the state employed a religious language and promoted Islam 
so as to maintain the community. Last but not least, cultural alienation thesis 
suggests that modernization has failed due to cultural alienation. But, this 
may not necessarily be the case. It may be the flawed understanding of 
modernization rather than cultural alienation that led to the arguable failure 
of modernization. 
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3. There is also anather approach to the political implications of Kemalist 
Westernization that emphasizes the goals and intentions of Kemalism. This 
approach generally takes for granted the cultural alienation thesis and 
suggests it as the ratianale for the iliiberal practices of Kemalism. By 
focusing on the substance of Kemalism, i.e. Westernization, which among 
other things imply democracy, this approach explains the non-liberal 
practices of Kemalism by exigencies of modernization and consolidation of 
the regime. In this perspective, 
Extraordinary measures were justified by temporary needs to protect 
the state and the regime against the counterrevolutionaries .... liberal 
democracy remained the ideal, authoritarianism was justified only as a 
temporary measure arising out of the need to defend the Kemalist 
revolution against the counterrevolutionaries. Kemalism asa doctrine 
was much closer to nineteenth century liberalism than to the 
authoritarian and totalitarian philosophies of the twentieth century.54 
Cultural alienation, rather than doctrinal repudiation of liberal democracy 
and liberal values, explains why the retainment of power by the ruling elite 
was essenhal for the consolidation of the Republic. It was necessary to 
protect the purity of reforms and altered environment for the good of the 
society and for a successful Westemization. It was only to train people with 
the appropriate culture that power was retained. The aim was to educate 
elite and then people for democracy .55 And, in order to retain power 
54 Ergun Ozbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: 
Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in Perspectives on Democracy in 
Turkeyed., idem (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 12, 
15. 
55 Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey 154. 
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Kemalism had to be non-mobilizational and anti-participatory, lest the 
culturally backward masses might infiltrate the central mechanisms of 
political control. Hence, retainment of political power was not something 
ideological but pragmatic, not ever-lasting but transitory. 
This approach to Kemalism is in terms of i ts goals and intentions and it 
implicitly equates Kemalism with its substance, Westernization. Yet, if the 
purity of intent is the criterion, the outcome of deeds is downplayed and/ or 
neglected. It must be borne in mind that the intentions are not the only 
source of the legitimacy. Moreover, equating Kemalism with Westernization 
fully may lead us to neglect the fact that Kemalism has often been 
"selective" in what and how to borrow from the West and cautious about 
when to borrow.56 It must be reminded that the Westernizing elite may not 
necessarily be committed to all aspects of modernity, simply because, as 
agents of Westernization, they have their own interests, protection of which 
might be endangered asa result of further modernization.57 Indeed, the full 
commitment to Westernization was intermixed with the goal of controlling 
the polity.58 In other words, emphasis should be put on "Kemalist way of 
Westernization" rather than "Westernization as Kemalism's way." 
56 See Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu, "National Identity vs. Integration with the 
West: The Case of Turkish Nationalism" unpublished mimeo/ nd. 
57 Keyder, "Whither ... ," 39. 
58 See Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu, "National Identity vs. Integration with the 
West..." 
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Conceptualization of Kemalism in such a way will enable us to recognize the 
limited and limiting nature of Kemalist Westernization. Only in this way we 
will be able to understand why "the reforming elite has always been deeply 
suspicious of ... ideas and institutions that originated outside the ruling 
elite."59 The adjective "always," surely, goes against the descriptions of 
Kemalism as transitory. As no te d above, repression of opposition -ev en 
when it converged with the Kemalist elite on key issues and provided a 
potential for a genuinely liberal democratic regime60- is often explained on 
the basis of the exigencies of the consolidation of the Republic. This 
explanation, to state it again, could only be plausible when one focuses 
solely on the substance/intentions of Kemalism. This dissertation, on the 
other hand, focuses on the Kemalist structuration of politicsasa type of 
republican structuration of politics. 
An analysis of Kemalism with regards to the ideals infarıning its mode of 
integration of society will enable us to shift the focus from such intentions of 
Kemalism as liberal democracy to the Kemalist structuration of politics and 
to the Kemalism's concept of the political. In this respect, whether Kemalism 
has been an ideology or mentality has little relevance, because the focus is on 
the Kemalist concept of the political. It may well be true that Kemalism has 
59 Kasaba, "Kemalist .... ," 29, emphasis added. 
60 See for example Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet: Ikinci Grup/ 
[Opposition in the First Assembly: The Second Group] (Istanbul: Iletisim, 
1994), 611-613. 
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not been an ideology in the sense of an intellectually elaborated system of 
thought but a mentality -emotional way of thinking and feeling that provide 
non-codified ways of reacting the situations.61 Realism, flexibility and 
adaptation to circumstances were all qualities of Kemalism and that 
Kemalist principles have emerged as it went along.62 That Kemalism has not 
been an ideology is often praised as a positive aspect for the purposes of 
(future) democratization(s). Yet, it could be the very fact of being mentality 
may enable Kemalism to endure as a permanent non-doctrinal, flexible 
impediment to liberal democracy and pluralism while aiming at liberal 
democracy on the long run. It may well be true that Kemalism had not been 
an ideology. Y et, Kemalism can be a moralized substantive co mm on go o d 
leading to a certain iliiberal mentality and structuration of politics. 
Once seen from this perspective, Islamism could not be associated 
automatically with traditionalism and authoritarianism, but it may well be a 
form of "identity politics" seeking the recognition of Islamic identity in the 
public sphere. To the extent that struggles for the recognition of identities in 
the public sphere are the struggles for justice, Islamism may well be seen as 
a struggle for justice. In this respect, it might have a liberalizing potential. 
61 See Ergun Ozbudun, "The Nature of Kemalist Regime" in Ataturk: 
Founder of a Modern State/ (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981). See also 
Dankwart A. Rustow, ''Kemalism" and Eric Zurcher, Turkey: A Modem 
History. Rustow regards Kemalism as an ideology but in reality his 
description of Kemalist "ideology" corresponds to Ozbudun's description of 
Kemalism as a mentality. 
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But, what Islamism represents cannot just be seen through Kemalism's 
stance towards Islamic identity, what the Islamİst alternative involves 
should be studied as well, especially in its relation to Kemalism. In other 
words, the fa ct that Kemalism' s illiberalism provides an opportunity for a 
liberal opening does not necessarily mean that this opportunity is taken up 
by Islamism. But what is for sure is that we cannot depict Islamism as 
undemocratic, authoritarian, anti-modem solely on the basis of its 
opposition to Kemalism. In order to illustrate this point further, how 
Kemalism acts as an impediment to democratic politics and why Kemalism 
is not just a Westernization project should be explained by returning to 
moralizatian of Kemalism. 
2.4. Kemalism asa Permanent Moral Cansensus 
It was noted above that modern Turkish society was constituted through 
Kemalist revolution and in this sense ithasa republican character because 
the status of citizenship, rights and liberties were granted by the Kemalist 
revolution to the former subjects of sultan. It was, in other words, the 
Kemalist revolution that made the Turkish society possible and the rights 
and liberties of citizens did not precede the formatian of the Turkish 
Republic. lt was also noted that Kemalism as the founding principle has a 
republican concept of the political in the sense of orientation towards the 
62 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Kemalism" 238, Ozbudun, "The Nature ... " 87. 
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common good of society -an orientation that prevents the vanishing of the 
political. Also the famous Kemalist dictum, "reaching the level of 
contemporary civilization," could be considered asa positive aspect of 
Kemalism, for it implied, in ter alia, democracy, pluralisation and 
liberalization. In this context, the key to understanding why Kemalism is not 
solely a Westernization programme and why it functioned as an 
impediment to political activity is an analysis of Kemalism asa grammar of 
politics and as the permanent moral consensus of society which determines 
the legitimate sphere of politics. 
Kemalism, it could be suggested, is not simply a goal oriented 
Westernization project that would fold up with the realization of its goals, be 
those the consolidation of regime or construction of the new Turks. This is 
because the Kemalist idea that modern Turkish society owes its existence to 
Kemalism and is integrated around the elite-defined Kemalist goals of 
Westernization and secularism as its common good implied that if the goals 
of Kemalism is completed the society would lack a direction and would 
eventually disintegrate. Society, or more accurately community, was 
integrated solely for the realization of goals, and thisisa feature of 
republicanism in general. In this respect, it could be suggested that 
Kemalism has been the raison d' e tre of society. Ev en when defined as a 
solely goal-based project, a full realization of Kemalist goals were impossible 
due to the uneven nature of development. Hence there will always be a need 
to maintain the moral consensus that Kemalism upholds. The correlation of 
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the maintenance of society with the maintenance of Kemalism meant that 
Kemalism's "the others" has to be reproducedas well. The Kemalist elite' s 
idea that Turkey owes its existence to Kemalist revolution, and therefore 
Kemalism has to be protected meant in effect perceiving the society as 
ontologically insecure. Hence, a preconceived concern about the indivisible 
integrity of the nation is followed. 
The republican idea that society, rights and liberties have became possible 
with the foundation of the Republic meant that Kemalism as the founding 
principle is installed into the regime. This in turn meant that there has been 
an ideology of the state inthesense of "fundamental principles which 
organize behaviour, frame of choices, constitute a world view and are 
considered to be the means of achieving that rare commodity which is the 
goal."63 This ideology, in turn, foreclosed the possibilities of politics in the 
sense of cansensus or modus vivendibetween different life styles and 
political perspectives because the state could not be impartial to different life 
styles and ideologies. Hence, society was divided into those who supporting 
Kemalist values of the centre and those who do not. This is because, the 
ideology of the state was not a democratic ideology in the sense of allowing 
different opinions about what should be done.64 Rather, it entailed a 
63 See John Clammer, Dİlierence and Modernity: Social Theory and 
Contemporary fapanese Society(London: Kegan Paul International, 1995), 
12. Note that this canception of ideology is sornewhat similar to the concept 
of morality as defined above. 
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substantive idea of comman good and promoted a certain life-style, 
deseribed above as the model man who w as Westernized and secular. 
Of the six principles65 of Kemalism, "populism" was often usedas a 
synonym of democracy.66 However, populisıni democracy denied the 
presence of different dasses and clashing interests and values within the 
society. Kemalist democracy aspired to an ideal society without class, 
without personal conflict and freed from all attachment to past. Democracy 
was actually about the transformatian of the empirical will of the people 
along rational linesas defined by the elite. In effect, this conceptualization of 
democracy made it compatible with a quasi-authoritarian logic. The 
commitment to democracy referred actually to elections and democracy is 
equated with plurality of parties competing one anather in free elections. It 
has been defined neither in terms of individual rights of citizens nor in terms 
of a value in itself. Democratic procedures were expected to result in the 
maintenance of Kemalist values araund which society was supposedly 
integrated. 
64 W. J. Stankiewicz, In Search of a Political Philosophy: Ideologies at the 
Close of Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1993), 416. 
r,
5 Nationalism, Secularism, Reformism, Etatism, Populism, and 
Republicanism. 
66 Ergun Ozbudun, "Ataturk ve Demokrasi" Ataturk Arasfirma Merkezi 
Dergisi, V, 14, (Mart, 1989): 285-295, 285. 
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As in the republican ideal, Kemalism too had a concept of active citizenship. 
But, since the common good was already given, actively participating citizen 
meant a citizen subscribing to Kemalist idea(l)s. Its understanding of 
democracy, therefore, required democratic citizens to be loyal to the 
prevailing arrangements without any reservation, and participation was 
dependent upon the precondition that citizens should first be virtuous. As in 
the republican mode of integra tion, discussed in previous chapter, one 
eriterian of rationality /virtue was in turn the acknowledgment of the 
rationality of Kemalismi existing political arrangements. In this respect, it 
could be suggested that Kemalism was aiming to secure the outcome of 
democratic deliberation process in advance. As in republicanism possibility 
of participation in the common praxis was recognized, but the common 
praxis meant not the political deliberation of the common good, but the 
realization of a pre-defined common good. 
As people were not considered virtuous in the early years, there were no 
elections. It was for this reason that Kemalist democracy first wanted to 
construct people "rational" enough to participate. Virtuous people were to 
be trained/ cultivated gradually through schools, Public Houses and Village 
Institutes. But, once trained with the appropriate virtue, people would 
discover the rationality of Kemalism and keep subscribing to it. Until then 
rule by the vanguards of the revolution was essential to protect the ratianal-
scientific Kemalist goal of Westernization and to educate people for 
democracy. Hence, bureaucrats "saw it as their duty to protect 'public 
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interest' against 'incompetent and unprincipled' politicians elected by and 
'ignorant' majority."67 Popular government was legitimate only when it 
subscribed to Kemalist morality and acted within the parameters set by the 
bureaucratic guardians, who also "checked and balanced" politics of the 
political elites. Limitation of the powers of the state was not on the agenda 
however. What Kemalism meant here and now could only be known by its 
guardians.68 It was these guardians who could, as conditions require, 
consider politicians unfit to rule.69 The legitimate sphere of politics was, 
thereby, set by them. Democracy was also the best form of government 
"provided that democratic competition does not endanger Ataturk's 
principles."70 Hence, the great elite commitment to democracy is 
demonstrated by so-often restaration of it by the elite.71 
67 Ozbudun, "State Elites ... ," 198. 
68 It must be noted that the stance of these guardians has changed within a 
broad parameters of secularism from repression to accommodation. Both of 
these trends were apparent in the secularization policies of the early 
republic. Post-1980 "deal" with Islam could be considered asa kind of 
accommodation of Islam for the purposes of the maintenance of the 
community. 
69 To this end every constitution secured a significant role for the military, 
the ultimate guardians of Kemalist principles, through the National Security 
Council. Civil bureaucracy, too, played the role of guarding Kemalism vis a 
vis the politicians un til it was fragmented and infiltrated by "political" 
elements. Thus, military had little trust to bureaucracy after 1970. 
70 Ozbudun, "State Elites ... ," 204. 
71 Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism, 82. 
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Hence, after the transition to multi-party regime bureaucracy and military 
functioned as check and balance mechanisms on popular government. This 
is because, a majority of population is seen as unenlightened about "the 
national interest" and therefore liable to deception by politicians who give 
priority to their own personal or partisan-ideological interests over national 
interest.72 Even after transition to multi-party regime, certain key political 
issues were a prerogative of the guardians of Kemalism and political 
accommodations were to be reached with them.73 Yet, because politics 
inevitably involves such divisive "positionings" as Islamİst or leftist 
questioning or interpretations of Kemalist morality, guardians conceive 
politicsasa threat to the unity and integrity of society. Politics, by definition, 
is divisive and therefore it is necessary to make "administrative" "unifying" 
interventions to "tame" it.74 Elections were held and they were "the only 
proof of system' s allegiance to democracy," 75 but the function of them was 
72 Ozbudun, "State Elites ... ," 203. 
73 In this respect the fact that Kemalism has open to different interpretation, 
i.e. flexibility of Kemalism, has little practical political relevance, for the 
(re)interpretation of Kemalism was a prerogative of a privileged elite rather 
than a matter of political deliberation. For the openness of Kemalism to 
different interpretations see Ozbudun, "State Elites ... ," 203. 
74 The similarity with the French Republic in the mid 1800s should be 
mentioned here. For the French republic, too, pluralism was unthinkable 
without a suspension of founding principle "otherwise, it can only be 
included within the categories of misunderstanding or the outright conflict 
of personal ambitions" see Pierre Rosanvallon, "The Republic of the 
Universal Suffrage" in The Invention of the Modern Republic, ed., Fontana 
Biancamaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 203-204. 
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not to bring the existing social diversity into political sphere. Elections were 
rather a gesture of adherence, a symbolic expressian of membership to 
collectivity. 
In this context, Kemalism endured ina way to set the limits to "rational" 
politics. What is expected from politicsisa dedication to Kemalist goals and 
retleetion of Kemalist ethical life. Hence, all those rejecting the Kemalist 
common good are depicted as irrational, which foreclosed the possibilities of 
legitimate dissent inthepublic sphere. This is because the removal of the 
issue of common good by moralizing the elite-defined Westernization and 
secularization depoliticized what actually were political questions. The issue 
of secularization, henceforth, could not be on the agenda of legitimate 
politics. It was impossible to redefine, reexamine it in through politics. The 
idea of common good was a given of politics and politics/politicians were 
expected to dedicafe themselves to it. The practical effect was reduction of 
politics to a limited activity. It was in this sensethat Kemalism reduced 
politics to "administration." Political rights therefore included the right to 
participate in the "common" Kemalist project but not to refrain from it w hile 
at the same time remaining inthepublic sphere. 
Kemalist republicanism consequently resulted ina state-centered polity with 
little focus on society. It was the state who acted for the whole society and 
75 U mit Cizre-Sakallioglu, "Historicizing the Present and Problematİzİng the 
Future of the Kurdish Problem: A Critique of the TOBB Report on the 
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who displayed a clear dİstaste for polİtİcs and polİtİcİans. The implication 
was the shift of focus from input, i.e. genuine participation to the output, i.e. 
policies of the state. Since the state identified itself with a substantive 
purpose, the source of its legitimacy was that substantive purpose as well. 
Effective use of power by certain groups located in the state, i.e. 
bureaucracy, mattered more than the limitation of state power. Since the 
source of legitimacy was substantive, procedures, asanother source of 
legitimacy, were neglected. Effectiveness became the basis of legitimacy. The 
1921 and 1924 constitutions which set the framework of politics did not 
organize rights and liberties but emphasized the duties that the citizens 
owed to the state. Decreasing effectiveness of the state and its concomitant 
decrease in the legitimacy of the state may well be benefidal for the claims of 
Islamism. But, it must first be recognized that it was the Kemalist state that 
based its legitimacy on effectiveness/ delivery by ignoring other, procedural, 
sources of legitimacy. It is this point that has been ignored by the studies 
linking the rise of Islamism to the "economic failures of modemization," 
mentionedin the first chapter. It is for this reason that an analysis of the 
political context of Islamism was essential. 
Consequently, there emerged an iliiberal republican picture in which society 
is seen asa moral community united around Kemalist valuesandas an 
object of government for the Kemalist state. What is lacking was a vision of 
society asa composition of different identities and interests. Hence, 
Eastern Question" New Perspectİves on Turkey 14 (Spring, 1996): 1-22, ll. 
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participation is restricted only to members of community, i.e. those who 
subscribe to Kemalist values, and not to the members of society. 
Democracy 1 politics was to function to demonstrate the unity of the 
community, but not to enable prevailing differences to cohabit. Differences 
were rejected and politics expressing differences were seen essentially 
divisive. The ideal politics for the Kemalist elite was actually administration 
for the realization of the comman goals as defined by Kemalist elite, but not 
the deliberation of what the comman good of society is. For this reason, 
Kemalist elite supervised politics and politicians and left them a restricted 
legitimate sphere of politics by asserting their prerogative on certain key 
issues such as secularism. To the extent that "we are free when we have a 
role in determining the character of our communities,"76 the primary concern 
of Kemalism was not realization of freedom, but construction of the ideal 
political community. 
The idea that Kemalism is the moral cansensus of society together has 
proved counter-effective because modern societies are hold together not by 
pre-defined comman valuesor comman religion but the very activity of 
politics. The predicament with Kemalism was not that it conceived politics 
as discovering what is good for the entire society rather than 
accommodation and aggregating diverse demand. The difficulty with 
Kemalism is the rejection of political activity by reducing it to administration 
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for the purposes of realization of an already-given concept of common good 
and by assuming that society is not a composition of different identities and 
interest but a moral community united around Kemalist values. 
As such the task of politics is not to further rights and liberties, but to protect 
of rights and liberties that were granted with the constitution of the republic. 
Kemalist republicanism, in this respect, asserts the morality of the already 
given rights but not of emancipation by furthering rights and liberties. 
Kemalist stance could therefore could be considered as a conservative stance 
in the sense of being concerned only with the protection of the status of 
citizenship that was granted by the Republic, and in the sense of disclaiming 
the activityof citizenship. Such an administrative canception of politics is 
also, it could be claimed, is anti-enlightenment because it narrows the 
concept of progress. The normative ideal of Kemalism is moral unity of 
community around the Kemalist values, i.e. extension of Kemalism to the 
society, but not realization of freedom in the public sphere. Islamism in this 
context cannot be depicted as anti-enlightenment by virtue of being a 
religious movement and/ or by virtue of being in opposition to a 
Westernizing regime. Also, with such an administrative concept of politics, 
we lack liberal tools to confront the iliiberalism of Islamism. This is not only 
because Kemalist view of politics is iliiberal but also Kemalist structuration 
of politics is iliiberal -and therefore forecloses the possibilities of liberal 
76 Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society: A Histarical Argumenf;, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 258. 
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questionings of Islamism- as well. This is so because Kemalism links political 
stability to moral consensus (on Kemalism) and thereby associates every 
reexamination of the political system with a revolutionary challenge. In this 
respect, contrary to the Kemalist depiction of it, Islamism may not 
necessarily be a revolutionary or anti-systemic challenge to the Kemalist 
political system. Moreover, Islamism could even be associated with a 
struggle for justice, if struggle for recognition of identities could be 
considered as struggles for justice. Most importantly, we might speculate 
that Islamism seeks to gain the power of state not because Islam is a religion 
which unites state and religion, but because in Turkey it is impossible for 
Islamic identity (or any other identity) to appear inthepublic sphere 
without having the power of the state. In other words, "is there any 
democratic outlet for different identities to appear inthepublic sphere 
without recoursing the power of state" is a meaningful question. 
As such Kemalism paradoxically 1 ironically could be considered as 
republicanism plus liberal canception of politics. This is because the task of 
politics is to protect an already-established orderin liberalism. Kemalism 
tried to do the same. But, like in republicanism, the already-established 
order was substantive in nature, that is, it proposed a certain life-style. 
Hence, Kemalism is republican canception of politics minus the activity of 
politics, i.e. vanishing of the concept of the political. The rise of Islamism 
could be located precisely in this context in which politics, in the sense of 
debate over the nature of good life, is absent. This is so because Islamism 
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seems to offer an alternative vision of good life in the absence of any other 
alternative vision of good life. Also, if Islamism could be associated with a 
culture conflict, ina context where basis of political divisions is not the 
fundamental (functional) cleavages, the stage is left to cultural divisions. 
In sum, it could be suggested that if modern republicanism is a political 
structuration in which modern liberal ideals, and especially individual 
freedom, injected in to a dassicall ancient republicanism, then Kemalist 
structuration of politics has not been along the lines of modern 
republicanism, but pre-modern republicanism. Indeed, Kemalist republic, it 
might be claimed, has been a Platonist-Rousseauist republic inthesense of 
having an "objective" definition of common good, seeing the society as an 
object of government and freedom in terms of one' s ability to fulfill his/her 
role in the realization of common good, and in depicting divergences from 
Kemalist good as either "false consciousness" or self(ish)-interest. 
It is against this political background that we could analyze the politics of 
Islamism. It may well be true that Islamismisan iliiberal political 
movement, but this is not because of its opposition to a "Westernizing" 
regime. Islamism should be assessed in terms of its own vision of the 
political and social integration. It is for this reason that this study 
introduced republicanism asa non-essentialist and universal tool of analysis 
of the politics of Islamism. As will be seenin the following chapter, Islamism 
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is close to its adversary in terrns of its alternative political structuration. But 
this is not because it is Islamic but because it is republican, like Kemalism. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
KEMALISM OF THE NATIONAL OUTLOOK MOVEMENT 
1. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
It was noted in the first chapter that Islamism as an alternative nationalism 
and as an alternative legitimation of capitalİst rationality has its own 
alternative model of society, mode of social integration and type of state-
society relationship. It was also suggested that if Islamism is to be assessed, 
it is more accurate and legitimate to do it in terms of its own definition of 
political community and (the legitimate sphere of) "the political." This is 
because Islamism is not a movement about the fundamentals of religion, but 
about the fundamentals of society. Islamism insists that religious morality, 
which is the precondition of a virtuous men/ society, is indispensable for a 
stable social order and for enabling individuals to make out what is right 
and wrong. For Islamism society isa homogenous entity with aset of 
Islamic values at i ts "center." It is in this respect that Islamism is a political 
movement because w hat are the fundamentals of society is a political 
question. Islamists come to politics with their (supposedly superior) moral 
ideas and they are concerned with continuity with the past, community and 
ord er. Islamists believe that politics can transfigure life and they enter in to 
political sphere for "rescuing" the society which is deemed to be in crisis. 
Islamic principles, in this context, expresses the identity of the 
Islamism/Islamists. The principles are interpreted in the light of modern 
experience. 
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to approach the Islamİst National 
Outlook Mavement (Milli Corus Hareketi) from the perspective of studying 
its conduct of politics, its concept of "the political," its definition of the 
political community and its visian of state-society relations, all of which are 
informed by an underlying ideal of society and i ts mode of integration. The 
aim, by approaching the National Outlook Mavement (henceforth NOM) 
from this perspective, is to emphasize its similarities with, rather than 
differences from Kemalism so as to provide an opportunity to go beyand the 
dominant/ determining diehatamy of either Islamism or Kemalism. Indeed, 
behind the often emphasized conflict between the Islamİst NOM and the 
Kemalist Westernizing regime, there are many convergences and 
resemblances between them that makes such diehatamy less meaningful 
than it appears at first sight. It will be suggested that, as far as the 
relationship between the mavement and the society -as well as its 
constituency- is concerned, the NOM's opposition to the Kemalist regime is 
coloured by iliiberal Kemalist elements. By showing these iliiberal Kemalist 
aspects of the NOM, we could canfront the daim that it is gaining a 
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democratic political culture as it opposes an oppressive and undemocratic 
regime.1 To the extent that representation of different identities are a sign of 
democracy, the NOM could be considered asa democratizing mavement for 
it seeks a space for Islamic identity inthepublic sphere. But, it should be 
borne in mind that, there are concerns about that the NOM may go beyand 
this by daiming to Islamize the public sphere and by monopolizing the 
representation of identity and by associating being a Muslim with voting for 
its parties. 
In emphasizing the similarities between Kemalism and Islamism, what is 
meant by Kemalism is crucial. As notedin the previous chapter, this study 
takes Kemalism not in terms of its substance, Westernization, but in terms of 
its form, i.e. structuration of politics and concept of "the political." 
Therefore, these convergences will be sought in the concept of the political 
and relatedly in the definitions of political community regardless of the 
substance/basis of the community /politics in question. For example, both 
Kemalism and Islamism hold that a societies are homogenous entities 
integrated araund common values/ good, though their deemed comman 
values are different. That the common good in the former is Westermzation 
and in the latter it is Islamization makes little difference as far as the political 
implications of a moralized idea of comman good on democracy and 
pluralism is concerned. 
1 Cf. Ali Bulac, "Islamda Secim Vardir" Milli Gazete, 4.5.1997. 
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It will be claimed that Islamism of the NOM converges with Kemalism on 
two crucial points. The first convergence concerns the non-recognition of the 
prevailing society as it is and, its concomitant, the alternative social 
engineering project. Second convergence is more enduring inthesense that 
it lasts longer than completing a (social engineering) project because it 
concerns a certain mentalİtywith regard to legitimate sphere of politics, that 
is the Islamİst concept of "the political." When studied in detail these two 
convergences can expand to cover a few more similarities, namely, the 
primacy of culture in modernization/development, the view of democracy 
as an instrument of establishing ideal (Islamic or Kemalist) order, the 
concept of populismas denial of differentiated structure of society, state-
centredness, and quasi-authoritarianism. These "correspondent aspects" of 
Islamism will be revealed by critically studying the issues problematized 
and alternatives offered by the NOM. 
As such this study is limited to aim of revealing the "political logic" or the 
"political mind" of the NOM that persisted in all parties of the movement. 
There are, of course, differences between Islamism and Kemalism. For 
instance, the latter is a state-ideology while the former is the ideology of an 
opposition mavement which springs from the cleavage created by the latter. 
Also, Islamism of the NOM could be considered asa social movement, 
which nonetheless is turning into an elite movement, while Kemalism was 
originally a mavement of cadres, which gradually gained a foothold in 
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society. Dissimilarities between Kemalism and Islamism are missing in this 
study. Also, the similarities between the NOM and other political parties, 
such as the misreading(s) of society and incomprehensive stance with regard 
to secularism, are missing due to time limitations. 
The term "National Outlook" (Mıllİ Gorus)is usedin two different senses. 
First inthesense of an Islamic/indigenous world-view fideology and, 
second, in the sense of a movement structured around this world-
view fideology and organized under three different political parties. Below, 
the former (ideological) aspect will be referred to as "the National Outlook" 
and, as in previous chapter, ideology will be taken as "fundamental 
principles which organize behaviour, frame of choices, constitute a world 
view and are considered to be the means of achieving that rare commodity 
which is the goal."2 The organizational/movement aspect will be referred to 
as the National Outlook Movement (NOM). Instead of talking about political 
parties of the movement, this study will employ National Outlook and the 
NOM in order to emphasize the continuity between the three parties of the 
movement primarily in terms of "ideology" and the leading cadres, which, 
at times, is depicted as the "leading oligarchy."3 Indeed, the ideology of 
2 See John Clammer, Dİlierence and ModernHy: Soda] Theory and 
Contemporary fapanese Sodety(London: Kegan Paul International, 1995), 
12. 
3 Also called founding elders, this elite of the movement include Oguzhan 
Asilturk, Sevket Kazan, Recai Kutan, Fehim Adak, Suleyman Arif Emre, 
Ahmet Tekdal. 
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National Outlook, which as will be seen below, is predominantly a 
culturalist stance, has been maintained as the founding principle of all three 
parties that have existed since 1970 as the carriers of this ideology, while the 
pressing social issues of the time (functional cleavages) have been integrated 
into this basic culturalist stance.4 This culturalist stance indicates a self-
consciousness about identity, culture, heritage and articulates the prevailing 
issues in terms of culture and morality.lt thereby sees politics and economy 
as functions of culture. The National Outlook does not emphasize an ethnic 
substance but a religious one. An analysis of the politics of the NOM could 
start from its standpoint vİs a vİsthe Kemalist (Westernizing) republic. But 
first a brief histarical review of the parti es of the mavement is in ord er. 
2. THE PARTIES OF THE NATIONAL OUTLOOK MOVEMENT 
The first political party with an explicit daim to be Islamic/lslamist, the 
National Order Party, was founded on January 26, 1970 under the leadership 
of Necmettin Erbakan. The National Order Party (NOP) also marked the 
beginning of the movement. lt was closed on January 14, 1972 on the 
4 See for example, Necmettin Erbakan, Turkİyenİn Meselelerİ ve Cozumlerİ 
(Ankara, np. 1991), 6, and Hasan Huseyin Ceylan, ed., Erbakan ve 
Turkİyenm Meselelerİ, (Ankara: Rehber Yayincilik, 1996), 211. See also 
Ahmet Yildiz, "The Evolution of Islamic Politics in Turkey Along the NSP-
pp Line: Change or Continuity?," Unpublished MA thesis. (Ankara: Bilkent 
University, 1991) for the continuity of culturalism as it is called in this study. 
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grounds that it sought to establish a theocratic orderin Turkey. The verdict 
was actually reached on May 21, 1971, but its publication in the Official 
Gazette, necessary for the enforcement of the decision, was in January 14, 
1972. The declaration issued for the foundation of the NOP asserted that it 
was the revival of the same National spirit that scattered (drove away) the 
crusaders, that conquered Istanbul and that defended the country during the 
war of Independence which led to foundation the Party.5 The parties of the 
NOM differed from other center-right political partiesin daiming the 
relevance of Islam to economic and political development and in seeking a 
space for Islamic identity inthepublic sphere. The basic aims of the National 
Order Party were realization of "the potential of the Turkish nation for 
morals and virtue, bringing order, freedom from anxiety and social justice, 
happiness and peace to all Turks, and moral recovery."6 The National Order 
Party also called for "moral and material progress ... to bring about 
prosperity and happiness, together with civilization that would serve as a 
model for the world."7 The party opposed to any interpretation of 
secularism that is hostile to religion and to increasing ties with, the then, 
5 See Rusen Cakir, Ne Serial Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak 
[Neither Sharia Nor Democracy: Understanding the W elfare Party] 
(Istanbul: Metis, 1994), 20. " ... Milli ruh yeniden sahlaniyor, cosuyor ve Milli 
Nizarn Partisini kuruyor ... " see also 4.9.1995 Sabah, for Erbakan stressing 
that Fatih, the conqueror, was a the National Outlookist. 
6 Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Turkey(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 190. 
See also Ali Yasar Saribay, Turkiye/de Modemlesme/ Parti ve Din Politikasİ: 
MSP Omek Ola yi [Modernization, Religion and Party Politics in Turkey: 
The Case of National Salvation Party] (Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1985), 100. 
7 Landau, Radical Politics in Turke~ 190. 
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European Economic Community. The charismatic leader of the party, 
Erbakan, in his "Declaration to the Religious Turk" stated that 
Thus the European, by making us copy him blindly and without any 
understanding, trapped us in this monkey' s cage and, as a result, 
forced us to abandon our personality and nobility. That is to say, he 
was successful in this because he used agents recruited from within, 
who felt [inferior and] disgusted with themselves, bringing to his knees 
the Turk who for centuries could not be defeated by the crusades and 
external blows. 8 
The second party of the National Outlook Movement, the National Salvation 
Party, was founded on October ll, 1972. The National Salvation Party (NSP) 
was, too, closed by the military government on October 16, 1983 along with 
all other political parties. The ideology of the NSP was the same with that of 
NSP. The primacy of moral and cultural development was reasserted. To 
this end, education based on modesty, morals, virtue, and religion was 
emphasized. The glorious Ottoman Past and the loss of power and strength 
linked to the degenerating influence of Western culture were stressed. The 
NSP regarded otherpartiesas "imitators of the West" and claimed that it 
was the only party based on Turkish national values and national heritage 
that could deliver material progress.9 
8 Erbakan' s "Mukaddesatci Turke Beyanname" in Salname 1390, (Istanbul, 
1971) cited in Feroz Ahmad, "Politics and Islam in Turkey" MiddleEastem 
Studies/ 27, 1 (1991), 3-21, 14-15. 
9 See Ergun Ozbudun, "Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey: The Case of the 
National Salvation Party'' in The Islamic Impulse/ ed. Barbara Stowasser, 
(Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Gerogetown University, 
Washington: Croom Helm, 1987). See also Turker Alkan, "The National 
Salvation Party in Turkey" in Islam and Politics in the Middle East eds. 
Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, (New York: St. Martin' s Press, 1984). 
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In the election of 1973, the National Salvation received 11.8 per cent of the 
vote and 48 seatsin the Turkish Grand National Assembly. As such, it was 
the third largest party after the center-left Republican Peoples Party (RPP) 
and the center-right Justice Party (JP) with 186 and 150 seats respectively. 
The National Salvation formeda coalition with the RPP which lasted from 
February 1974 to September 1974. This coalition was followed by 
participation in the so-called National Front coalitions formed by the JP, the 
ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (NAP), the Republicanist Reliance 
Party and the NSP between March 1975 and December 1977. Although the 
absolute number of votes cast for the National Salvation remained around 
1.25 million, it received 8.56 per cent of the votes and 24 seatsin the elections 
of June 1977. After this election, a second National Front government was 
formed by the JP, the NAP and the NSP, but this was short-lived. 
The W elfare Party was founded on July 19, 1983. It maintained the basic 
culturalist stance by emphasizing the glorious Ottoman past, degenerating 
effects of Westernization, moral developmentasa precondition of material 
development and opposition to increasing ties with the European 
Community. The National Outlook Movement reached its zenith during the 
W elfare Party period by steadily increasing its votes and finally by forming 
a coalition under the prime ministry of its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, with 
the True PathPartyon June 28, 1996. In the local elections of 1984, it received 
4.4 percent of the total votes. In 1987 general elections, its votes slightly 
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increased to 7.16 percent. In 1989local elections its votes increased by 2.6 
percent to 9.8 percent. In the 1990s, the Party was no longer a fringe party. In 
the 1991 general elections, the Welfare Party in alliance with two other 
parties, received 16.9 percent of the votes, which allowed W elfare Party to be 
represented by 38 deputies in the Grand National Assembly. A catch-all 
strategy, adopted after the 4th Congress of the WP in 1993, proved to be 
effective and in the local elections of 1994, the party received 19.1 percent of 
the votes. Its candidates were elected as the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara 
metropolitan municipalities among many others. Finally, the party emerged 
as the largest party from the December 1995 general elections by receiving 
21.38 percent of the votes and 158 seatsin the Grand National Assembly 
which eventually allowed it to form a majority coalition with the True Path 
Party. It should be briefly mentioned here that the WP's ability to exploit the 
political opportunities available through dynamic/ effective organizational 
penetration into society and tailored electoral campaigns have played an 
important role in the rise of the WP. 
After the 1995 elections, an attempt was made to keep the W elfare Party out 
of office through a "stimulated"10 minority coalition between the True Path 
Party and the Motherland Party, both center-right. This coalition was short-
lived and the WP formed a majority coalition government with the True 
PathPartyon June 28, 1996 that lasted almost a year. This coalition made an 
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Islamist leader the prime minister for the first time in the history of Turkish 
Republic, and according to some Islamic circles, it symbolized the 
bankruptey of the Westernization ideology of the Republic11 as well as the 
end of a taboo12 that an Islamist leader cannot become a primeminister of 
the secular Republic. Some other Islamİst groups, on the other hand, 
registered their doubts about the co-optation of the Party into the system.13 It 
seems reasonable to say that the WP's access to the office was, at least tacitly, 
accepted and a credit was given to WP to show its ability for 
"performance."14 It could also be suggested that performance expected from 
WP in government was not progress in Islamisation, for example abalition of 
interest or confrontation with the West, but in terms of its concrete deliveries 
through a better administration. 
In this context, if, asA ydin Menderes suggested, this government was a case 
testing the ability of the WP to run the state (devleti idare etmek) rather than 
1
° For the role played by the military in forming the MP-TPP coalition see 
Yavuz Donat, "28 Subat Dosyasİ," Milliyet 27.2.1998. 
11 Davut Dursun, "Sayin Bashakan N. Erbakan," Yeni Safak/ 6.7.1996, and Ali 
Bulac, "Erbakan Basbakan, RP Iktidar" YeniSafak 10.7.1996. 
12 The Islamist-fascist daily Akit's headline, which stretched over eight 
columns was Bir Tabu Yikildİ. See Akit 9.7.1996. 
13 See editarials of Hak Soz, 63 (Haziran, 1996) and 57 (Aralik, 1996). 
14 See for example Atalay Sahinoglu's statement that the failures of center-
right parhes is making them accept the WP government tacitly (ister 
istemez), Yeni YuzyiL 16.6.1996. See also Bayram Meral' s statement that a 
chance should be given to the stance of National Outlook for a year. Yeni 
YuzyiL 3.1.1996. 
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i ts loyalty to the secular system, 15 thenit can be suggested that the WP failed 
in this test since Erbakan, as the prime minister, resigned on June 18, 1997 as 
a result of what is often called a "soft coup." The coalition could not survive 
the tension initiated by the military and increased by the civil societal 
organizations as well as within the ranks of the WP itself. The WP lacked a 
consensual approach in government and took some "politically incorrect" 
actions such as portrayal of constructing a mosque in Taksim square as 
reconquest of Istanbul. It totally ignored the increasing tension by 
considering it as an artificial agenda, and turned a blind eye to the main 
source of the tension, the rnilitary, by daiming that the tension was 
generated by the mass media in alliance with Zionism. Due to its lack of 
consensual approach, it was at loggers head not only with the military but 
also with a large seetion of society, even with its own constituency, as well. 
On the other hand, the WP retreated by remaining silenton certain issues, 
such as the increasing ties with Israel, that it opposed harshly during its 
opposition years. During its tenure in office, the military dedared 
"reactionary" movernents, associated with the WP, as internal enemies of the 
secular republic. Asa result, a dosure case was filed against the WP by the 
Chief Prosecutor of the High Courts of Appeal on the basis of its anti-secular 
activities, and the party was closed by the Constitutional Court on January 
16, 1998. With the verdict dosing the party, the charismatic leader of the 
National Outlook Movement and the W elfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, 
15 Milliyet 19.8.1997. 
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along with some other top figures, was barmed from political activity for five 
years. This was on the basis of the Article 69 of the constitution which 
stipulated that "the members, including the founders, of a party, whose 
speeches and actions have led to the closure of the party, cannot be a 
founder, member, administrator or inspector of anather party for five 
years .... , 
It must be noted here that, the last party of the NOM, the Virtue Party (f. 
December, 17, 1997), is not included in this study. Although the Virtue Party 
(VP) represents a continuity with the W elfare Party in terms of its leading 
cadres except the charismatic leader of the movement, Necmettin Erbakan, it 
is dubious whether the VP will follow the stance of its predecessor. This 
follows the decision of the Constitutional Court which not only closed the 
party but stated the legallimits of Islamİst politics by interpreting secularism 
ina rigid way. The Court, for example, considered opposition to the ban on 
wearing headscarf at the Universities as an divisive anti-secular activity. 
Bearing in mind that what the Constitution stipulates -a permanently closed 
party cannot be founded under anather name- the VP's possible opposition 
to ban on headscarf will not only be an anti-secular activity but it will also 
represent a continuity with the WP, both of which can be regarded as 
reasons for the closure of the VP. Also, in response to the WP's demand that 
secularism should be interpreted in Turkey as it is interpreted in the West, 
the Court took a culturally relativist stance and stated that secularism in 
Turkey cannot be defined as simply separation of the affairs of the state from 
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the affairs of religion. The legal grounds for the verdict stated that due to 
differences between Islam and Christianity, we cannot expect the principle 
of secularism to be exercised ina similar way.16 
There are other reasons why judging the future profile of the VP is difficult. 
The failure of the W elfare Party in government seems to have triggered a 
process of self-criticism and self-evaluation that might possibly lead to a 
change in the overall political conduct and "ideology" of the movement.17 
While there are signs of change, there are also indications of the 
maintenance of the original stance. Erbakan, whose influence over the party 
is inevitable, himself, stated that the ideals would not change and the 
mission of the WP will continue.18 But, Erbakan' s absence could also provide 
an opportunity for changes in the understanding of internal democracy as 
well. It seems that the Virtue Party has chosen for a low-profile position and 
as such it is difficult to locate where the party stands. The Party can make 
16 The Courts verdict with reasoning was published in Resmi Gazete on 
22.2.1998. 
17 See for example, Abdullah Gul, "confessing" that they lacked dialog and 
cansensus-seeking when in govemment, for they thought it is the "national 
will" that governs 30.10.1998 Zaman. See also interviews with Bulent Arinc 
in RadikaL 25.5.1998, Milliyet, 22.2.1998, and ArtıHaber, No. 27, 20-26. 
6.1998, interview with Aydin Menderes, Milliyet, 19.8.1997, and interview 
with Bahri Zengin, Milli Gazete, 24.8.1997. 
18 Milli Gazete, 16.2.1998, Milliyet, 17.1.1998. The very name of the party is 
indicative of the continuity of the basic stance of the NOM, which sees 
virtue, linked to piety, as an indispensable ingredient of a stable social order 
and politicalliberty. See for example, Saribay, Turkiye'de Moderrılesme, 
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moves to become a center-party if it employs a new political approach that 
appeals to all sections of the society and injects hope to society on the basis 
of a more realistic analysis of the current deadlock in Turkish politics, as 
opposed to the "reform populism" 19 of the WP. It must be borne in mind 
that complying with the legallimits of politics is not sufficient for becoming 
a center party. The YP can be expected to emphasize "democracy, freedoru 
and human rights"20 instead of harping on" imitating mentality" in Turkish 
politics. But neither a mere emphasis on these issues, nor the daim to follow 
the line of Democrat Party and Turgut Ozal may suffice for "the occupation 
of center." Indeed, the same themes was expressed by Erbakan in the speech 
hemade in the Fifth General Congress of the W elfare Party. To do so, the YP 
is expected to show, for example, that it means something more than rule of 
"national will" by democracy.21 
Parti ve Din Politikasİ/ lll for an emphasis on virtuous people as a 
precondition of "meaningful" democracy. 
19 I borrow this term from U mit Cizre-Sakallioglu, see interview by Nese 
Duzel, Yeni YuzyiL 26.1.1998. 
20 Erbakan, "Turkiye'nin temel meselesi demokrasi, insan haklari ve 
ozgurluktur." 15.10.1997, Milli Gazete. See also interview with Bahri Zengin 
in Milli Gazete, 24.8.1997 where he states that previously they thought that 
economic problems were prior and that they could be solved by a skillful 
administration (iyi yonetim). Now, in the light of the experience they had in 
government, the primary issue in Turkey is realization of democracy and 
human rights. 
21 At this stage if a comment is to bemade about the programme of the YP, it 
could be suggested that it is a programme in which the National Outlook is 
diluted and hidden. Need for a totally new order, glorious history, 
democracy as the rule of national will, moral/religious education, virtuous 
people are still the themes expressed. 
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3. WHAT IS THE NATIONAL OUTLOOK? 
3.1. Civilizational Shift as the disease and the cure 
As notedin the first chapter, Islamismisan essentially this-worldly and 
alternative modernization movement. However, the fact that it is this 
worldly does not make it less religious/Islamic. This is because, Islamists, by 
retrieving the principle of tevhid, argue that Islam covers all aspects of life. 
Therefore, as long as one is aware of the Islamic principles that regulate all 
spheres of our lives, this-worldliness does not imply going profane or 
"secularization." What counts is consciousness of being a Muslim. Islamism, 
in reality, calls for this consciousness in being this-worldly. It attempts to 
legitimize their involvement in politics in the name of rescuing society and 
for enabling Muslims to practice their religion. It attempts to give a meaning, 
for example, to capitalİst rationality by seeking capitalist development for 
the sake of revitalization of Islamic civilization. It instrumentalizes Islam for 
the purposes of authentic development. And to this end, it refers to history 
to validate the superiority of Islam. 
History, according to the NOM, is about the rise and decline of two kinds of 
civilizations; religious and secular, or more accurately, those which assert 
the superiority of the "might" and those which assert the superiority of the 
"hak/' which could mean all rights-possessed, God, and as will be seen 
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below, "the absolute truth." All of the civilizations based on superiority of 
hak are founded by Prophets, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Mohammed. All 
of them are Just Orders, because only those civilizations based on the 
superiority of the hak are the ones which respect the rights of human 
beings.22 Contemporary Western civilization, according to the NOM, has no 
religious morality but secular principles at i ts foundation. Since it is a man-
ınade (beserı) system, like all such systems, it too is founded upon blood, 
tears and might.23 It cannot be "just" and respectful of human rights because 
its basic principle is "might is right."24 Westem civilization, therefore, isa 
"dar k Ord er of Oppression." 
According to the National Outlook, "the glorious" Ottoman Empire was a 
Just Order, superior to and stronger than the West because it was Islamic, or 
more accurately it was not secular.25 Ottoman Empire declined due to 
morally degenerating effects of Westernization that started off with the 
Tanzİmatreforms. Westernization since Tanzimat resulted in moral and 
material backwardness that was enough to destroy the Great Empire. By 
removing the tax-liability of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, 
Tanzimat made it impossible for the Ottoman state to finance its defense 
22 Necmettin Erbakan, Adil Ekonomİk Duzen (Ankara: np, 1991), 72-74. 
23 Ahmet Tekdal, Mİllİ Gazete 14.12.1994. 
24 Veyis Ersoz, "Koku Zulme Dayali Sistemler," Mİllİ Gazete, 20.10.1994. 
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expenses. Thereby, the state had to borrow, which in effect meant that the 
loss of economic and political independence, i.e. colonization. Hence, 
Westernization alsomeant the colonization of the Muslim lands.26 The pious 
Muslim people, or the National Outlook spirit, reacted to the 
colonization/Westernization of Muslim lands by waging the Independence 
W ar, and founded the Turkish Republic asa fully independent state.27 
25 See for example, Ferhat Koc, "Laiklik Uzerine" 4.8.1994, Abdullah Altay, 
"Grosman: Turkiye Laik Kalacak" 25.9.1994 both in Milli Gazete 
26 Erbakan ve Turkiyenin Temel Meseleleri 81, 204-205. Suleyman Arif 
Emre, "Ahlak Reformundan Sozeden Yok" Milli Gazete, 4.4.1997, Isınet 
üzel, "Carpiklik Tanzimatla Basladi," Milli Gazete, 3.11.1994, lbrahim Kara, 
"Batililasma Seruveninin Acikli Serencami," Milli Gazete, 9.8.1997, Isınail 
Hasbal, "Yikim Politikalarİ ve RP Misyonu," Milli Gazete, 20.8.1997. See also 
Saribay, Turkiye/de Modernlesme/ Parti ve Din Politikasİ/ 100 for the same 
theme in the foundation of the NOP. 
27 Nazir Ozsoz, "Bu Cumhuriyeti Kim Kurdu," Milli Gazete, 30.10.1994, 
Sadik Albayrak, "Sakarya Zaferi ve Seriat,'' Milli Gazete, 31.5.1995 That the 
Republic has been founded by the National Outlookist people is a daim 
made by Necmetti~ Erbakan as well. Such a speech was made by him, for 
example, in the Fifth General Congress of the W elfare Party, Ankara, 
13.10.1996. Needles to say, in this case, the founder of the secular Republic, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, unconvincingly turns out to be a National 
Outlookist as well. At the same time the National Outlook turns out to be 
true Ataturkist, though the principles of Ataturkism are quite different than 
the ones taught to the Turkish nation. In this speech Erbakan counted the 
principles of Ataturkas "rationalism," "independence," "self-reliant 
development," "industrialization," "assertive foreign policy" and "going 
beyand the contemporary civilizations." See also Erbakan' s dedaration for 
the death anniversary of Ataturkin 10.11.1996 Milli Gazeteand 12.11.1994 
Aksam. In this way Westernization project and rigid secularism policies is 
not associated with Ataturk. See for example Ali Gunvar, "Mustafa Kemal 
Dinin Kurallarina Uygun Davranmaya Belki Pek Dikkat Etmezdi Ama ... ", 
Milli Gazete, 23.6.1998 for a daim that Atatutk did not consider 
"secularism" asa sine qua non of the Republic. For a daim that those who 
ruled after Ataturk did not really understand what Ataturk meant by 
"contemporary civilization and did exactly the opposite of the things that 
Ataturk had done, see Erbakan in Aksam/ 14.7.1995 and the editorial 
"Ataturk'un Hedefi Milli Idi," Milli Gazete, 12.6.1997. Once Ataturk is 
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Although founded by pious Muslim people, who are represented by the 
NOM today, the Republic has actually been an extension of colonialism and 
an "Order of Oppression."28 
Therefore, it has to be replaced with the Just Order of the NOM, which is 
informed by divine commandments. It has been an "order of oppression" 
because, the ruling elite, which captured/ seized the state ever since the 
inception of the republic, has plunged into a Westernization project. For this 
reason, they have an "imitating mentality" (taklitci zihniyetl which prevents 
the development of creativity and motivation needed for the re-construction 
of "Great Turkey Once Again."29 Westernizing elite/state actually opened a 
battle against the culture, history and religion of the Muslim people. 
Westernizing elite/state morally degenerated Turkish society, and made 
Turkey a satellite country that lacks independence, identity and self-
associated with the National Outlook, there are only fascists and 
communists abusing the legacy of Ataturk, see for example, 5.1.1995, 
8.1.1995 and 15.11.1996 all MilH Gazete. Whatever the guilt of the Republic, 
the blame is put on post-Ataturk period and it is claimed that the things 
Ataturk has done is in concert with the National Outlook. In addition to 
Erbakan' s speech see, for example, Burhan Bozgeyik, "Kemalizmi Kim Icat 
Etti," Mı1li Gazete, 26.4 1995 for a daim that the Republic that Ataturk 
founded was a religious/lslamic republic and that "Kemalism" was 
invented asa religion by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu!. Or, it is claimed that 
it was Moiz Kohen, a Jewish, who turned Kemalism into an 
ideology 1 doctrine. Mehmet Sevket Eygi, Milli Gazete, 5.8.1994. 
28 See for example, Bahri Zengin, "K urtulus Savasiari Yeniden Yazilmali," 
Aksam, 5.11.1994. 
29 Necmettin Erbakan, Turkiyenin Meseleleri ve Cozumleri (Ankara: np. 
1991), 60. 
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confidence.30 Estranged from "the people" this ruling elite/state lacked a 
genuine concern for the well being of people, wasted money by preferring to 
invest in Opera and Bale rather than to building adam, and oppressed "the 
people" both materially and physically so as to maintain their own ruling 
position.31 It is, therefore, the wrong policies of this imitating mentality 
which is the fundamental cause of Turkey' s (all of the) current problems.32 It 
was this mentality that left Turkey, one of the richest countries in the world, 
behind such countries as Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Germany.33 The poor 
conditions of hospitals, unemployment, inflation and even lack of a Turkish 
novelist with a Nobel prize is linked to this imitating mentality and 
emphasized so as to delegitimize the current "order of oppression." It must 
be noticed that what is called as the "order of oppression" is not actually an 
"ord er" but certain people who form a political class or a power cartel. In 
other words, the system is actually equated with an invented political class. 
Depicted asa "handful of happy minority" (bir avuc mutlu azinlik), all 
political actors except the cadres of the NOM forms a political class, and the 
political competition between themis fake. 34 They are in reality colluding 
30 ibid., 13, 31. 
31 Zeki Ceyhan, "71. Yil Dondumu" Milli Gazete, 30.10.1994. 
32 Erbakan, Turkiyenin Meseleleri ve Cozumleri, 7, 11-15. "Turkiye'nin 
meselelerinin asil sebebi taklitci zihniyetierin yanlis politikalaridir." 
33 Refah Partisi Secim Beyannamesi: 24 Aralik 1995. 
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against the NOM and thereby against the people. This political class is 
portrayed as corrupt, unaccountable, unresponsive, incompetent and selfish. 
They are the "discotheque boys" who want Turkey to severe i ts links with 
Islam like those who wanted Turkey to be ruled by an American mandatory 
during the W ar of Independence.35 In reality, there are only two alternatives: 
the National Outlook and the imitating others.36 Evenother Islamic groups, 
as will be seen below, at times play right into hands of this political class just 
by eritkizing the NOM. In alliance with imperialist Christian West and 
Zionism, all other parties (and the mass media), as sub-constructors of 
Western imperialism/7 are actually preventing the people from realİzing 
what their own true idea is, the National Outlook?8 Those who do not want 
WP to govern are either the rentier class or the ones who oppress people in 
the name of secularism?9 Because the ideas that spring from Western 
civilization does not bring peace to Turkey,40 and because all other parties or 
34 See Erbakan ve Turkiyenin Temel Meseleleri 153,231. 
35 Erbakan, Turkiye/ 21.12.1995. 
36 Erbakan, Turkiyenin Meseleleri ve Cozumleri 6. It must be noted that 
before the collapse of communist block, there were three main political 
views, leftist, liberal, and national (outlook). Both leftist and liberal views, 
represented by Republican Peoples Party and, the then, Justice Party 
respectively, were illegitimate for they belonged to Western club. See 
Erbakan ve Turkiyenin Temel Meseleleri 120, and Saribay, Turkiye/de 
Modemlesme/ Parti ve Din Polİtikasi/ 110. 
37 Abbas Pirimoglu, Milli Gazete, 14.6.1995. 
38 Erbakan ve Turkiyenin Temel Meseleleri 121. 
39 Abdullah Gul, Milliyet 28.2.1996. 
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political views belong to Western club, they are hindering the development 
of Turkey, which is possible only under the rule of the NOM. They lack 
motivation and mission to serve people, instead they are in the service of 
international finance, IMF. As such, they are not adversaries whose right has 
to be respected and protected, rather they -and their supporters- are 
(internal !) enemies to be destroyed. 
3.2. Culturalism as Kemalism 
Such a narration of history, and i ts concomitant diagnosis of the causes of 
the current problems points to a number of things. First, the issues expressed 
as problems are mostly the functional issues of underdevelopment, 
unemployment and so on. It is in this sense that the Islamİst NOM is not a 
revolt against modernization, but a reaction to uneven modernization which 
if corrected will deliver more material benefits as well as identity.41 In the 
meantime, also the Islamic civilization will be revitalized by re-constructing 
"Great Turkey Once Again" (Yeniden Bu yuk Turkiye) which will lead the 
Islamic world that was fragmented into nation-states after the dismantling of 
40 Oguzhan Asilturk, Yeni YuzyiL 12.11.1997. 
41 See for example, Erbakan ve Turkiyenin Temel Meseleleri, 103, where 
Erbakan asserts that under WP government incomes/earnings will increase 
by five to ten times. See also his speech to the members of Istanbul 
Chambers of Commerce. Yeni YuzyiL 13.10.1995. 
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the Ottoman Empire.42 Asa corollary of this civilizational perspective, the 
NOM is not eager to develop relations with the European Community (EC). 
Indeed, the NOM regards Turkey' s membership to EC as invasion of Turkey 
by Zionist/ colonialist forces without resorting to war.43 
Second, these problems are seen as a symptom of an underlying 
fundamental problem, which is the alienation of state/ruling elite from the 
society asa result of their imitating mentality. The solution, therefore, is the 
elimination of the imitating mentality and instead cultural unification of 
state and society (devlet mİllet kaynasması) which will be possible under the 
rule of the cadres of the National Outlook. What is really diagnosed as the 
ca use of the problems is the presence of a culturally alienated state/ elite 
which promoted a certain life style and barred Islamic identity from the 
public sphere. As such, the NOM could be considered within the framework 
of center-periphery cleavage in which the main cultural is cultural. Indeed, 
the NOM claims to represent the culturally peripheralized vİs a vİs the 
culturally alienated state/ elite. However, it could be suggested that center-
periphery framework is not a very useful framework for analyzing the 
NOM. First of all, as suggested in chapter two there is no such thing as a 
culturally homogenous center or culturally homogenous periphery. Second, 
by sharing this misleading assumption, the NOM claims to represent 
42 Ahmet Kucukaga, Mİllİ Gazete, 13.9.1995. 
43 Erbakan ve Turkİyenİn Temel Meselelen~ 100-101. 
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periphery, "the people" vis a vis the s ta te. To falsify this daim we have to 
recognize/introduce the differentiated nature of the society. Only then, it 
could become clear that there is no such thing as a political class alienated 
from people but representing a segment of society. And, since the society is 
differentiated neither the NOM nor any other political stance could be the 
single representative of the whole society. Indeed, as will be seen below, the 
NOM is not the sole political representative of the Islamic social movement 
in Turkey. In this way, one could avoid the risk of facing the either 
Kemalism or Islamism dichotomy. 
What the identification of imitating mentality as the fundamental problem 
shows is that the stance of the NOM is a culturalist stance, for its links the 
question of development to presence of appropriate culture. Indeed, cultural 
unification of the state and society is necessary because it is believed that 
moral progress is the precondition of material progress.44 Japan, according to 
Erbakan, progressed because it has remained loyal to its culture/religion.45 
The Westernizing state/ elite is not in harmony with the culture/religion of 
society, and therefore, unable achieve moral regeneration essential for 
material progress. Thus, a cultural-turn to Islam, i.e. going native, is the 
44 Maddi kalkinmanin temeli manevi kalkinmadir. This is a motto of the 
NOM mentioned in almost every publication of the parties of the 
movement. See for example, Turkiyenin Meseleleri ve Cozumleri and Refah 
Partisi Secim Beyannamesi: 24 Aralik 1995. See also Saribay, Turkiye/de 
Modernlesme/ Parti ve Din Politikasi 113, 122-129, for the same themes of 
NOP/NSP. 
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solution to all of the problems Turkey face. As an alternative modernization 
project, the NOM, then, challenges the equation established between 
civilized and Westernized by asserting not only the possibility of an Islamic 
civilization,46 but also the impossibility of a non-Islamic just civilization for 
Muslim Turks. 
At this stage, one of the resemblances between Islamism and Kemalism 
becomes clear: Islamism resembles Kemalism in the emphasis it has put on 
the primacy of (appropriate) culture in development. Both Kemalism and 
Islamism of the NOM consider appropriate culture as the precondition of 
development. The fact that the appropriate culture for Kemalism was 
Western culture and for Islamism it is the indigenous Islamic culture does 
not exonerate this parallelism between them. Both rejection and assertian of 
Islam as the appropriate culture operates within the same paradigm. What 
this parallelism showsis that, in its opposition to Kemalist Westernization, 
Islamism reproduces the same logic/paradigm. It is in this sensethat 
Islamism is the mirror image of Kemalism. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the question of development was seen as a 
function of appropriate culture by Weberism, the convergence between 
45 Milliyet 22.5.1995. 
46 Nilufer Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of 
Turkey", in Civil Society in Middle East Richard A. Norton, ed., (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1996), 24. This equation is challenged, for example, by Recep 
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Kemalism and Islamism is actually a convergence on Weberism. But most 
importantly, it would be misleading to jump into conclusion that Islamism 
involves areturn to our own indigenous culture as opposed to Kemalism 
which tried to change the culture. As will be seen below, Islamism too 
involves a social engineering project to mould society inaccordance with the 
one it imagines. Islamİst social engineering, is not really a publicized 
political action but a by-product of the assumption that the cadres of the 
NOM are the true representatives of the society which also implies that the 
replacement of the current political class with the cadres of the NOM is 
sufficient for cultural unification. As such the system, order of oppression, is 
equated with the political elite that occupies the state. Cultural unification 
turns out to be a social engineering project only when we look at the 
prevailing society. Overall, one could suggest that neither the diagnosis nor 
the solution of the NOM isa political one but a cultural/moral one which 
offers only rule by best/virtuous men as the solution. Virtue, in turn, is 
defined in terms of religiosity. 
Tayyip Erdogan in an interview on Kanal 7 television channel on 13.10.1996. 
See also Mustafa üzel, fsfİkbal Koklerdedir(Ankara: Iz Yayincilik, 1996). 
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3.3. Personalization: "we are the solution" 
The first and foremost task, indeed raison d' etre of the NOM is then to 
"cure the sickness of imitating West" through a cultural unification of state 
and society so as to solve all of the pressing social, economic and political 
issues. This "cure" is often called as the establishment of the Just Order. 
However, not only what the Just Order entails but also how the Just Order 
will be established is never explained. According to Erbakan, it takes a 
conference to explain how the transition will be achieved.47 Yet, at one level, 
the cure involves the replacement of the political class, or the ruling "happy 
minority" with the cadres of the NOM, who are the true representatives of 
"the people." 
Against this ruling "happy minority," the cadres of NOM portray 
themselves as unselfish and as having a genuine concern for the well-being 
of people.48 They seek power not just for their self-interests but for morally 
superior purposes and for realizing a mission, rescuing Turkey. Theirs is not 
politika (politicking) which means doing all evil things for the sake of 
gaining political power, but siyaset(politics) which means 
administrating/running the state properly.49 The cadres of the NOM are 
47 Erbakan ve Turkiyenin Temel Meseleleri/ 116, and Turkiyeflin Temel 
Meseleleri/ passim. 
48 Selamİ Guder, "Tarihte 26 Yil Once" Milli Gazete 16.10.1995. 
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beyond left and right, they represent the center, the true history, culture, 
spiritual and moral values of the societi0 that once brought salvation and 
felicity to humanity.51 They are, therefore, the vanguards of change as 
illustrated by one of the mottoes of the party: A New World (Yeni Bir 
Dunya). The cadres of NOM are pious, and since only those who surrender 
themselves to Allah could be a just ruler, they qualify for running the state 
in a just manner.52 Because they fear the judgment of Allah, what they offer 
to public is solely an "honest" ( durust) govemment.53 
Hence, if National Outlook is the suggested solution to the pressing issues, 
this "solu tion" does not entail a coherent and comprehensive policy 
programme, not even a programme of Islamisation but a group of people 
that should be ruling. In the final analysis, what the NOM suggest as the 
solution, and for cultural unification, is only its pious cadres. In this respect 
the motto of the NOM is not "Islam is the solution" but "we are the 
solution." The NOM could stay away from any policy making because the 
49 Veyis Ersoz, "Islam ve Siyaset" Mılli Gazete, 22.5.1995. 
50 Oguzhan Asilturk "RP olarak biz milleti, milletin tarihini, kulturunu, 
ahlaki ve manevi degerierini temsil ettigirniz icin biz merkeziz. Çünkü, 
millet asildir. Bizim sagimizda ve solumuzcia partiler olabilir." Hurriyet 
7.11.1997. For a similar statement by Erbakan see Hurriyet 10.6.1996. 
51 Hasan Aksay, "Milli Gorus: Aydinlik Bir Devrin Kapisinda" Mi]]j Gazete, 
16.10.1995. 
52 Abdullah Sanlidag, "RP'nin Yukselisini Hazmedemeyenleı:" Milli Gazete, 
17.10.1995. 
53 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Meydan 27.12.1993. 
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problems are created by incompetent rulers. Therefore, there is actually no 
need for policy making but only for just and virtuous administrators. 
Obviously, as such the alternative of the NOM is not a political but a 
"personalistic" alternative inthesense that it "personalizes" political 
problems and solutions. As noted above, the system, "order of oppression," 
is equated with the people inhabiting it and the target, in being "anti-
systemic," is them. With this personalistic aspect, the NOM represents a 
continuum with the classical republicanism which, emphasized moral/ good 
rule by virtuous rulers. It could also be suggested that the emphasis of the 
NOM on virtuous rulers is in line with Islamic political theory which 
emphasized the importance of competent rulers. The mostrecent example of 
this line of thinking is Mawdudi's -an Islamİst thinker who founded the 
Jamaat-i Islami Movement in Pakistan- diagnosis that links problems to the 
"non-ideal" rulers. But as notedin chapter two, the emphasis on virtuous 
rulers in Islamic theory is less Islamic than Platonic/ republican, for which 
the virtue is the essence of republic and the rule by virtuous men is the 
prime principle. Therefore, personalism of the NOM could better be traced 
back to republican tradition than to Islam. Since Kemalism has not been 
informed from Islamic political theory, it is through this republican tradition 
one could decipher the convergences between Kemalism and Islamism. As 
notedin the previous chapter, Kemalism asa variety of republicanism, has 
been elitist and emphasized rule by virtuous people for the effective use of 
power to achieve the already-given ends. In this respect, neither Kemalism 
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nor Islamism of the NOM problematizes the idea of virtuous rulers and both 
agrees on the merits of rule by "best man." Surely, what virtue entails and 
who is the best man is different in each alternative. 
In this context, if modern politics is about going beyond the Platonic 
principle of "rule by best men" and if the primary concern of modern 
politics is ideas, ideologies and policies, then we could suggest that politics 
of the NOM is pre-modern. Also, if democracy is about participation, 
plurality of views, public debate and most importantly non-charismatic 
leadership, then we could also suggest that "personalism" of the NOM is not 
democracy-friendly either. But, suggesting a personalistic alternative is not 
an exclusively pre-modern pre-modern practice either. In this personalistic 
aspect there is also a convergence with a new type of party that has emerged 
in Western Europe in the last decade. This new type of party is called New 
Populist Parties54, Anti-Party Parties55 or Anti-Political-Establishment 
Parties.56 Like the NOM, these parhes too lack an ideologkal package, daim 
to be beyond left and right, define themselves as the mainstream, equate the 
system with the people inhabiting it, and appear to be the agents of change. 
This recent rise of personalismin politics could best be understood if we 
54 Paul Taggart, "New Populist Parhes in Western Europe" West European 
Politics/ 18, 1 (1995): 34-51. 
55 Cas Mude, "The Paradox of the Anti-Party Party: Insights from Extreme 
Right" Party Politics/ 2, 2 (1996): 265-276. 
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recognize the shift of the ground of politics from ideas/ideologies to 
"identities" of the politicians. When what is to be done is no longer a matter 
of political deliberation, but a given of politics, political competition tends to 
be over "who" will adıninister best. 
When viewed from this personalistic perspective, one cannot know in 
advance, how the cadres of the mavement will behave in govemment 
because there is neither an Islamisation programmenoran "ideology" based 
political programme that would be followed in government. Thus far, the 
only religious aspect of the party is its pious cadres and the only alternative 
of the party is virtuous rulers which is associated with piousness. This 
allows a large sphere of flexibility and pragmatism for the cadres of the 
NOM. Y et, the NOM, quite correctly, is associated with an Islamisation 
project. Below, an attempt will be made to explain why pragmatism does not 
hinder the possibilities of Islamisation programme. In the meantime it will 
become clear that an Islamisation programme is unconditionally associated 
with the cadres of the NOM. In other words, how the NOM remains a 
movement for Islamisation without making the substance of its ideology 
clear or how could the cadres of the mavement be excessively pragmatic 
without losing the "ideological" dispositian will be explained. In all these, 
resemblances with Kemalism will become apparent. 
56 Andreas Schelder, "Anti-Political-Establishment Parties" Party Politics/ 2, 3 
(1996): 291-312. 
255 
3.4. Islamist Concept of "the political" as Kemalism 
Kemalism was studied in previous chapter primarily in terms of its vision of 
state-society relations, and in terms of its concept of the political, which are 
believed to be determined by the underlying mode of social integration, 
republicanism. It was noted that Kemalism asa republicanist mode of 
integration assumed that society is integrated around the Kemalist goals of 
Westernization as it common good. It was also noted this common good was 
substantive in nature because it implied promotion of a certain life style 
through a social engineering project. Moreover, it was suggested that the 
assumption of society as integrated around Kemalist goals of Westernization 
resulted in the necessity of the protection of Kemalism as the fundamental 
idea of modern Turks. Westernization was, as notedin the previous chapter, 
moralized and elevated to a level above and beyond politics and the society 
was considered to be an object of govemment with no participatory role in 
policy-making and deliberation of its common good. The common good of 
the society, under Kemalism was, therefore, not a question of politics but an 
objective phenomenon for both society and individuals. 
As for Islamism of the NOM, this study thus far explained the opposition 
between "the political class" and the cadres of NOM, but not the type of 
relationship between Islamism and society, where we could observe the 
Kemalist, and therefore republicanist, aspects of the NOM. It was noted 
above the NOM is a pragmatic political movement seeking power by 
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personalizing what are actually political problems. Therefore, a political 
programme by which the consistency of the movement could be checked is 
lacking. Yet we could decipher the hints of the NOM's vision of state-society 
relationship by looking at the implications of the way the NOM 
differentiates itself from other political visions. These hints became the 
symptoms of an underlying logic in the last government experience of the 
WP. WP' s above mentioned non-consensual attitude in government should 
be borne in mind. 
The NOM could be considered as republicanist in its aim to bring an order 
of justice and construct a society united around a common good. But, the 
best starting point in showing the "Kemalism" of the NOM is the daim that 
the National Outlook is the true collective idea of the people and that the 
whole nation should subscribe to it.57 It is in this respect that Islamism, like 
Kemalism, falls into the republican trap, mentionedin the previous chapter. 
It is this daim that gives way to a counter-social-engineering project in the 
name of democratic seli-assertion and to a rigid structuration of the 
legitimate sphere of politics as in Kemalism. This daim is based on an 
imaginative reading of society, which in realityisa deliberate misleading 
based on the conclusion drawn from the fact that there isa cleavage between 
57 
"Biz ikibin yilina kadar iktidarda olursak bas meselemiz takliteilik 
hastaligini tedavi etmek, Bati taklitciligi zihniyeti yerine milletimize kendi 
"Milli Gorus//unu temel gorus olarak kazandirmaktir." "Milletce 
kurtulusumuz ... butun milletimizin Milli Gorus ve Adil Duzen bayragi 
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"the political class," the NOM and "the people." The conclusion drawn is 
that the NOM is the precise representative of the whole society vis a vis the 
political class just because both the NOM and the people oppose to the 
political class. By lumping all political views together and by associating 
them with "the system," the NOM appears to be anti-systemic and claims to 
correct the errors of the system for the benefit of people. But whether the 
society is really as homogenous 1 religious as the NOM reads is an important 
question that has been not been answered by the NOM. The fact that there is 
a cleavage between the Westernizing state and society, and the indigenous 
NOM and the Westernizing state does not necessarily mean that the NOM is 
the exact representative of the whole society. 
As such, there is no religious dimension in the daim of the NOM that it is 
the true representative of the people. But, as it is implied above, when 
describing the civilizational framework of the NOM, the idea that the 
National Outlook is the true idea of the people is not without a religious 
foundation. It must be remembered that only the civilizations based hak are 
just civilizations. 
That the NOM is the true idea of "the people" could be seenin the way 
Erbakan differentiates the National Outlook from other political 
views/ideologies. As opposed to all other political views, the National 
altinda toplanmasidir." Necmettin Erbakan, Turldyenin Meseleleri ve 
Cozumleri (Ankara, np. 1991) 15, 7, emphasis added. 
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Outlook differs from other political views in being hak, while all other 
political views are batil. In referring to the National Outlook one could have 
used dogru (right) instead of hak, but, Erbakan claimed that, it would not be 
the same thing, because rightness/ correctness of something when it is dogru 
is temporal and relative whereas hakimplies something true/right under all 
circumstances and conditions, which actually is absolute right. Bati] is the 
exact opposite of hak, because something batİLaccording to Erbakan, is not 
just wrong but an absolute wrong. Erbakan maintained that, "what we say is 
correct/right under all conditions. What these (other parties) have done and 
their consequences are obvious, so is their absolute falseness." 58 Hence, the 
National Outlook is absolutely the right "ideology" of people and as 
variations of batiLother "imitating" parties belong to the Western club and 
deserve to be destroyed. As such the National Outlook indicates the basic 
principles that have to be followed everytime and that are not subject to 
revision. The National Outlook has a mathematical (unerring) accuracy and 
certainty. 
As such, like the Kemalist elite, the elite of the NOM, too, assumes that the 
question of comman good of the society is not a matter of political 
deliberation. It is an objective phenomenon known by the cadres of the 
NOM and will be taught to people. Hence, the National Outlook is the 
58 Ina television interview with Kanal6 on 7.1.1996. See also Erbakan ve 
Turkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri/ 124, 180. See also Erbakan, Adil Ekonomik 
Duzen 14-16. 
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collective idea of the whole society and the NOM is in complete harmony 
with society. Other political views are only the obstacles to the people's 
realization of their own true idea. As such, the supporters of other parties 
are at best "falsely conscious" people, waiting to be enlightened with their 
own true idea, the National Outlook. Since they are falsely conscious, their 
different political choices (other than that of the NOM) do not deserve any 
respect. But, if they insist on not supporting the National Outlook, they 
could also be the (internal) enemies to be destroyed. In both case, there is no 
need for the NOM to seek a cansensus with other groups when ruling. 
Politics, in this context, is not about accommodation of diverse interests 
prevailing in society. Indeed, like Kemalism, the NOM denies that there are 
conflicts of interests/identities in society. Just Order, it is claimed, is not an 
order of conflict but of harmony. The underlying republican assumption is 
society is united araund the National Outlook as its common good. Indeed 
the political aim is to homogenize people along the lines of the National 
Outlook so as to unite them. Since the republican canception of politics is 
about the discovery of the collective idea/ common good of the society and 
since Kemalism as a variety of republicanism conceived politics as a process 
of discovering the collective idea of the whole society and considered 
politics as a divisive activity, for it would involve questionings of the 
already discovered collective idea, thenit could be suggested that the NOM 
is not very different from Kemalism in its approach to politics. This is 
because, for the NOM, too, the collective idea of society is already 
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discovered. Therefore, politics is not a process of discoveringit, but perhaps 
a process of realizing and reproducing it smoothly. Politics is about 
drawing/ gaining the support of people to the cause of the NOM and to the 
National Outlook as the fundamental idea of people by 
influencing/impressing people.59 Therefore, the NOM aims first to teach 
people what is true and right inaccordance with the divine commandments, 
and thenit aims to implement/ realize the truth by gaining the support of 
people, i.e. by making people aspiring to these goals.60 The definition of 
politics, therefore, is centred araund consciousness-raising, persuasion and 
mobilization of people for the purposes of the realization of a pre-defined 
canception of good. Participation is only participation to this comman good, 
but not in i ts deliberation. As such, the legitimate sphere of politics 
"granted" by the NOM is as much restricted as the legitimate sp here of 
politics under Kemalism. This in effect is reduction of politics to proper 
administration. But, reduction of politics is not the same thing with being 
pre-political or apolitical. The NOM has high expectations of politics: it 
believes that society could be rescued through politics which isa means of 
transfiguring life. In order to transfigure life, the NOM does not need a new 
institutional set up for there is an already-existing institutional set up 
designed to promote a certain life style. Gaining the control of it will suffice. 
59 Riza Ulucak, Hürriyet/ 31.10.1997 "siyaset insanlar üzerinde etki yaparak 
kendi görüsüne çekmektir" 
60 Ahmet Akgül, "Seviyeli Siyaset" Milli Gazete, 25.6.1997. 
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3.5. Islamism as Counter-Kemalism: Islamist Jacobinism 
If one of the implications of the National Outlook as the true idea of people 
is the restriction of state by removing the question of comman good from the 
political arena, anather one is the ideological-educational state protecting 
and promoting the already-given comman good, which in this case is the 
National Outlook. This is because, instead of taking the current society asa 
given and conducting politics in accordance, the NOM takes its ideology, the 
National Outlook, as the absolute truth and aims to mould society so as to 
return to its own roots. The NOM sees itself asa corrective force to recover 
the lost unity, identity and community. The NOM isa vanguard mavement 
for making people conscious (Muslims). Asa corollary, it conceives the 
current differentiated society based on false consciousness. Like the Kemalist 
elite, the cadres of the NOM, too, assumes that ordinary people do not know 
what is good for them. 
By not taking the society as a given, not unlike Kemalism, the NOM opens a 
battle against the prevailing society in the name of a "cultural unification of 
the state and society," which is actually the cultural homogenization of 
society. The NOM thereby reproduces the Kemalist maxim it constantly 
criticizes: "for the people despite people." lt is for this reason that Islamism 
could be considered as counter-Kemalism. It resemblance to Kemalism arises 
from its cultural design through a social engineering process, it is counter 
because the deemed culture is different. The NOM's Islamİst challenge to 
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Kemalist Westernization, in effect, turns out to be a challenge to the 
prevailing (differentiated) society by reproducing the same political logic 
with that of Kemalism. Hence, in order to correct the errors of Kemalism, the 
NOM repeats them. It was perhaps for this reason that surveys showed that 
a significant portion of society was firmly against the WP, even when it was 
the largest party.61 
Hence, the NOM intends to construct an alternative society through a social 
engineering process carried out by an ideologkal state. The society to-be 
constructed is an alternative pious Muslim society in accordance with the 
Just Order. Thus, the Constitution which s tipulates that" organization of 
state could not rest on religion" is considered to be too rigid, because it 
forbids the economically and socially useful Islamic principles.62 Rejecting 
the use of such useful (iyi ve gıızel) principles of Islam is an act hostile to 
religion, not even to be considered as an act of atheism.63 Islam, therefore, 
will be used for the purposes of maintaining the community against such 
61 Riza Guneri cited in Nazli Ilicak, "Fazilet Yeniden Sekilleniyor" Aksam/ 
18.3.1998 "Kamuoyu arastirmalarinda RP en buyuk parti cikiyordu. Ama bu 
partiyi hic İstemeyenlerin sayisi cok yuksekti." 
62 Suleyman Arif Emre, "Nefrete Dayali Politika" MHli Gazete, 20.5.1995, 
Zeki U nal" Anayasal Hokkabazlik" Mİllİ Gazete 21.6.1995, Refah Partisi mn 
Bııyıık Zaferi: Prof Dr. Necemettin Erbakan m Basİn Toplantisi, 26.12.1995, 
(np., 1995) 41-42. It must be noted here that this criticism of the Constitution 
is accompanied by a praising of it as well. In this case, constitution is 
"perfect" but it is in the wrong hands. 
63 See Interview with Erbakan by Nilgun Cerrahoglu, Milliyet 31.12.1996. 
See also Erbakan in Milli Gazete, 13.6.1995. 
263 
divisive forces as the Left and Kurdish nationalism, for the establishment of 
"just (economic) order" to realize material progress and for a fully 
independent foreign policy. 
This does not necessarily mean areturn to the sharia rule, but the promotion 
of a model man and society so as to achieve the cultural/moral regeneration 
on Islamic grounds which is needed for material development. In this 
respect, Erbakan' s daim that state/society will be run according to 
principles of science (İiim), rationality and democracy64 actually means that 
these three principles will be defined in accordance with the ideology of the 
state. Hence, for example, if the consumption of alcohol will be banned, it 
will be barmed on the basis of scientific-rationality not on the basis of the fact 
that Islam prohibits its production, trade and consumption. The line of 
reasoning is as follows: alcohol is harmful for health, therefore its 
consumption should be banned for the well-being of people.65 In addition, an 
Islamizatian programme to make people pious can also be rational once the 
ideology of the state is the National Outlook. In this case, religious education 
is rational, or more accurately functional for a stable/peaceful society, 
because it is assumed that pious people do not commit erime for they fear 
the punishment of Allah.66 Ina similar way, the solution for Kurdish and/ or 
64 Ina press conference heldon 5.1.1996. 
65 See for example, the statement of the WP's mayor of Konya HalilUrunin 
Radikal, 23.4.1997. 
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Leftist terrorism is educating people Islamically. In this context, if modernity 
is about various functionalisations of religion, then the NOM surely belongs 
to the practice of modernity, but whether this makes it a democratic 
mavement is another question, because such an ideological state will also 
divide the society into those who subscribing to its ideology and those who 
do not. Hence, it would be possible for the state to prevent those people who 
lack the fear of Allah from getting rich.67 As society is united along a certain 
axis, at the same time, it will also be divided along the same axis. 
In this context, the NOM's demand that secularism should be practiced in 
Turkey as it is practiced in the West requires a critical examination. In 
reality, the NOM opposed both the principle and the current Turkish 
practice of secularism. Depending on the circumstances, either the 
inadequacy of the principle of secularism or the hypocrisy of the current 
practice of secularism is emphasized. In both cases, the image of society asa 
Muslim community and the primacy of the community over individual 
rights and liberties is reproduced. 
For the NOM, human rights and particularly the freedom of belief and 
conscience includes freedom to express and diffuse the belief/religion; 
freedom to tea ch and le arn the belief 1 religion; freedom to be organized; and 
freedom to live inaccordance with the requirements of one' s own belief. 
66 Oguzhan Asilturk, Milliyet 1.11.1996. 
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Therefore, a (secular) state that respects human rights should heed the 
beliefs of its citizens when enacting laws. In this respect, not just the 
Republican state but all secular-modern states violates the human rights, 
because the principle of secularism means that the state should rule without 
taking into account the beliefs of its citizens.68 As opposed to this secular 
system, Just Orderisan orderthat recognizes the human rights of all, is 
truly pluralist, and respectful of the tradition and customs of "the people." 
In the Just Order of the NOM, there is true freedam of conscience and belief. 
This is because the Just Order allows everyone to live in accordance with the 
requirements of his/her own belief through a multi-legal system which 
allows citizens to choose the legal system they want to live in. Just Order 
allows different religious groups to be governed by their own religious 
principles.69 However, whether this multi-legal system is really a means to 
67 Mehmet Sevket Eygi, Mılli Gazete, 17.7.1998. 
68 Bahri Zengin, "Turkiye Bir Din Develeti Mi?" Aksam/ 30.10.1994 for 
example argues that all current political systems are in reality theocratic 
systemsistates because they impose a system/lifestyle against the will of 
individual. 
69 See Refah Partisinin Anayasa Degisıkligi Uzlasma Teklifi, (nd, np), 4. See 
Oguzhan Asilturk's speech in Hak-Is' s Constitution Congressheldin 
National Library Conference Hall on 27-29.2.1992. Hak-Is Anayasa 
Kurultayi(Hak-Is Egitim Yayinlari, No. 15, 1992), 200-212. Originally 
introduced by Islamist intellectual Ali Bulac, the multi-legal system is 
modelled upon the Medina Document which is a document displaying the 
agreement made between the Prophet Muhammad and Jews, Christians and 
the pagans of Medina. The document, apparently, allows each party to live 
in accordance with their own religion. Bahri Zengin was influential in the 
integration of the multi-legal system into the discourse of the WP. See his 
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further freedom of conscience and belief is an important question that has to 
be answered. 
3.6. Secularism, Democracy and the State in "the Just Order" 
While it asserts the right of individuals to live inaccordance with their own 
belief, the NOM does not say anything about the freedam of individual to 
have discretion over the requirements of his/her religion. In other words, if 
secularism is also about the plurality of the interpretations of a religion, 
multi-legal system does not say much about this. It only recognizes one' s 
right to choose his/her religion, but once chosen, one has to live in 
accordance with it. What if one does not fancy practicing Islam, but stili 
wants to be called a Muslim? It only seems liberal to argue that those who 
believe will practice and those who do not will not. Elsewhere, it was also 
argued that multi-legal system is actually a kind of "end of politics."70 
Dividing the society into islands of life-styles without a common public 
sphere between the islands is not prone to pluralism but multiplicity, in 
which a common thread that runs through different life-styles is missing, 
Ozgurleserek Birlikte Yasamak: Hukuk Topluluklarİ Birligi (Istanbul: 
Birlesik Y ayincilik, 1995). 
70 See my "Cok Hukuklu Toplum: Kamusal Alana Veda Mi? Otantik Bir 
Kimlik Politikasi Mi? In Kuresellesme/ Sivil Toplum ve Islam/ eds. E. Fuat 
Keyman and Ali Yasar Saribay (Ankara: Vadi Yayinlari, 1997), 226-253. 
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because public realm is the realm where moments of commonality between 
different interests and identities could be discovered. 
The multi-legal system has actually been an instrument for the NOM to 
oppose the current practice of secularism in Turkey, which is called "the old 
Republican Peoples Party-mentality." The current practice of secularism is 
claimed to violate the freedom of belief. According to Erbakan, a definition 
of secularism that "imprisons" Islam to conscience is precisely how (George) 
Bush, (Ronald) Reagan and (Itzak) Shamir wants to see Islam.71 The aim -by 
imprisoning Islam to the conscience of people, by removing all the useful 
injunctions of Islam that would bring peace, justice and happiness in social 
life- is to remake Islam. In reality, it is suggested, Islam covers all aspects of 
life and should be practiced as such. Therefore, while the Republic 
recognized that Turkish society is 99 percent Muslim, it did not fulfill the 
requirements of this recognition. Asa corollary, people do not know what 
being a Muslim entails.72 Current practice of secularism, therefore, aims to 
change and prohibit Islam. In other words, current practice of secularism is 
actually a practice of hostility to Islam and this is contrary to the principle of 
secularism.73 
71 Erbakan ve Turkiyenin Temel Meselelerı~ 146. 
72 Halk ben Muslumanim diyor ama o nedir bilmiyor. 
73 Refah Partisinin Anayasa Degisikligi Uzlasma Teklifi, 9-10, and Erbakan 
ve Turkiyenin Temel Meseleleri, 215. 
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Given the fact that secularism in Turkey has never been practiced ina way 
emphasizing the freedam of individualbelief and pluralityof interpretations 
of religion, the current practice of secularism could be subject to criticism 
from a pluralist democratic perspective. Indeed, informed by a 
communitarian logic, the practice of secularism was a means to promote a 
particular life-style through an official interpretation of religion. Turkish 
secularism never denied Islam as part of a Turkish identity. It barred the 
Islamic identity /visibility from the public sphere to keep the religion where 
it belongs, i.e. private sphere, so that religion would not be tainted by 
politics. When, in the 1980s, "radical" secularism was left behind anda 
limited amount of Islam was integrated to the Kemalist ideology of the state, 
it w as to maintain the society as "community of believers" and thereby to 
relegate the conflicts of opposing interests and ideologies to a secondary 
place. What counted was unity around religious/moral values that was 
promoted by the s ta te in a controlled manner ?4 
Whether the NOM criticizes the Republican practice of secularism from a 
pluralist-democratic perspective is an important question that could not be 
74 For an excellent discussion of the communitarian logic of Kemalism see 
Faruk Birtek and Binnaz Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal 
Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazards of 
Rewriting Modernity" Praxis InternationaL 13, 2 (July, 1993): 192-212. See 
Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State 
Interaction in Republican Turkey" International journal of Middle East 
Studies/ 28, (1996), 231-251,245. 
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answered without referring to the movements concept of democracy. In 
other words, the NOM's "real secularism" is linked to its concept of 
democracy. The Kemalist communitarian logic is apparent here as well. 
Indeed, the mavement justifies its non-democratic and non-pluralist 
canception of secularism through a communitarian logic and through a 
canception of democracy as participation and rule by virtuous people. 
The NOM asserts the primacy of community over individual rights and 
liberties and asserts that community has right to take the necessary 
precautions for the protection of moral/religious order of society.75 This is 
because, the NOM sees religious morality, piousness, or more accurately, 
virtue as indispensable for a stable social order. Indeed, as noted above, the 
decline of Ottoman Empire was linked to its moral degeneration. For the 
NOM, virtue, associated with piousness, isa precondition of political liberty, 
because only virtuous people can use their political liberties to the general 
75 Oguzhan Asilturk's speech in Hak-Is' s Constitution Congressheldin 
National Library Conference Hall on 27-29.2.1992. Hak-Is Anayasa 
Kurultayi(Hak-Is Egitim Yayinlari, No. 15, 1992),209. See also Ahmet 
Kucukaga, "Devlet-Millet Kaynasmasi," Milli Gazete, 25.8.1995 which reads 
"Eger o [devlet] baba iyi babalik yapmassa, cocugunu kendine karsi saygili, 
durust, hurmetli ve ahlakli yetistirmesse, elbette o cocukta babasina karsi 
gelir. Demek ki isin espirisinde babanin cocugunu gerektigi sekilde 
yetistirmesi yatmaktadir .... devletin kendi cocuklarinin egitimini 
yapabilecegi o kadar buyuk imkanlar vardir ki, mecburi egitim, basin-yayin 
kuruluslari, her turlu haberiesme araclari devletin ya emrindedir, ya da 
resmi anlayisi empoze etmek icin sira beklesmektedir." 
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benefit of the society. Without virtuous people, democracy can lead to the 
rule by non-deserving people?6 
Hence, religious education of people is necessary to make people virtuous, 
and thus useful. Therefore, the NOM will educate the young generations as 
pious, or more accurately the National Outlookist by replacing the current 
textbooks that are based on imitating West with the ones written in 
accordance with true idea of people, the National Outlook.77 The Just Moral 
Order, for example, will function like a factory producing useful-for-society 
people by meeting with the natural/intrinsic need of men for moral 
development so that they could fulfill their duties and obligations topublic 
re alın properly .78 Denying this intrinsic need of man for moral development 
is not only impossible but also damaging (zararlı) for the society. Thus the 
state is held responsible for the "production" of pious/virtuous/useful 
people. In the meantime, the unique feature of Republican secularism, 
76 See Saribay, Turkiye'de Modernlesme, Parti ve Din Politikasİ, 100-101, 
Suleyman Arif Emre, "Ataturk'un Cizdigi Laiklik Cercevesi" Milli Gazete, 
8.2.1997 and "Derin Devlet Olayi" Milli Gazete 20.10.1998 where Emre 
argues that "Toplumu ve yonetiınİ kirlenmekten kesin olarak kurtarmak 
icin, yeni nesillerimizi saglam durust, ak parayi, kara paradan veya helali 
haramdan ayird eden, harama el uzatmayan, vatanini milletini seven, 
devletine sadik, dininin icablarini hic bir irticai harekete, hic bir istismara 
kapİlmayacak derecede iyi bilen kisiler olarak yetistirmemiz, Milli 
egitimimizi ayni zamanda Anayasada yer alan manevi gelisimimizicin de 
planlamamiz gerekmektedir." (Emphasis original). 
77 Erbakan, Turkiyenin Meseleleri ve Cozumleri, 53, 59, for the same view of 
the NOP, see Saribay, Turkiye'de Modernlesme, Parti ve Din Politikasİ, 102. 
78 Erbakan, Turkiyenin Meseleleri ve Cozumleri, 56. · 
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Directorate of Religious Affairs, which enables the state to control religion 
and promote an official interpretation of religion, will be maintained to 
promote the NOM' s own version of official Islam, which is more pious and 
has a privileged space inthepublic sphere. In effect, the challenge of the 
NOM to the current practice of secularism takes a "your Islam versus my 
Islam" colouring. 
According to the NOM, such a production/ education of "model man" is 
contrary to neither the principle of secularism nor democracy. What justifies 
such a canception of secularism is the NOM's concept of democracy. Indeed, 
the question of secularism, according to Erbakan, is related to the question of 
democracy and without democracy there is no secularism either.79 In other 
words, as opposed to the conventional wisdom in Turkey, democracy is the 
precondition of secularism, not vice versa. But when there is democracy, 
there is construction of a pious Muslim community as well. This is because, 
the NOM' s concept of democracy is based on, or more accurately restricted 
to the Republican maxim of "sovereignty belongs to people." Hence, there 
are no limits to what can "the people," or an elected government, do. If "the 
people" want the sharia laws no one can prevent it. This canception of 
democracy, which emphasizes the superiority of "national will" and which 
restricts democratic legitimacy to elections is actually in line with the general 
perception of democracy in Turkei0 and with those approaches which 
79 Erbakan ve Turkiyenm Temel Meseleleri, 109. 
272 
reduce democracy to non-violent transfer of power in accordance with the 
election results. The negligence of, for example, the rule of law and limited 
state is not a peculiarity of only the NOM. 
However, for the NOM not all popularly elected governments are legitimate 
for they do not represent the "true idea" of people. They are extensions of 
Westem colonialism and puppets of Zionist plot to rule the world. They 
prevent the people from realizing the truth of the NOM. They prolong the 
state of false consciousness. For the NOM, democracy is a means to express 
the will of the na tion and since the will of na tion is the National Outlook, 
democracy is expected to result in reproduction and revelation of the 
National Outlook. Hence, the NOM as the true representative of the people 
deserves to dominate, it does not need to seek consensus when in 
government through elections. In this way, democracy turns out to be a 
means through which state and society unification is to be reached. Indeed, 
democracy for the NOM is not a value in itself, but a means for establishing 
the "Order of Happiness" or "Order of Prosperity" (Saadet Nizamı) through 
the rule of the NOM.81 Alternatively, it is also a means of securing Turkey' s 
international reputation.82 Since other political parties are representatives of 
external forces, their election will (re)produce the "Order of Oppression." If 
80 See Umit Cizre-Sakallioglu, "Historicizing the Present and Problematizing 
the Future of the Kurdish Problem: A Critique of the TOBB Report on the 
Eastern Question" New Perspectives on Turkey, 14, (Spring, 1996): 1-22. 
81 Erbakan, Turkiyenin Temel Meseleleri ve Cozumleri 46. 
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democracy votes the NOM out, it is not really democracy but maintenance 
of an order of repression with the help of Zionists and colonialists. Majority, 
gained through elections, therefore is not a source of legitimacy if it is the 
majority of other parties. It is a source of legitimacy only for the NOM. 
In a context, in which the modern Turkish society is imagined as a pious 
Muslim community, the NOM' s solution to the Kurdish issue is the 
unification of Kurds and Turks through bond of Islam. Indeed, according to 
the NOM, the problem was created by the secular, materialist-racist policies 
of last seventy years. Hence, it is claimed that during the war of 
independence, no one talked about the composition of Turkish society asa 
mosaic because what united us was Islam.83 "The hearts of the Kurds," 
Erbakan claimed, "goes out with the Islamic world and therefore, no 
resolution could be successful without taking into account the Islamic factor. 
The resolution lies in moving towards a new and non-racist larger unity" 
which, of necessity means Islamic unity.84 Obviously such a solution 
involves, first, Islamisation of the current state so that the Kurds too can be 
attached to it. Therefore, recognition of the Kurdish identity is postponed 
un til securing unity on Islami c grounds first. W ithout securing "our" unity, 
education and broadcasting in Kurdish, that were promised by Erbakan, will 
82 Suleyman Arif Emre, Yenİ Safak/ 15.5.1997. 
83 Mj]Jj Gazete, 31.1.1997, editorial. 
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be dangerous. To secure our unity we rnust first get rid of terrorisrn which is 
created by external forces. 85 Although the Islarnic solution to Kurdish issue 
can include granting the Kurds right to broadcast and publish even educate 
in Kurdish, it will also divide the Kurds/Turks into pious and not so pious 
ones. 
84 Erbakan' s speech in the Fourth General Congress of the Welfare Party, 
10.10.1993 cited in Selarnİ Carnci, "RP ve Kurt Sorunu" YeniSafak 12-16. 
8.1996. 
85 Since the Kurdish issue, like secularisrn, was largely controlled by the 
rnilitary, the WP in governrnent had to deny that there isa Kurdish issue. 
This was actually a retreat from the speech he rnade in the fourth general 
congress in which he identified three aspects of the issue, terrorism, 
underdeveloprnent and identity. What he rneant by Kurdish issue was the 
identity aspect of it. Later on, the WP toed the line and reduced the Kurdish 
issue to an issue of underdeveloprnent and terrorisrn created by extemal 
forces. The solution to the forrner was rnore rnodernization of the Southeast 
region, and the latter was a security issue. See Burhanettin Duran, 
"Approaching the Kurdish Issue via Adil Duzen: An Islarnist Formula of the 
W elfare Party For Ethnic Coexistence" journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 
18, 1 (1998): 111-128 for a detailed review of the WP's approach to Kurdish 
issue and changes rnade in it in the course of governrnent. For Erbakan' s 
denial of the identity aspect of the issue see Fatih Cekirge, "Onemli 
Aciklarnalar", Sabah, 25.1.1997, Fikret Bila, "Hocanin Beklentisi" Milliyet, 
22.8.1996, Selahattin Onkibar, "Basbakan'dan Aciklarnalar" Turkiye, 
5.12.1995. 
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3.7 Systemic, anti-systemic or conservative? 
Whether the NOM is an anti-systemic mavement depends on what we mean 
by the system. If the system is associated with the substance/ideology that a 
political/institutional set up (state) pursues, then the NOM is an anti-
systemic mavement because i ts ideology implies "promotion" of a certain 
life style to construct a society that is different from that of Kemalism. If, on 
the other hand, the system is associated with a particular institutional set up 
of politics (state) constructed to promote alifestyle regardless of its 
contents, then we could suggest that the NOM is not anti-systemic. Indeed, 
the NOM never questions the current institutional set up of Turkish politics 
that was constructed to promote a certain life style. The mavement considers 
the republican structures as fully legitimate, including the structures that 
enables the state to control religion so as to promote a single understanding 
of Islam and that deny the differentiated nature of society. Indeed, problems, 
for example, concerning secularism, Erbakan stated once, does not spring 
from the regime but from the implementation of the principles.86 The NOM 
aims to maintain the current institutional set up so as to carry out its own 
Islamisation programme. There will, in other words, stili be an ideology of 
state inducing a new life style, a new virtuous moral community. In the Just 
Political Order, for example, the duty of military will be the protection of the 
86 15.2.1997, Sabah. 23.2.1997, Hurriyet "Türkiyede laiklik meselesi rejim 
meselesi degil, tatbikat meselesidir" for the same view of the NOP see 
Saribay, Turkiye/de Modernlesme/ Parti ve Din Politikasİ, 102. 
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country from those external threats to Just Order.87 Since, other political 
views are regarded as extensions of colonialism, the military as the guardian 
of regime will also protect the regime from these internal enemies. What will 
change with the NOM is not the structures but the "ideology" that these 
structures functions to pursue, i.e. Islamisation rather than Westernization. 
Consequently, if an Islamisation is to take place, it will take place without a 
rupture from the current institutional arrangements because what is 
problematized is the "ideology" of Westernization which is associated with 
a political class/ruling elite, but not the institutional set up of Turkish 
politics. For example, the republican concept of secularism made the state 
responsible for the delivery of the religious services so as to control religion. 
But, it also made the provision of religious services a duty of the state. 
Hence, if the ideology of National Outlook is in power, it can use the same 
mechanism and justify making the holy Friday a holiday as not an anti-
secular activity but fulfillment of a duty.88 In this way, the issues concerning 
secularism is not located within a framework of pluralism, democracy or 
Islamisa tion. It is in this respect that the NOM pragmatically undermines the 
current system by its apparent dedication to the to existing arrangements, 
but with a long term mission to change the contents of the current system. In 
87 Erbakan, Turkiyenin Meseleleri ve Cozumleri, 49. 
88 Suleyman Arif Emre, "Ataturk'un Cizdigi Laiklik Cercevesi," Milli Gazete, 
8.2.1997. It was on the basis of the daim that satisfying the religious needs of 
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this way, the substance of the communitarian political set up can be turned 
inside out. In other words, the NOM reproduces Kemalism from a different 
angle while delegitimizing the substance of it. Hence the priority given to 
the exigencies of politics, or more accurately power-seeking, should not lead 
us to conclude that ideology is omitted and accommodation is democratic, 
because, according to the National Outlook, struggle (war) against the 
enemies necessitates deceiving.89 Drawing from Gordon Smith, if working 
through institutions is a radical strategy and if canfronting the institutions is 
a revolutionary strategy, then, we could suggest that the strategy of the 
NOM is radical.9° From a different angle, the NOM could also be considered 
as conservative, for it aims to conserve the same institutional set up and the 
same type of state-society relationship. Hence, if the system is defined in 
terms of its substance, i.e. Westernization, the NOM isa "radical anti-
systemic" movement, if the system is associated with the structures that 
pursue Westernization, the NOM isa conservative systemic movement. 
people isa constitutional duty that Erbakan tried to justify construction of a 
mosque in Taksim Square, see Milliyet/ 3.2.1997. 
89 Ahmet Akgul, "Seviyeli Siyaset" and "Siyaset Sanatİnda Hile 
Mumkundur." 25.6.1997 and 7.11.1997 both in Milli Gazete. 
90 Gordon Smith, "Party and Protest: The Two Faces of Opposition in 
Western Europe" in Opposition in Western Europe/ ed. E. Kolinsky 
(London: Croom Helm, 1987), 56. 
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3.8. Monopolization and Cultivation as Microcosmos 
The above mentioned disregard for the differentiated society, its 
concomitant narrowing of the legitimate sphere of politics, 
antiparticipatoriness and elitism of the NOM could also be seenin the 
NOM's relations with other Islamic groups and with its constituency as well. 
In reality, the relations with other Islamic groups and with its own 
constituency could be considered as the nucleus/microcosmos of the NOM's 
relations with the society at large. Below, an attempt will bemade to show 
that the leading cadres of the movement, instead of providing a platform to 
build a consensus between different Islamic groupsin Turkey, try to 
homogenize and monopolize the definition of Islam and different Islamic 
concerns under its organization through a cultivation process. In the 
meantime it will become clear how the NOM remains Islamist without 
having a concrete Islamisation programme. 
W e could suggest that there is an Islamic socıalmovement in Turkey, 
developed against the secularist policies of the Republic and consisting of 
different Islamic groups. Although all of them converge on the degenerating 
consequences of Westernization, eriticize the Republican practice of 
secularism and seek Islamisation of state and society, Islamic groupsin 
Turkey are divided on what Islamisation should entail and on the methods 
of Islamisation. There are different Sufi tarikats, there are "independent" 
Islamİst intellectuals, and there are radical Islamİst groups that emphasize 
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the armed struggle for establishing an Islamic order.91 However, the only 
poHtical movement with an explicit daim to be Islamic is the National 
Outlook Movement and its parties. The NOM, therefore, is only a part of a 
broader Islamic social movement in Turkey, though it is the only politically 
organized one. It would be misleading to suggest that all Islamic groups 
approve the policies and support the parties of the NOM just because it is 
the only Islamic political option. Some of the tarikats (sufi orders), for 
example, support the center-right parties, but not the NOM. It is true that 
initially, i.e. during the foundation of the NOP and the NSP, Naksibendi 
tarikatand some Nurcus92 have been active.93 Nurcumembers resigned from 
the National Salvation Party prior to 1977 elections on the basis of the daim 
that the party ascribed Islam an instrumental role in the attainment of the 
political goals.94 Naksibendls, on the other hand, withdraw their support on 
91 See Rusen Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan: Turkiye'de Islami Olusumlar, [Verse and 
Slogan: Islamic Movements in Turkey] (Istanbul: Metis, 1990). 
92 As followers of Said-i Nursi, Nurcus could not be defined asa tarikat 
proper because they lack the sheik-dervish relationship and the customs and 
rules of good behaviour (adab-erkan) specific to that relationship. The 
Nurcus is considered asa community, jamaat, with aleader and his 
followers. The relationship between the leader and his followers is said to be 
more like teacher-student (?) relationship. 
93 Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan, 217. See also Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right" 
in Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives, eds., Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul 
A. Tonak, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 230. 
94 See Ahmet Yildiz, "The Evolution of Islamic Politics in Turkey Along the 
NSP-PP Line ... " 41. See also Ali Yasar Saribay, Postmodenıite, Sivil Toplum 
ve Islam, [Postmodernity, Civil Society and Islam] (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1994), 
67. 
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the basis of the co-optation of the party.95 Therefore, that Islamic groups 
have a collective identity and that they can act it concert, for example, in 
getting rid of corrupting effects of Westernization, should not imply 
homogenei ty. 
But, lack of homogeneity does not necessarily mean lack of attempts to 
homogenize Islamic groups either. The NOM by virtue of being the only 
political organization of Islamic mavement attempts to draw the support of 
other Islamic groups and homogenize them within its ranks. It does not tie 
itself to a particular Islamic group, rather it attempts to free the Islamic 
mavement in the political arena from other Islamic groups so as to enable its 
top cadres to take full control of its constituency. It also claims to be the only 
party whose pious cadres are truly representing Islamic values (of the 
society). If other parties have pious cadres, sametimes drawn from the ex-
members of the NOM, it is to hide their real political stance which has no 
relation with Islam by "using" pious people. Hence, those Islamic groups, 
for example, Nurcus which do not support any political enterprise that seek 
power in the name of Islam are invited to vote for those who serve the ca use 
of religion, i.e. the NOM/WP.96 In this respect, we could suggest that the 
95 See Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan 223 and 48-54 for a speech byNaksibendi Sheik 
Esad Cosan heavily criticizing the Party and its leader Erbakan. See also 
U mit Cizre-Sakallioglu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State 
Interaction in Republican Turkey," 241. 
96 See Metin Karabasoglu, "Ulkeyi Degil Ilkeyi Esas Almak" Yeni Asya/ 
30.4.1994 for a criticism of political enterprises that seek power, namely the 
NOM, because politics is based on philosophy which in turn is based on 
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NOM attempts to monopalize Islamic opposition, and the tension between 
the NOM and other Islamic groups can be explained on this basis. 
In this context, the criticism -advanced by some other Islamic groups-that 
the NOM has not been loyal to Islamic principles/morality and usesIslam 
for political purposes is less effective than it appears to be at first sight. In 
reality, what the movement tries is to gain the monopoly of definition of 
what Islamic morality /principles means here and now. In this respect, · 
Erbakan' s assertian that "those who do not blend their allegiance to me must 
look for a new religion" could be read as an attempt to homogenize and take 
the full control of the constituency as well as the broad movement.97 
Needless to say, this is actually an assertian that links Muslimness to the 
allegiance to the NOM and its parties, which is worrying not only for those 
secular sections of the society, but also for Islamic groups.98 
If the semi-official daily of the National Outlook Movement, MiJJj Gazete, 
could be considered as one of the instruments of cultivation of the 
constituency, then there are many exemplary articles revealing the 
monopolizing logic of the NOM by asserting the importance of loyalty to the 
might, whereas religion is based on hak. (Yeni Asya is a publication of a 
branch of the Nurcus). See also Ahmet Akgul, "Bediuzzaman ve Siyaset" 
Milli Gazete, 10.7.1995 for an argument that Nurcus should vote for the WP, 
which serves to the ca use of Islam. 
97 Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan, 223-224. 
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hierarchy of organization (read political party) over loyalty to sufi tarİkats 
and other Islamic organizations. Hence, while it is recognized that political 
party isa modern/Western invention, it is asserted that it is the only useful 
"weapon" to fight against the enemies. It is claimed that those religious 
groups who say that there is no place for a political party in Islamic struggle 
are traitors anda political party, in reality, is the most useful"weapon" to 
fight against the enemies. Therefore, those who want to practice their 
religion must gather together within the ranks of the W elfare Party.99 
Moreover, those who serve the National Outlook will not only strengthen 
the mission (dava) but also will have the privilege of saying "I have served 
for the National Outlook" in the hereafter. 100 Voting is deseribed asa 
religious responsibility, and Muslims are not expected to waste their votes 
by voting for "the other" parties because each community will enter the 
presence of Allah behind the le ader it has followed. 101 Conscious Muslims 
are those who voted for the parties of the NOM. Belief (inanc) is something 
to be practiced in the life of the community and this could only be achieved 
by those who have a sense of organization. Otherwise, as disorganized 
believers they would remain impartial on the issues of practicing their belief 
98 For a critique of the NOM depiction of the elections as a "census of 
Muslims" see Kazim Gulecyuz, "RP ve Din" Yeni Asya/ 9.6.1995. 
99 Nevzat Ozpelitoglu, "Onurlu Mucadele Kok Saldi" Milli Gazete/ 16.5.1995. 
100 Zeki Ceyhan, "Milli Gorus Heyecani" Milli Gazete/ 13.11.1995. 
101 Mehmet Talu, "Musluman Liderini Iyi Secmelisin" Milli Gazete, 
19.11.1994. 
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when their partiality is required by their belief.102 In this way, 
working/voting for the party is associated with religious prayer. The first 
duty of the conscious Muslims (read those who subscribe National Outlook 
Movement) is to warn their unconscious Muslim brothers rather than non-
Muslims and to inject them "the real Islam" rather than the traditional one.103 
Accordingly, although it is not written in the ilmihalbooks (books teaching 
the elements of religion), Allah likes communal rather than individual 
prayers. Therefore, conscious Muslims are those who are aware of their 
political duties and those who are indifferent have no right to complain 
about the current state of society. 104 
One of the logical aims of cultivating an Islamİst constituency freed from ties 
to other Islamic group s is unconditionalloyalty to the "organization" which 
is depicted as an educational institution and which represents the absolute 
truth. Hence, it is taught whatever one' s rank within the organization is, one 
has to respect the organİzahonal hierarchy because otherwise there will be 
pluralism that would destroy the unity, and endanger and damage the 
future mission of the movement_l05 The constituency of the movement are, 
102 Nedim Diyemli, "Teskilatci I" and "Teskilatci II" Milli Gazete, 3-4. 
10.1995. 
103 Fethi Kozan, "Islam Davetcileri" Milli Gazete/ 21.10.1994. 
104 Ahmet Kucukaga, "Sahihlerin Tembelligi Fasikiarİn Iktidarini Hazirlar," 
Milli Gazete, 15.9.1995. 
105 See Ihsan Kilic, "Siyasette Teskilatlarİn Onemi" Milli Gazete, 12.10.1995. 
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therefore, not only supporters but also believers in the movement and/ or 
army. 106 Indeed, Erbakan claimed that the WP isa community ofbelievers in 
the revitalization of J/Great Turkey", but not an interest-based association. 
Therefore it has not members but believers.107 Participation, in this context, is 
an end itself. Participation only means the expression of the (Islamic) 
identity of the partidpant which is equated with subscribing to the NOM. 
In the meantime, no role/function is attributed to the 
participants/ constituency in policy making, let alone, getting the elected 
delegates represented in the party's administration.108 Any criticism of the 
leading elite is depicted as betrayal and those who eriticize are humiliated as 
uphysically long, mentally short" or "enemies in friend's clothes."109 The 
NOM relies on the sentiments of people to mobilize them for its own cause, 
rather than their intellectual/ rational capacities. One implication is the 
unresponsive, indifferent leadership oligarchy and a type of relationship 
106 Riza Ulucak, 3.9.1996, Sabah see also Recep Tayyip Erdogan cited in 
Serdar Sen Refah Partisinin Teori ve Pratigi: Refah Partisi Adil Duzen ve 
Kapitalizm [Theory and Practice of W elfare Party: W elfare Party, Just Order 
and Capitalism] (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayinevi, 1995), 84. As illustrated by 
uhere is the army, here is the commander" (iste ordu/ iste komutan). 
107 Yeni Safak, 22.9.1996. 
108 Riza Ulucak, Hurriyet__ 10.9.1996. elections isa legal necessity and if the 
results put the headquarters under stress, we would not let it happen. 
109 See Oral Calislar, Refah Partisi: Nereden Nereye [W elfare Party: From 
Where to Where] (Istanbul: Pencere Yayinlari, 1995), 89-90 where a portrayal 
of Abdurrahman Dilipak as boyu uzun akli kisa is cited. See also Zeki 
Ceyhan, "Dost Kilikli Dusmanlar" Milli Gazete, 22.10.1996. 
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with the constituency in which the constituency has no sphere of discretion 
but is an object of control, manipulation, mobilization. The sphere of control 
includes the NOM' s members of parliament as well who are expected to 
submit the texts of their speeches to the headquarters before reading them in 
the parliament.110 If democracy is about an attitude that insures that people 
are well informed to make intelligent decisions, then, the NOM is not a 
democratic movement. 
As Hakan Yavuz pointed out, Islamic identity isa mobilizational tool in the 
hands of party leadership and the newcomers are expected to accept the 
form of the party which also acts as a school to mould and shape 
individuals.111 In such a context, one of the underlying reasons for the sufi 
ord er' s support of the centre-rigbt parties could be the fa ct that they can 
assert their distinct identity without the risk of assimilation only under 
center-rigbt parties.112 This is not to say that the party manipulates the 
religious feelings of people to achieve purely secular ends,113 otherwise we 
might neglect the fact that there isa genuine Islamic mavement in Turkey. 
110 Sabah 1.4.1996. Also, for example, Oguzhan Asilturk asserted that all 
MP' s should be disciplined and kept un der control, and on certain delicate 
subjects only the authorized people should make statements. Hurriyet, 
6.10.1996. See also Suleyman Arif Emre, "Cok Imamli Namaz Olmaz" Milli 
Gazete, 17.11.1996. 
111 Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the W elfare (Refah) Party in Turkey" 
Comparali ve Politics/ 30, 1, (October, 1997): 63-82, 75. 
112 Yildiz, "The Evolution of Islamic Politics in Turkey ... ", 44. 
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The expresses the grievances and represent the claims of Islamic identity in 
Turkey. What is pointed here is the type of relationship between the Islamic 
social movement and the NOM as illustrative of the party's relations with 
the society at large. 
Contents of Islamisation will be defined by a privileged leading cadre with 
no participation of the Islamİst constituency of the NOM.114 This 
understanding of participation the NOM shares with Kemalism. This is 
because, although different interpretations of Kemalism is possible, what 
Kemalism means here and now is a privileged position of the self-appointed 
guardians of the regime over the elected politicians.115 
113 Cf. Turker Alkan, "The NSP in Turkey", 98. 
114 The circumscription of participation is justified on the basis of Islamic 
political principles. If the Islamic principle of sh ura is the equivalent of 
democratic participation in policy making, then those who are asking for the 
functionalization of it, Ahmet Akgul maintains, are actually divisive traitors. 
The leader is not obliged to consult all issues with the religious leaders (read 
sheiks of tarikatsor Islamİst intellectuals). He also has the right to choose his 
own consultants. And, those sheiks/people who think that they could lead 
the army of jihad and the cadres of state just because they could run a 
Dervish Convent (tekke) or publish a journal are mistaken, because fighting 
against the Zionist in many frontiers is not the same thing as delivering 
emotional speeches in the mosques or writing articles for a journal. Hence, 
everyone should serve/remain within his rank and participate in the 
realization of the cause as defined by the leading cadres. See Ahmet Akgul, 
Dunyanin Degisimi ve Erbakan Devrimi [Change of World and Erbakan-
Revolution] (Istanbul: Dogus Yayinlari, 1995), 95-100. 
115 Even after the failure of the WP in government those within WP who 
suggest that a restructuring is needed are depicted as extensions of the 
Pentagon-Zionism. Milli Gazete, 2.7.1998. 
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The monopolization of the right to define what Islamisation should entail 
could be explained on the basis of defending an Islamisation project in a 
cantext where there are restrictions on ordering the state on the basis of 
religion. It is true that the NOM has to be cautious to prolong the existence 
of its partiesin the presence of legal prohibitions. In this case, Oguzhan 
Asilturk's explanation that the NOM's ideas are applied ina controlled 
manner because it is under the spot light of the regime might well be true.116 
But, the tight control of the constituency and monopolization of mission by 
the leading cadres, as the above discussion suggests, cannot solely be 
explained in terms of legal necessities, because the dominant political mind 
in the NOM conceives the relation between ruled and ruler as the 
relationship between knowledgeable and ignorant. Hence, one of the well-
known policy makers of the party, Abdullah Gul, could boldly state that the 
mavement in government does not really represent the pledges they made 
to electorate.117 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it could be suggested that, the NOM 
has two aspects, personalistic/pragmatic and ideologkaL The former aspect 
gives rise to a political mission for acquiring power while the latter implies a 
sociological mission of uniting state and society through a social engineering 
116 Interview with Oguzhan Asilturk by Mehmet Ali Birand for 32. Gun news 
program on Show TV television channel, 3.2.1997: bizim fikirlerimizde bir 
yanlislik yok. .. ama okuzun altinda buzagi aranilan bir yerde bunlar 
dikkatlice dile getirilmeli. 
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project. The NOM educates its constituency with the sociological mission 
which implies a social engineering process to achieve a cultural-turn. But the 
NOM wants its constituency to be dedicated to the organizahanal hierarchy 
not to the mission of cultural turn/ unification and expects i ts constituency to 
believe that the leading cadres of mavement stands for this mission. 
Monopolization of the mission via cultivation of an unconditionally loyal 
constituency allows a large sphere of flexibility to the leading cadres of the 
NOM. Consequently, it becomes unclear if the mavement is united araund 
the mission of Islamisation of society or araund a certain group of pious 
people daiming to Islamize society 1 s ta te if opportunity is given. How could 
such a party that stands for an alternative social engineering without 
offering an ideology and while disregarding its constituency increase its 
eleetaral fortunes in the 1990s? 
117 Yeni YuzyiL 21.2.1997. 
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4. ACCOUNTING FOR THE RISE OF THE WELFARE P ARTY 
A number of factors arelistedas causing the rise ofIslamismin Turkey: the 
erosion of center right parties, failures of the Turkish modemization after 
1980, increasing economic disparities, internal immigration to cities, 
saftening of the secular state's approach to Islam, identity crisis, increasing 
legitimacy of the Islamic identity and Islamic modernization as a result of 
postmodern critiques of modernity and globalization. These accounts were 
critically reviewed in the first chapter. While accepting the role played by 
these factors on the rise ofIslamismin Turkey, this study tries to approach 
the issue from a different perspective. What count as the reasons behind the 
rise of the NOM are usually the issues acidressed by the NOM, but it would 
be misleading to explain the rise of Islamism in Turkey on the basis of the 
increasing economic disparities, identity crisis, failures of development. This 
is because the economic and social/ sociological variables do not determine 
the political outcomes but provide the raw material of politics. lt is up to 
political actors to take the pressing issues up or problematize certain facts. 
Therefore, the proper sphere of focus should be the political sphere where 
issues are diagnosed, expressed, and policies are developed to solve them. 
In this respect, there seems to be two main reasons for the rise of Islamism in 
Turkey. First concerns the NOM itself, and the second concerns the other 
political actors in the political sphere. With regards to the NOM's own 
contribution to its success, it could be suggested that the Fourth General 
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Congress hel d in 1993 is a crucial turning po int in the rise of the WP. After 
the fourth Congress the WP was the most-close-to-society party. In this 
Congress, the party's will to catch-all was publicized and efforts to change 
the traditional image of the NOM was started. The W elfare Party, since then, 
tried to assure that it is not an authoritarian party of religious fanatics that 
would suppress the freedoms and bring an Iranian type regime when in 
power and that it is not against secularism, democracy and liberal economic 
system. It also tried to make it clear that the military would not interfere and 
the West would not put an economic blackade if the WP governs.118 These 
were meant to assure the people that the WP isa mainstream party able to 
govern better than any other party. The election campaigns of the party 
emphasized the scandals of corruption, softened the discourse of anti-
Westernism and emphasized the failures of the previous governments. 
For the following elections a pragmatic electoral campaign addressing the 
immediate issues were carried outinaccordance with this image-making. In 
a booklet published by the Party, entitled "General Strategies to be Followed 
during and after Elections," it was asserted that although election strategies 
are expected to emphasize long-term goals by addressing the contemporary 
political and social issues, short-term and regional strategies could be 
developed as well.119 The booklet wanted the party activists to refrain from 
118 See Cakir, Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi/ 195-196. 
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abstract issues that do not relate to daily lives of people. Hence, only the 
ongoing dornestic and international problerns were to be taken up. In line 
with the above rnentioned differentiation of the NOM from other political 
views, the activists were asked to ernphasize the wrongness of the 
mentalihes of the other parties in political debates rather than identifying 
certain partiesi candidates. Also in line with the hegernonic concepts of the 
time, privatization and decentralization to local governrnents were to be 
defended by arguing that any reduction in the size of the state was increase 
in the freedoru of the individual. 
In big cities of Ankara and Istanbul, the WP tried to rnake it clear that it was 
not the party of only those who wear beard and headscarf. The activist of the 
party were urged to ernphasize human rights issues and refrain from 
adapting a discourse which would seern reactionary. The headscarf issue 
was to be taken up as an issue of the liberty to dress. The candidates were 
asked to be all-ernbracing and, when needed, informaL In the southeast, the 
Republic was to be repudiated as racist/ ethnicist and the therne of Islarnic 
brotherhood (Islami kardeslik) during Ottornan Ernpire was to be 
ernphasized. Cultural identity of the Kurds were to be respected. The 
grievances of those who were oppressed for reasons of security and the 
underdeveloprnent of the regionasa result of the wrong policies of the state 
were to be ernphasized. And the candidates were asked to develop close 
119 Secimde ve Secim Sonrasinda Izlenecek Genel Stratejiler'94 (Refah Partisi 
Tanitma Baskanligi, nd). This and the following paragraph draws from this 
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relations with such figures as aghas, sheiks and hodjas, who have the ability 
to influence/mobilize people. 
Organizational penetration of the WP into society also played a significant 
role in its image-making and rise. Because of the unavailability of the mass 
media for the WP, the party developed face-to-face relations of trust with the 
electorate. Yet, lack of access to mass media did not prevent the party to 
realize its goal of catching votes from different segments of the popula tion. 
Indeed, the party tried to catch all by plunging into a face-to-face 
relation/ campaign of "persuasion" of the people evenin pubs, brothels, 
discotheques. Activists of the party could participate in funerals and 
weddings, they could provide financial help for the physically handicapped 
and organize distribution of material benefits mostly in kind during the 
month of Ramadan.120 
The party appoints a representative for each neighbourhood, who in tum 
appoints street representatives to collect information about the profile of the 
inhabitants of each street. Street representatives report to neighbourhood 
representatives, who in turn report to city or town representatives. Every 
month the city committee meets and all appointed activists at the 
booklet. 
120 See Gazete Pazar/ 2.11.1997 for a description of the organizational 
structure by Bahri Zengin. See also, Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare 
(Refah) Party in Turkey", 76-78, and Jenny B. White, "Islam and Democracy: 
The Turkish Experience" Current Histor~ (January 1995): 7-12, 11-12. 
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neighbourhood and street level participate in this meeting. Also every 
month, city representatives and inspectors, members of parliament and 
related people from the headquarters meet in Ankara. In this way, everyone 
has a task to do and there isa non-stop activity, which keeps the 
constituency dynamic and ready for elections at any time. But also, in this 
way, the constituency activists of the party are educated and kept under the 
close supervision of the headquarters. As noted above, activists of the party 
are not actively participating in the policy-making, but vigorously 
"transmitting" the eternal massage of the NOM, which is that the cadres of 
the NOM represent the absolute truth. 
Closeness to the electorate, expressian of the prevailing issues, and non-stop 
campaigning certainly contributed to the rise of the WP. Yet, the WP, while 
expressing these issues, did not have a comprehensive and consistent policy 
alternative, but presented themselves as the solu tion. The crux of the NOM' s 
alternative was, as noted above, that they themselves were the better 
administrators but not their ideas that would alter the basis of the 
administration. The Just Order of the WP was appealing but it was also 
loose. The Just Order discourse enabled the party to appear "out of range," 
or perhaps anti-systemic ata time when the system was increasingly 
delegi timized. 
The system was being delegitimized most importantly because politics as an 
activity that generates legitimation was restricted. This is so, for two reasons. 
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The first is the Kemalist structuration of politics. As noted above, by 
removing certain key issues from the legitimate sphere of politics, Kemalism 
set the boundaries of rational politics. And, all parties are expected to 
remain within the limits set by the "state" if they are to remain mainstream. 
Hence, the center-parties have deprived themselves of the initiative to take 
real issues up and thereby reproduced their "centrist" position. This 
hindered to possibilities of creating a dynamic cansensus which would have 
prevented the eroding of the center. The real issues were taken up by the 
WP, and otherpartiesin their competition associated the WP only with anti-
Westernism. They thereby neglected the real issues that were taken up by 
the WP and restricted their strategy to a defense of Westernization. 
Secondly, in the 1980s Westernization took aneo-liberal colouring and neo-
modernization meant neo-liberalism. The overwhelming cansensus of the 
mainstream parties on neo-liberalism was also an additional factor in the 
erosion of the center. Hence, for example, it has become a common stand for 
most centrist parties to take pride in the excess of foreign exchange reserves, 
while remaining silent on the issue of many people living below the poverty 
level. In this context, a mere expressian of this social reality and the promise 
of heeding the basic needs of the people has become effective, even if it is 
informed more by an Islamic charity-mentality than an ideologkal policy 
alternative. This is because, politics was reduced to administration by both 
Kemalist structuration and by overwhelming cansensus on neo-liberalism. If 
political competition is not over "what" should be done but "who" should 
do and if other parties are identifying the pressing issues as non-issues by 
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taking the policies-applied for granted, a mere expressian of issues could be 
effective in increasing the eleetaral fortunes. 
296 .. 
CONCLUSION 
Into the hopeless Orientalist picture, which portrays Islamic culture asa 
"defensive" "preindustrial" culture, the modernization paradigm injects a 
hope that, "despite Islam," Muslim societies can be modernized. However, it 
does so without altering the Orientalist portrayal of Islam. The question of 
modernization is stili a question of appropriate culture and Islam is not 
appropriate for modernization. Hence, Muslim societies can be modernized 
only if Islam is tamed and replaced with rational-scientific Western culture. 
Therefore, secularization, as a precondition of modernization, does imply 
not a process, but rather policies to push Islam into the private sphere so as 
to enlarge the sphere of rationality. One reason for the politicization of Islam 
is not Islam itself, but secularization policies. 
Throughout this study the aim has been to introduce an alternative 
framework that would enable us to study Islamism on "political" grounds. 
This is because existing explanatory frameworks for Islamism are based 
either on an essentialist conceptualization of Islam/Muslim society or on the 
modernization paradigm. Both of these accounts are informed by a 
culturally and politically essentialist conceptualization of Islam. These 
approaches are based on the fundamental assumption that Islamisa religion 
to be curbed, submerged and, if possible, reformed by the modernizing 
states. Culturally, Islam is regarded asa religion that resists modernization 
and progress, and that it should therefore be made publicly invisible. 
Politically, in this perspective, Islam is a political religion that unites religion 
and politics because of the principle of tevhİci by which Islam covers all 
aspects of life, including politics. Therefore, it is not only an 
"unsecularizable" religion but also a permanent potential political rival to 
secular modernizing regimes. Thus, if modernization and secularization are 
to be achieved, it could be achieved only by subjugating Islam. 
Within this perspective, the relationship between Islam and 
politics/modernization is considered in zero-sum terms. Consequently, the 
political option available to a Muslim society is that eHherthe modernizing 
regime controls religion, which in our case corresponds to the Republican 
regime which is built on Kemalism, or Islam that resurges/revives asa 
consequence of the failures of modernization. Here, an Islamic revival or 
Islamic resurgence are the terms employed for referring to Islamism. This 
either 1 or logic arises from the assumption that modernization in Muslim 
societies is, among other things, about the submergence of Islam. Failures of 
modernization are deduced by the "resurgence" of Islamism, which is often 
portrayed as the reassertion of society vİs a vİs the culturally alien(ated) 
state. By implication, the success in modernization is measured by the 
political insignificance of Islamism in the public and private spheres. 
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As such, by building a deterrninistic link between the political outcornes 
(rise of Islarnisrn) and the econornic and sociological variables (poverty, 
immigration, distributional failure, rnobilization ete.), the autonomy of the 
political sphere is not rnade an object of study. The negative consequences of 
employing this either 1 or logic in studies on Islamism are the restriction of 
political antagonism(s) to a certain cultural axis; developing a polarized 
perspective along the lines of friends and enemies of modernization; not 
focusingona democratic accornrnodation between "Islamic" and "secular" 
identities; and most importantly not using liberal political tools to confront 
Islamisrn from a dernocratic perspective. In the rneantime, the either 1 or 
picture prevents one from studying Islamisrn and modern secular politics in 
terms of their politics, for exarnple, in terms of their vision of state-society 
relationship. Dichotornic thinking, by focusing on the substances of each 
alternative, encourages one to emphasize the conflicting differences between 
the two alternatives, but not the sirnilarities, if there are any. 
Possible similarities between the two options cannot be discovered by 
emphasizing the modernity of Islarnisrn either. This is because, considering 
Islamism as an alternative modernizing movement that seeks progress and 
material development for the revitalization of Islamic civilization vis a vis 
the West, tells us little about the political aspects of Islamism. The important 
point here is that being a modernizing alternative does not necessarily mean 
being dernocratic and pluralist. 
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Since studying Islamism in terms of its modern or oppositional aspects does 
not explain the political aspects, this study suggests an alternative 
framework that focuses on the political sphere for studying both the rise and 
the substance of the alternative visian ofIslamismin terms of politics. 
Islamismin this dissertation is not studied in terms of Islam or in terms of 
modernity. Islamism, as notedin the first chapter, is not just an alternative 
modernizing movement, but it is also primarily a political movement about 
the fundamentals of society. Islamism should better be grasped on political 
grounds rather than in terms of the substance of Islam, of Muslim society or 
of its relationship to modernity. The political grounds for studying Islamism, 
or for that matter any other political movement, hinge on an analysis of 
Islamism's concept of the political, its definition of political community and 
its vision of state-society relations. 
Also, Islamism asa fundamentally political object of inquiry cannot be 
isolated from the analysis of the cantext within which it emerges. This is 
because, by studying the cantext we can see the similarities and differences 
of an Islami c movement from the regime it challenges and understand the 
alternative framework Islamism presents in relation to the dominant power 
relations in society. This could allow us to decipher what the Islamist 
opposition involves as far as the type of state-society relationship is 
concemed and how far it differs from the current practice. 
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Essentially, the approach which this dissertation adopts for studying 
Islamism on political grounds is analyzing its alternative mode of 
integration which determines the legitimate sphere of politics, possibilities 
of pluralism and the state-society relationship. This approach is based on the 
assumption that structuration of politics in any context is not about the 
substance that the structures promote, but about a political form, a grammar 
of politics or about a politicallogic that points at the way to achieve the 
substantive purpose. 
Thereby, the focus on political sphere and structuration(s) of politics enables 
us to avoid taking positions only in terms of substances of the political 
alternatives. This is im portant because Islamism is not just about 
Islamisation as Kemalism is not just about Westemization. The emphasis on 
the mode of integration and the concomitant structuration of politics, 
enables one to decipher the "grammatical" or "logical" similarities between 
two substantively different alternatives such as Westernizing Kemalism and 
Islamising National Outlook. If, in other words, democracy is about state-
society relationship which is an issue related to the structuration of politics, 
and if both alternatives share the same type of state-society relationship, 
then, for example, one could suggest that Islamİst movements are not anti-
systemic movements. But, if we fail to associate the system with democracy, 
neither being systemic nor being anti-systemic tells us much about the 
concern of this dissertation which inevitably problematizes the system 
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within which Islamism emerges. This is because, Islamism is problematized 
not in terms of its substance but in terms of its form or political logic and if 
in this respect there are convergences with the system it challenges, then one 
could not turn a blind eye to them. 
This study identifies two basic modes of social integration that give way to 
two different structurations of the sphere of politics and concepts of "the 
political," namely, liberal and republican modes of integration. Both liberal 
and republican models moralize common goods, but while the liberal 
common good is not substantive in the sense of promoting a certain life 
style, the republican common good is substantive. In both models, it is 
assumed that every member of society subscribes to the moral consensus. As 
for the concepts of "the political," liberalism, it is suggested, tends to empty 
political life of substantive argument by conceiving politics as the pursuit of 
self interest. However, the liberal model guarantees the protection of 
individual rights and liberties. Republicanism, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the common good of society which ideally is subject to 
democratic political deliberation by actively participating citizens. 
Nevertheless, republicanism runs a crucial risk of smothering politics by 
moralizing a given canception of substantive idea of common good that 
promotes a life style. This is because moralizatian is also depoliticization of 
what is good for the whole society. In this case, subscription to a moral 
consensus becomes a precondition of political activity. This is ariskof 
smothering politics which is called the republican trap. 
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In this dissertation, the distinction between a republican and liberal ideal is 
made in the light of a fundamental assumption that modern societies are 
culturally differentiated and plural as far as values are concemed. They, 
therefore, are held together not by some pre-existing common values, 
common culture or a moral consensus, but by the very activity of politics. 
Politics is defined as the debate over the nature of good life. In this way, 
political nature of a given "moral" consensus is introduced. Therefore, the 
possibility of political questioning and reexamination of a moral consensus 
is recognized. This recognition is conceived as a precondition of modern 
democracy whose difference from the ancient democracy "resides in the 
acceptance of pluralism [in the sense of] the end of a substantive idea of 
good life."1 Judged against this background, both Kemalism and Islamism of 
the National Outlook are located within a republican context. 
By locating Kemalism within the general context of republicanism, this 
study tries to show that Kemalism should not only be conceived as the 
ideology of a Westernizing state, but asa particular structuration of the 
Turkish political space in which the legitimate sphere of politics is restricted 
to proper administration; politics revolves around friends and enemies; and 
the source of legitimacy is not procedural but substantive, i.e. moral. The 
1 Chantal Mouffe, "Democracy, Power, and the 'Political"' in Democracy and 
Dıfference: Cantesting the Boundaries of the PoliticaL Seyla Benhabib, ed., 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 246 emphasis 
original. 
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most important reason for Kemalism's ability to structure the political 
sphere isa histarical fact: modern Turkish society is constituted through a 
Kemalist revolution. Similarly, the status of citizenship was granted to the 
former subjects of the Sultan by the Kemalist revolution. In other words, 
Kemalism was a republican mode of integration of society. As in 
republicanism, society, rights and liberties did precede the foundation of the 
Republic. 
Republicanism is influential in the structuration of politics as well. As in the 
republican mode of integration, modern Turkish society, too, was integrated 
around a substantive common good. It, therefore, had a "shared" vision of 
happiness and welfare anda "shared" purpose. As the collective idea of 
society, this shared vision was a source of legitimacy. Given the substantive 
nature of the collective idea, i.e. Westernisation that promoted a life style, it 
is suggested that moralizatian of politics by Kemalism has had restrictive 
consequences for conducting politics for a differentiated society. As in 
republicanism, what is good for the whole society is an objective 
phenomenon and is not subject to political deliberation. The task of the state 
was to bring about the good society. The legitimate sphere of politics is, 
therefore, structured for the reproduction and realization of the substantive 
principles of the collective idea that promotes a new way of life through 
secularism and education. 
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Since a substantive idea is inevitably questioned in a culturally differentiated 
society, politics is conceived by republicanism as an activity that has to be 
checked and balanced and even curbed by administrative mechanisms. A 
constant supervision of politics is also deemed to be necessary, for, in 
practice, the relations between rulers and the ruled is conceived, in a 
Platonic manner, asa relation between knowledgeable and ignorant. This is 
to protect people from deceitful politicians. It is true that the status of 
citizenship was granted to the former subjects of Sultan, but activity of 
citizenship was linked to the precondition of being rational first. Since 
Kemalist arrangements were portrayed as rational, being rational meant 
subscribing to Kemalist arrangements and questioning of them is equated 
with irrationality. Such an approach by "Republican" Kemalism is not really 
prone to an understanding of what Islarnisrn represents and expresses. It is, 
rather, prone to a portrayal of Islarnism asa force exploiting the religious 
feeling of people for selfish political purposes. 
In a polity where there are only friends and enemies of Kemalist morality, 
we lack the tools to decipher what the Islamİst alternative offers, apart from 
its opposition to Kemalist principle of secularism. This is because, mere 
opposition by utilizing a vague democratic discourse is enough to harvest 
votes. But when viewed from the alternative framework advanced in this 
study, the Islamism of the National Outlook Mavement is close to the 
regime it opposes ona basic aspect, i.e. its perspective of politics. It is in this 
political realm rather than in Islamic principles of the mavement that we can 
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search for answers to critica! questions regarding the nature of objectives, 
vision and in intellectual instruments of the movement. This dissertation 
takes a further step and locates the answers to these questions ina zone 
where Kemalist ideology meets the National Outlook Movement (NOM): the 
intellectual tradition and political praxis of republicanism. The cadres of the 
National Outlook Movement moralizes the National Outlook as the 
collective idea of society and aims to structure politics so as to protect it. For 
the NOM, too, society is integrated around a substantive idea of common 
good which proposes an Islamic way of life to be followed by the whole 
society. The National Outlook as the moral cansensus of the society is not 
subject to political reexamination, questioning and deliberation. This is 
because the NOM represents the absolute truth. It is a given for politics and 
for the people and those who do not subscribe to it are people with false 
consciousness. 
Therefore, the National Outlook Movement does not conceive society as 
pluralist, but rather, asa homogenous entity united around the idea of 
National Outlook. Although it depicts itself as the self-assertion of the 
society, given the differentiated nature of the society, the National Outlook 
Movement proposes an alternative social engineering project that will be 
carried out by a state who se main task is to ed ucate and socialize citizens 
along the republican political axiom. Thus, to correct the errors of Kemalist 
Westernization, the National Outlook repeats them. The final goal of the 
National Outlook is to bring about a pious and therefore virtuous society 
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that is inaccordance with the idea of the National Outlook. Its Islamism 
does not necessarily point to a return to Sl1aria rule, but to a redefinition of 
society as essentially a Muslim society. 
What is thus problematized in this study is not the contentof alternatives 
ideologies, i.e. Westernization and Islamisation, but the legitimate sphere of 
political activity that is granted by them. The idea of common good is indeed 
essential for politics, for politics is about the substantive purposes of the 
society. But attributing a moral status to a substantive idea of common good 
isitselfa hindrance to political activity, because it implies a process of social 
engineering to homogenize a culturally and politically differentiated society, 
a restriction in the legitimate sp here of politics and therefore, a foreclosure 
of the possibilities of the dynamic consensus of the society. Kemalism and 
Islamism, in this respect, resemble each other and belong to the same family 
of republicanism. 
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